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INTRODUCTION
The subject of Spanish Indian policies is an extra­
ordinarily intricate one, as perhaps inevitably follows from 
the complex nature of the forces from which they emerged.
The Spanish empire in America contained a large and diverse 
aboriginal population, which ran the gamut of cultural de­
velopment from the incredibly poor existence of the Indians 
of California to the fabulous civilization of the Aztecs in 
the Valley of Mexico. Their attitudes towards the Spanish 
conquerors varied from quick and eager alliance to undying 
hostility. The motives of the Spaniards in their dealings 
with the Indians were mixed and often conflicting. Deter­
mined to exploit to the fullest the wealth of their empire, 
they naturally seized upon the Indians as the instruments of 
that exploitation. This usually meant armed conquest and a 
kind of serfdom for the Indian population, with many concomi­
tant abuses. There was at the same time, however, a strong 
consciousness of the obligation of Spain to convert the Indi­
ans to the Christian faith and to bring them the rudiments
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of Spanish civilization. Converted Indians became vassals 
of the Crown, morally entitled to its protection. The Crown, 
acutely conscious of its moral responsibilities, made every 
effort to shape its Indian policies so as to avoid abuse of 
the natives by the Spanish colonials. There resulted con­
flicts between Crown principle and colonial practice, from 
which emerged compromises which became the foundation of 
unique and in some cases oddly practical Indian policies.
But still other forces than the complex Indian and Spanish 
factors joined the interplay. Further compromises were made 
under pressures from forces far removed from the Indian fron­
tiers— the strategic requirements of the Spanish Empire in 
the great power conflicts which marked the opening of the New 
World and the emergence of the modern European states.
The importance of the subject of Indian policy can 
hardly be exaggerated, for upon the degree of success or fail­
ure which Spain achieved in dealing with her varied Indian 
inhabitants depended the prosperity or even survival of the 
various parts of the empire. This study deals with the evo­
lution of a single, unique aspect of Spanish Indian policy; 
the relations with the indios barbaros on the northernmost 
frontier of New Spain in the eighteenth century. Much of the 
area considered lies within the present United States, and 
the tribes considered were the hostile Indians of its western 
frontier only a century ago. The study, then, has a dual pur­
pose: to explore a crucial aspect of the history of Spain's
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Northern Borderlands, and to emphasize a much-needed time 
perspective essential to historical analysis of the "Indian 
problem" of the western United States.
Consider briefly, then, the evolution of Spanish 
Indian policy on this continent. New Spain was founded upon 
that most basic resource of empire, a large, settled native 
population, already successfully exploiting the resources of 
the land. Initially attracted to the mainland in search of 
a supply of slave labor for their Caribbean island mines and 
plantations, the Spaniards found there a rich aboriginal em­
pire, seething with internal discontents, as ripe for con­
quest as it was attractive to fortune-hunters. Hernando 
Cortes, with a force of only five hundred fifty-three sol­
diers, allied himself with malcontented nations within the 
Aztec state, and those Indian allies conquered the Valley of 
Mexico for Spain. Once in control, Cortés was able to leave 
essentially unchanged the economic, political, and even so­
cial structure of the Aztec empire, simply substituting the 
Spaniards for the Aztecs in the ruling class.
It was a highly successful policy, and, with some 
elaborations, remained characteristic of Spanish procedure 
towards the native population wherever applicable. Succeed­
ing generations, somewhat more closely accountable to the 
Crown than the original adventurers, had to pay considerably 
more heed to their obligation to convert the natives to the 
Catholic faith, so the mission became an important instrument
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of Indian policy. As the search for mineral wealth led to 
the northward expansion of New Spain, the matter of the In­
dian population became more problematic, for there were in 
the north few settled Indians ripe for exploitation. There 
were, instead, wandering bands of wild Indians who fled to 
the hills and fought tenaciously for their freedom— not a 
resource for empire-building, but a formidable obstacle.
The Indian problem now became in large part a military one, 
and while the friars pressed on to "reduce” and convert the 
northern Indians, the mission had now to be accompanied, or 
even preceeded by, the presidio. As a noted viceroy later 
remarked of the northern frontier, "in this region the meth­
ods of the conquerors of Mexico are not applicable, except­
ing that of granting peace to the Indians and using them in 
their mutual destruction."^
Even while the Spaniards struggled to conquer the 
northern mining frontier, there came tales of "another Mexi­
co," much farther to the north. Soldiers of fortune lis­
tened avidly to rumors of mineral wealth far greater than 
the fabulous sums already found in Mexico; the Church friars 
listened no less eagerly to reports of a settled Indian vil­
lage population which seemed to them ripe for conversion.
The bitter failure of the Coronado expedition to New Mexico
^Bernardo de Galvez, Instructions for Governing the 
Interior Provinces of New Spain, l'/së. ed. by Donald Worces­
ter (Albuquerque, 1952), 39.
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(1540-1542) cooled general enthusiasm for the northward ad­
venture for some years, but the friars did not cease agitat­
ing for entry into the new missionary fields which had been 
discovered. By the end of the sixteenth century, secular 
interests regained enough optimism to try the New Mexican 
venture, and in 1598 Spanish settlement moved north to the 
upper Rio Grande valley.
New Mexico was then, and remained, the northernmost 
frontier of New Spain. It was perhaps also the most diffi­
cult of her frontiers, for it was indeed not "another Mexico." 
The settlers and soldiers did not find the mines they had 
hoped for, or even the wealthy population described in so 
many legends. Between their fruitless treasure hunts, the 
Spaniards turned to exploitation of the sedentary Pueblo 
Indians, exacting tribute in goods and in labor, and using 
them to help capture slaves from the surrounding "wild" 
tribes; but the colony was hardly a success in its secular 
aspects. The only Spaniards not grievously disappointed were 
the Franciscan missionaries entrusted with the conversion of 
the new province, for if the Pueblos did not eagerly await 
conversion, they at least offered a far more promising field 
than had the hostile wanderers of the mountains of northern 
Mexico. It is for these reasons that Prance V. Scholes states 
that "prior to 1680 New Mexico was not a colony in the real 
sense of the word, . . . The raison d'etre of the province
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was the missions, and the non-aboriginal population was there
pmostly to sustain and defend them."
Although the Pueblos proved to be a relatively easy 
conquest, the very existence of Spanish New Mexico was pre­
carious from its beginning. It was surrounded by hostile, 
wandering Indians, who never ceased to harass the province, 
and often maintained a state of virtual siege against it. 
These Indians were called by the Spaniards indios barbaros. 
Utes, Comanches, Apaches, Navajos, Wichitas, and more, they 
differed widely as to language, social organization, and 
ways of life. Some were totally nomadic, others relatively 
stable village dwellers. But their common characteristic 
was a consistent resistance to any acceptance of the Catholic 
faith which marched indivisibly with the forces of Spanish 
empire. The indios barbaros. then, were the stubbornly non- 
Christian Indians, who spurned adoption of the faith and 
with it the Spanish culture which so penetrated the lives of 
most of the Indians of New Spain. Their story/is quite dis­
tinct from that of any mission Indians, no matter how turbu­
lent. Even the Hopi, who were obstinately apostate from 1680 
onwards, were not classified by the Spaniards as barbaros, 
nor was such a bloody incident as the uprising in 1751 of 
the Pima mission Indians sufficient to relegate a once con­
verted peoples to the designation of barbaros.
2Prance V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in 
New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico Historical 
Review, X (April, 1935), 96.
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These indios barbaros. who successfully defied 
either conversion or conquest throughout the Spanish period, 
presented the most perplexing problem in Indian policy which 
Spain had to face. Solution was imperative, because the se­
curity of New Spain depended upon maintenance of the New 
Mexican frontier as a buffer against both French and English 
invasion and against the waves of barbarians who might en­
gulf the ndhth Mexican provinces and cause a general native 
uprising. The mission province necessarily became a mili­
tary province, responsible for a holding action while a so­
lution was evolved. And remarkably enough, a reasonably 
successful policy did emerge in the late eighteenth century, 
strangely compounded of the philosophy of the Crown concern­
ing the Indian inhabitants of the empire, the hard realities 
of frontier experience, and, inevitably, the emergencies 
chronic in the declining Spanish empire. This study traces 
the evolution of that policy.
The indios bârbaros moved upon the Spanish frontier 
from the north in successive waves. For this reason, each 
group was first dealt with by the northernmost Spanish out­
post, usually Santa Fe, although in the case of the Nations 
of the North, Texas was the first province to meet the prob­
lem. It seems desirable, therefore, to treat the problem 
largely from the New Mexican perspective. It was only when 
the Comanche invasions of New Mexico, and later of Texas,
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had pushed the Apaches to the south that the problem became 
acute in the lower tier of the Interior Provinces. Perhaps 
even more important to the shaping of policies, it was only 
when the New Mexicans established some control of the situa­
tion by achieving an alliance with the most formidable seg­
ment of the indios barbaros that the more southern provinces 
were able to formulate and execute any effective action in 
regard to the indios barbaros.
Historians of the Northern Borderlands have published 
many of the documents from the archives of Spain and Mexico 
which are fundamental to the history of the area. Much re­
liance has been made in this study upon the documents pub­
lished and edited by Herbert Eugene Bolton, Alfred Barnaby 
Thomas, Charles Wilson Hackett, Lawrence Kinnaird, Vito 
Alessio Robles, and others. But in spite of the existence of 
the published collections of documents and of various short 
period and regional studies which touch upon the problem of 
the indios barbaros. there has yet to be traced the evolution 
of the problem and of the solution reached by the Spaniards. 
This study is designed as a synthesis to meet that need, re­
lying upon both the published sources and research in origi­
nal documents to trace the story with as complete a continu­
ity as the nature of the sources will permit. It is submit­
ted in the hope that it will contribute yet another thread of 
continuity to the still-emerging history of the Northern Bor­
derlands of New Spain. It is also hoped that, by virtue of
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a deepening of time-perspectives, this synthesis may con­
tribute towards understanding of the nature of the "Indian 
problem" encountered by the United states on its trans- 
Mississippi frontier.
CHAPTER I
SPAIN MEETS THE INDIOS BÂRBAROS: RELATIONS WITH 
THE APACHES AND NAVAJOS TO 1715
The problem of the indios bârbaros in New Mexico was 
almost entirely an Apache problem in the seventeenth century. 
The term Apache refers not to any one tribal unit, but to a 
great many rather loosely organized, autonomous wandering 
bands of Athapascan Indians, bands which were apparently 
almost as readily shifting in composition as in locale.
There results a confusion in Apache nomenclature which made 
it difficult for Spanish colonials, as for historians today, 
to be entirely certain just which of the Apache groups they 
were dealing with at any given time. The confusion was com­
pounded in the early period by the practice of considering 
the distinctly separate Athapascan people, the Navajos, as 
"Apaches Navajoes," for early writers often shortened the 
term to Apache, when actually treating the Navajos,
The Apache bands were far-flung, from the western 
plains to the mountains of present New Mexico and Arizona, 
with cultures varying as widely as their environments. The 
term Vaquero Apache is a general one, covering the buffalo-
10
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hunting Apaches of eastern New Mexico and western Texas. 
Principal divisions among the Vaqueros were the Jicarillas, 
located north, northeast and east of Taos, in present New 
Mexico, Colorado and Kansas; the Mescaleros, ranging through 
east central New Mexico, Chihuahua, and Texas; the Paraones, 
a collective name for vagrant bands taking refuge * the 
Sandia Mountains in the eighteenth century; the Llaneros, who 
ranged the Llano Estacado of eastern New Mexico and western 
Texas, south into Goahuila. The Llaneros had three important 
subdivisions: the Llaneros proper, the Natagêes and the
Lipans, In the mountains southwest of the Rio Grande lived 
the various Chiracahua bands, including the Mimbrenos, 
Mogollones and Ojo Calientes. The Apaches of the White 
Mountains were usually called just that. Sierra Blancas, in 
the Spanish period, but were sometimes called Coyoteros. The 
term Gilenos, or Gila Apaches, which appears to have no spe­
cific ethnic significance, was casually applied to various 
peoples, usually Apache bands, who happened to live in the 
vicinity of the Gila River at different times,^
There occur in documents of the Spanish period other 
Apache designations which are difficult to equate with divi­
sions known in later times. The Carlanas, who lived between 
the Arkansas River and Taos at the beginning of the eighteenth
^Frederick Webb Hodge (ed.) in Pray Alonso de Bena­




century, and the Quartelejos who at that time lived beyond 
the Arkansas River in present eastern Colorado and western 
Kansas, were divisions which were driven from their ranges 
quite early in the eighteenth century by the Comanches. Pre­
sumably they appeared in the south under other names, per­
haps as remnants which were absorbed by Apache bands already 
there. At any rate, those designations simply disappear 
from Apache history. The same is true of the term "Paloma," 
which early disappeared in the scrambling of Apache popula­
tions before the Comanche onslaught. The Siete Rios Apaches 
were probably the Natagees, who inhabited that area of pre­
sent southeastern New Mexico through the larger part of the 
eighteenth century.
The Horse and Metals Revolutionize Apache Life
Apache hostility towards the Pueblos long antedated 
the Spanish colonization. The Apache bands had for many 
years supplemented their meager hunting and gathering econ­
omy by raiding the food supplies of the agricultural Pueb­
los, and their continual attacks may have been a major fac­
tor in the consolidation of the sedentary New Mexican In­
dians into garrison-like pueblos. The Spanish forces became 
embroiled in the long-standing enmity between the Apaches and 
Pueblos as soon as they established themselves in New Mexico, 
for as soon as mission life was imposed upon the Pueblos, 
they became vassals of the Crown, entitled to its protection.
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Moreover, the advent of the Spaniards greatly sharpened the 
old hostilities, for they brought to New Mexican village 
life the horse and metal goods. At once desirable to the 
Apaches, those imports not only provided an added incentive 
for raiding, but gave them a greatly increased advantage 
in warfare. Borrowing heavily from the Spanish techniques, 
the Apaches evolved the kind of guerrilla warfare which made
them for the next century the scourge of New Mexico and the
2western plains.
It is estimated that the Apaches began seriously to 
adopt the horse around 1630.^ As the earliest of the Plains 
Indians to acquire the horse, they enjoyed in the seventeenth 
century a great advantage over neighboring tribes in the 
southern and eastern plains borderlands. Not only did the 
horse increase the range of effective warfare for the A- 
paches; it also greatly facilitated buffalo hunting, thus 
stabilizing their food supplies. The food supply was fur­
ther improved because the horse, both as an improved instru­
ment for raiding and as a medium of exchange, made it pos­
sible to acquire by theft or trade much greater quantities 
of corn from the Pueblos.
2France V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in 
New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico Historical 
Review. X (April, 1935), 84.
^Francis Haines, "Where Did the Plains Indians Get 
Their Horses?" American Anthropologist. XL (January-March, 
1938), 113.
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Reorientation of Apache life around the horse re­
quired a constant and ever-increasing supply of that animal, 
and like other essentially non-sedentary Indians, the Apaches 
never became successful horse breeders. They relied instead 
upon the Spanish horse herds in New Mexico, which thus became 
the target for constant Apache raids. In addition, the 
Apaches acquired some horses, as well as corn, cloth and 
metal goods, through sporadic trading with the Pueblos and 
Spaniards.
Metal goods were second in importance only to horses 
in the new patterns of Apache warfare; saber blades to tip 
their lances; knives for close combat; metal bits and stir­
rups, for the horse gear copied from the Spaniards; steel for 
arrowheads. Par more difficult to steal than horses, these 
goods constituted a tremendous trade incentive to the Apaches. 
They had traditionally bartered meat and hides to the Pueblos 
for agricultural produce. But more valuable in their trade 
with the Spaniards were captives taken in warfare with rival 
tribes to the east. Themselves frequently raided by slave- 
hunting Spaniards, the Apaches very early went into the slave 
trade. Apache horsemen, with improved metal weapons, made 
serious inroads against the populous agricultural Caddoan 
bands to the east, and their far-flung slave-raiding greatly 
intensified and embittered warfare in the plains borderlands.^
'^Prank Raymond Secoy, Changing Military Patterns on 
the Great Plains (I7th Century through Early 19th Century) 
(Locust Valley, N.Y., 1955), 9-24.
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Spanish Relations with the Apaches 
in the Seventeenth Century
Spanish contacts with the Apaches date as far back 
as the Coronado expedition of 1540-1542, but serious diffi­
culties with them began only about 1600, when with the found­
ing of Spanish ranches in New Mexico, the Apaches began to 
turn to horse theft as an occupation. By 1608 there were 
reports of regular raids by the Apaches, who were attacking 
and burning pueblos, taking a serious toll of Indian lives, 
and threatening every Spanish horse herd in the province.^
The raids gradually increased in intensity as the horse grew 
in importance in Apache life and Apache war potential multi­
plied. By the 1650's the menace was grave throughout the 
province, and by 1658 the friars of the frontier pueblos 
reported that they and their charges were subject to constant 
Apache attacks.^
Loath to send an army to defend the unprofitable 
mission province, the Spanish government resorted to a system 
of encomiendas. obliging the encomenderos to participate 
with their own arms and horses in the defense of the reli­
gious personnel and their mission Indians. In times of
Donald E. Worcester, "The Beginnings of the Apache 
Menace in the Southwest," New Mexico Historical Review. XVI 
(January, 1941), 10.
^Father Juan de Brada, Petition, Convent of San 
Francisco, Mexico, September 26, 1658, in Historical Docu­
ments Relating to New Mexico. Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches 
thereto, to 1775 ed. by Charles Wilson Hackett. Ill (Washing­
ton, 1937), 110.
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particular emergency, the encomenderos customarily hired 
soldiers at their own expense, giving them horses and arms, 
in order to assemble effective defenses. The encomenderos 
received no pay for their services, except for the tribute
7which they levied annually from their encomiendas. In 
addition to leading the local militia and Indian auxiliaries 
in campaigns against the Apaches and Navajos, the encomen­
deros were called upon from time to time for special guard 
duty in such frontier areas as Taos, Jemez and Zuni.® The 
manpower resources upon which they could draw were severely 
limited; in 1639 it was estimated that there were in all of 
New Mexico only two hundred persons, Spaniards and mestizos, 
who were able to bear arms,^ Under these circumstances, the 
quality of the defense of the province left much to be de­
sired.
Unwise local administrative policies seem to have 
worsened the New Mexican situation too, though an acri­
monious dispute between church and state colors the documents 
of the seventeenth century to such an extent that it is 
possible to determine only tentatively what actually did 
occur. The friars charged that Luis de Rosas, governor of
7lbid.
QFrance V. Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 
1659-1670," New Mexico Historical Review. XII (October, 1937), 
389.
^Francisco Martinez de Baeza, Petition, Mexico, Feb­
ruary 12, 1639, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 
119-120.
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the province from 1637 to 1641, //as guilty of actions which 
provoked intensified hostility from the indios bârbaros. He 
was accused of warring quite unjustly against the "Utaoas," 
and of increasing Apache hostility by allowing treacherous 
attacks to be made against friendly Apaches while on an 
expedition to the plains of Quivira. His motive apparently 
was the seizure of captives to be sold in the slave-trade, in 
which he was personally interested. Having jeopardized the 
safety of the province by -his actions, he then refused 
either to prepare adequate defenses for the pueblos or to 
organize counterattacks after raids,
While the secular and religious leadership of Spanish 
New Mexico joined in a paralyzing feud, the troubles of the 
Pueblo Indians multiplied. In 1640 an epidemic among the 
Indians took a toll of three thousand persons, more than ten 
per cent of the total Pueblo population. The Apaches took 
advantage of the weakened condition of the Pueblos and the 
factional disputes of the Spaniards to raid the pueblo area, 
burning and pillaging, costing the Pueblos heavily in stored 
foodstuffs. Absorbed in the undignified church-state quarrel, 
the Spanish authorities afforded little of leadership or com­
fort to the Pueblos. Since the experience of the Pueblos 
was that the acceptance of the Christian faith carried with 
it an inescapable obligation to serve both the secular and
^^Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610- 
1650," New Mexico Historical Review. XI (October, 1936), 501.
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religious representatives of the new regime, they were dis­
gusted and demoralized by the unseemly wrangle. The sorely 
tried Pueblos returned increasingly to their old ways, find­
ing strength in the native religion and ceremonials. The 
notable con3ervatJ..sm of the Pueblos which persists into the 
twentieth century may stem from the strong Apache pressures 
and the default of the Spaniards in the 1640's, for up to 
that time the missions apparently had made reasonably effec­
tive progress toward conversion of the Pueblos to Catholi­
cism.^^
Throughout the 1640's the civil authorities further 
provoked the indios bârbaros by sending out expeditions to 
seize Apache and Navajo captives to be sold as slaves in the 
markets of New Spain. Pueblos were often forced to serve in 
the expeditions. Apache reprisals most often took the form 
of raids on the pueblos. Resentful of the troubles brought 
upon them by their masters, the Pueblos began to league them­
selves with the Apaches against the Spaniards. During the 
administration of Governor Fernando de Argiiello in 1640, the 
Jemez collaborated with the Apaches to kill a Spaniard. The 
administration of Governor Ugarte de la Concha saw a more 
general conspiracy of the Indians of Isleta, Alameda, San 
Felipe, Cochiti, and Jemez with some Apache groups. These 
abortive movements did little or no real damage, but they
^^Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610- 
1650,” ibid.. XII, 105, and XI, 324.
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were clesu* warnings that the Spaniards had become so obnoxi­
ous to both groups that they might at any moment, in spite
of their traditional enmity, unite to drive the Spaniards
12from New Mexico.
About 1660, the mounting need for a more effective 
defense against the Apaches on the lower Rio Grande, where 
they were especially active, led to the creation of two major 
subdivisions for administrative purposes; the Rio Arriba, 
commanded by the governor, and the Rio Abajo, commanded by 
the lieutenant g o v e r n o r . B u t  the mounting danger signals 
were largely ignored by the Spaniards, and the familiar pat­
terns were repeated with mounting intensity through the next 
decades: further Spanish raids to seize Apache and Navajo
boys and girls; increasingly destructive retaliatory attacks 
on the Pueblos by the Apaches and Navajos; increasing rest­
lessness among the Pueblos, At first the raids were against 
outlying pueblos like Zuni, Jemez and the Jumanos, but by the 
1670's and 1680's no portion of the province was safe from
Apache or Navajo marauders.
Although the hostilities grew ever more acute, trade
continued with both the Apaches and Navajos in the intervals
^^Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610- 
1650," ibid.. XII, 99, 106.
^^Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New 
Mexico," ibid.. X, 91.
^^Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico," ibid., 
XII, 144, 150.
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between raids. The eastern Apaches came to trade at fron­
tier pueblos, and were in turn visited by Spanish trading 
expeditions to the lower Pecos area or to the plains, Pecos 
pueblo had long been the scene of an informal annual fair, 
where Apaches exchanged buffalo hides, meat and tallow for 
cloth and maize. The Jumano pueblo east of Abo was the 
principal base for trade with the Apaches of the Siete Rios 
area. Here the Apaches disposed of the captives taken in 
war with enemies to the east. Thus, the Pueblos frequently 
acquired Plains Indian slaves, whom they traded to the set-
qctiers for horses and cattle.
The trade itself was fraught with danger for New 
Mexico, Spanish trading expeditions often took advantage of 
their presence in the Apache or Navajo country to seize cap­
tives for the slave trade. The meeting of Apaches and Pueb­
los for trade always held the possibility of friction which 
might set off a murderous encounter. It was to deal with 
the latter problem that the government of New Mexico in the 
1660's set the precedent for the eighteenth century practice 
of regulating the frontier trade and drawing tribal boundaries. 
The action was precipitated by an incident at the pueblo of 
Cuarac, when two Apaches of Los Siete Rios who had come to 
trade were thought to be hostile and were killed. The Siete 
Rios Apaches immediately prepared to attack the pueblo to
l^lbid,. 396-397,
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avenge the killing, but the governor dispatched a squadron 
of Spaniards and another of Pueblos to prevent the attack. 
After reaching a settlement with the aggrieved Siete Rios 
Apaches, the governor sought to ward off future incidents by- 
decreeing that no Apache or Navajo should pass beyond a 
stated line of frontier pueblos when coming to trade. The 
action was deemed necessary because it was usually quite 
impossible for the Pueblos to tell which Apaches were friend­
ly and which were not.^^
Drought sharpened the New Mexican crisis after 1666. 
Crop failures meant famine in the pueblos, as among the Ju-
manos, where more than four hundred and fifty starved to 
17death in 1668. The drought affected the Apaches* subsis­
tence too, causing them to redouble their pressures on the 
afflicted Pueblos. Petitions from religious and lay leaders 
alike brought reinforcements from New Spain late in 1667. 
Fresh men and arms were stationed at the frontier pueblos
which had been most seriously depopulated, and they managed
1_8to restrain the Apache attacks to some degree. But the 
famine worsened in 1670, a great plague carried off many 
people and cattle in 1671, and in 1672 the Apaches staged
^^Nicolâs de Aguilar, Mexico, Hearing of May 11, 
1663, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 143.
17Pray Juan Bernal in a letter to the Tribunal, Con­
vent of Santo Domingo, April 1, 1669, ibid.. 271-272.
T O Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Mexico, May 10, 
1679, ibid.. 297-298.
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a general offensive in which they virtually sacked the prov­
ince of all its cattle and sheep,
New Mexico had been composed of forty-six pueblos of 
Christian Indians, and the one Spanish town of Santa Pe, 
with scattered Spanish ranches along the banks of the Rio 
Grande. In the 1670's the Apaches forced the abandonment of 
seven of the forty-six pueblos: Hawaiku, in the province of
Zuni; the Tompiros pueblos of Abo, Jumanos and Tabira; the 
Tewa pueblos of Chilili, Tajique and Quarai, The region of
the salt lakes and the Manzano Mountains was totally lost to
20the Spaniards and Pueblos, With the abandonment of these 
key frontier areas began a gradual forced contraction of the 
Spanish frontier, which seemed to foreshadow the total loss 
of the province. Now, for the first time, the Apaches did 
not hesitate to attack even Santa Pe, The Custodian of New ' 
Mexico, Pray Prancisco de Ayeta, urged the Crown to save the
province by establishing at Santa Pe for ten years a presidio
21of fifty men as had already been done in Sinaloa, He tried 
to bolster his plea by arguing that the development of New 
Mexico would facilitate the opening of the "contiguous
l^Ibid,. 302.
20Pray Sylvestre Vêlez de Escalante to Reverend 
Pather Reader Pray Juan Agustln Morfi, Santa Pe, April 2,
1778, translated in The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 
compiled by Ralph Emerson Twitchell (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 
1914), II, 268-280,
^^Ayeta to the Ki%g, Mexico, May 28, 1679, in Histori­
cal Documents ed, by Hackett, III, 309.
24
Californias which the Crown has been eager to exploit.” But 
even if his arguments had won over the Crown, there was now 
no time to forestall disaster.
The situation exploded in 1680 with the Pueblo Revolt. 
The uprising was made in collusion with Apache groups, some 
of which harassed the Spaniards as they retreated from New 
Mexico.
The Pueblos maintained their freedom from the Spanish 
dominion for sixteen years, but it was a troubled period.
Once the Spaniards were driven from New Mexico, the indios 
barbares turned with renewed enthusiasm to attacks upon the 
Pueblos. The Apaches maintained good relations with some of 
the Pueblos, but against others inflicted as much damage as 
they could. Apache and/or Navajo pressure was so great west
of the Rio Grande that the Zunis were forced to consolidate
22their remaining five pueblos into just one. The Utes came 
from the north to war upon Jémez, Taos, Picuris and the Tewa 
pueblos, where they wrought considerable damage. In addi- 
tion, there were wars among the Pueblos. The great dis­
order and hardship experienced by the Pueblos after the ex­
pulsion of the Spaniards may have been a factor in the 
comparative ease of the reconguest, completed in 1696.
22Carlos de Sigüenza y Gôngora, The Mercuric Volante 
ed. by Irving Albert Leonard (Los Angeles| 1932), 68, 72, 75.
^^Escalante to Morfi, Santa Pe, April 3, 1778, in 
Spanish Archives. compiled by Twitchell, II, 268-280.
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Apache Wars Follow the Reconguest of New Mexico
The problem of the indios bârbaros loomed large in 
New Mexico from the very beginning of the reconquest.
Apaches harassed Governor Diego de Vargas’ first entrada. 
and throughout the struggle, recalcitrant Pueblos drew upon 
Navajo and Apache allies for support against the reoccupa­
tion f o r c e s , W h e n  the reconquest was ostensibly completed, 
the bârbaros endangered the peace of the province by their 
very presence, for dissidents among the Pueblos knew quite
well that they could turn to the Navajos and Apaches for aid
25any time they wished to repeat the revolt. And all the 
while, Apache raids were commonplace in the lives of New 
Mexican Spaniards and Pueblos alike.
It seemed, then, from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, that Apache hostility was an inescapable fact of 
New Mexican life, fortunately, the province was now better 
equipped to meet that problem. In accordance with new poli­
cies of the Crown in regard to its Indian subjects, the
encomienda system was not restored in New Mexico after the 
26reconquest. Instead, Santa Pe was given a regular présidial
^^Sigiienza y Gôngora, Mercurio Volante. 72, 74, 79.
25’’Segundo Gobierno de Vargas,” in Documentes para 
la Historia de Mè.iico. series 3, ed. by P. èarcia Figueroa 
(Mexico, 1853-1857), I, 187.
26J. Manuel Espinosa (ed.) in Pirst Expedition of 
Vargas into New Mexico. 1692 (Albuquerque, 1940), 38.
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garrison, which it retained throughout the Spanish period. 
Although it was still necessary to supplement the defenses 
of the province by drafting Spanish settlers and Indian 
auxiliaries to serve in campaigns of any size, the presence 
of a professional military corps was an incalculable asset 
to the governor in the formulation and execution of policy.
Crown policy now rigidly forbade offensive war
against any Indians, so any New Mexican action against the
P7bârbaros had to be justifiable in terms of defense. Fur­
thermore, practical considerations ruled out a general of­
fensive aimed at extermination or expulsion of the Apaches, 
for experience indicated that such an attack would result 
only in a general scattering of the Apaches and useless ex­
haustion of the men and supplies of the Spaniards. New 
Mexican policy in regard to the Apaches, shaped not only by 
the principles of the Crown but by harsh frontier realities, 
therefore assumed a dual aim: first, a holding action, to
limit Apache hostilities and prevent their destruction of the 
province; and ultimately, peaceful reduction of the Apaches,
The Spanish settlers themselves greatly aggravated 
the problem of Apache raiding, by carrying on a trade which
27Marqués de Valero, Viceroy of New Spain, to Don 
Antonio de Valverde Cosio, Governor of New Mexico, Mexico, 
July 29, 1719, in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, The Gover­
nor's Palace, Santa Pe, no. 188. Hereinafter cited as S.A. 
N.M. Don Francisco Fernandez de la Cueva Enrriquez, Viceroy 
of New Spain, to Governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdez, Mexico, 
July 30, 1706, S.A.N.M., no. 124.
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only increased the war incentives and prowess of the Apaches. 
As early as 1703, settlers from the Santa Pe region were
going to the Jicarilla Apaches, selling them horses and
28buying captives. The raids steadily mounted in intensity, . 
while the limited Spanish forces were still largely pre­
occupied with maintaining the precarious reduction of the 
Pueblos. Some small punitive expeditions against the Apaches 
were all that could be managed in defense of the province.
It was in one such abortive campaign against the Paraon
Apache in the Sandia Mountains east of Bernalillo that the
29leader of the reconquest. Governor de Vargas, died.
A flurry of alarm ran through the Spanish community 
at the turn of the year 1704-1705, when rumors came in from 
the Canada area of a conspiracy of Pueblos and bârbaros. 
Jicarilla Apaches, Navajos and Utes were conferring with 
Jémez, Santa Clara and other Pueblo nations at the pueblo of 
San Juan. Governor Juan Paez Hurtado promptly sent a contin­
gent of five soldiers from Santa Pe, under Captian Diego de 
Medina, to keep San Juan under control. The alliance uoon 
exploded when some Navajos annoyed the Santa Claras by steal­
ing a horse at that pueblo. Taken into custody, the Navajos 
admitted that they had made the alliance in the first place
^®Antonio de Aguiloa et al. Petition to the Cabildo, 
Santa Pe, November 26, 1703, ÏÏ7A.N.M., no. 91.
Segundo Gobierno de Vargas,” in Documentos para 
la Historia de Mejlco. ser. 3, I, 187.
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just because they wished to gain entry into the pueblos.
Times were hard then in the Navajo country, and the hungry 
Indians had hoped to find food in the Christian pueblos.
When Prancisco Cuervo y Valdes came as a^ interim 
governor, 1705-1707, he found the Pueblos under virtual siege 
by various Apache groups in such outlying locations as Zuni, 
Acoma, Laguna, Jémez, Pecos, Picuris, Taos, Santa Clara and 
La A l a m e d a . T h e  Apache raids were by now felt in a serious 
depletion of the resources of the province. Although the 
province was subject on all fronts to constant enemy inva­
sions, Cuervo reported that he could not launch a general 
defensive war because the presidials now lacked not only arms 
but horses. The settlers, who must be relied upon to furnish 
much of the numerical strength of any expedition, were also 
stripped of arms and horses; indeed, many of them were also 
grievously short of food. A council called by the viceroy 
to consider the problem of New Mexico consented to aid the 
beleaguered province with powder and ball, and recommended
32that reinforcements of thirty soldiers be sent to Santa Pe.
^^Expediente concerning a reported conspiracy of the 
Pueblos with the Apaches and Utes, Santa Pe, December 23, 
1704, to February 28, 1705, S.A.N.M., no. 104.
31Rael de Aguilar, Certification, Santa Pe, January 
10, 1706, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 367.
32The thirty men were to be transferred in groups of 
ten each from the presidios of Janos, Sonora and Sinaloa, for 
it was felt that the more southern frontier suffered far less 
from enemy attack than did New Mexico.
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The council gloomily noted that New Mexico was now costing
the Crown 77,500 pesos annually, in addition to any funds
33which the religious were able to draw into the province.
It is difficult to determine just how much Cuervo 
was able to accomplish with his reinforcements. His own 
reports are almost the only source of information, and they 
are all too clearly the work of the interim governor try­
ing to secure a permanent appointment by impressing his su­
periors. While it might have been difficult for him to ex­
aggerate the difficulties of New Mexico in his letters of
1705, subsequent events do not bear out his claims that his 
campaigns achieved a general peace with the Apaches and Nava­
jos in 1706.^4 Certainly he staged a number of campaigns,
beginning in April, 1705, when he mustered the settlers to
3 3punish Apache horse thieves. . His military efforts meant 
using on the offensive the squadrons customarily stationed 
to protect frontier pueblos in order to carry the war home 
to the Apaches. That policy aroused the opposition of the 
missionaries, who cried that their missions were being left 
defenseless during the governor's campaigns.
33Duke of Alburquerque, Junta, Mexico, February 28,
1706, S.A.N.M., no. 122.
^^Id.. Mexico, July 30, 1706, S.A.N.M., no 124. The 
efforts of Cuervo to obtain the governorship on a permanent 
basis failed, for the king had already given the appointment 
to the Marques de la Penuela.
^^Cuervo, Bando, Santa Fe, March 10, 1705, S.A.N.M.,
no. 110
^^Fray Juan Alvarez, Testimonio, Santa Fe, March 10, 
1705, S.A.N.M., no. 110.
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New Mexico Comes to Terms with the Nava.los
While the occasional retaliatory thrusts against 
Apache hide-aways might curb to some degree, they could 
hardly stop the raids of the numerous Apache groups. But 
the Navajos to the west afforded a somewhat better target 
for Spanish military operations, and it was with that hostile 
group that the Spaniards had their first success in the 
eighteenth century.
The Navajos had probably begun to practice agricul­
ture as early as the mid-sixteenth century, and were a con­
siderably more settled group than their Athapascan kinsmen, 
the Apaches, Their fields contained corn, beans, squash and 
chile, as did those of their Pueblo neighbors. In addition, 
they planted cotton and raised flocks of sheep, thus produc­
ing the fibers for the textile weaving for which they were 
37already noted. Per purposes of defense they built their 
houses away from the fields, atop the adjacent m e s a s , T h e  
numbers of the Navajos were considerably augmented during 
the period of the revolt and reconquest, when many Pueblo 
refugees settled among the N a v a j o s . T h e i r  population at
37Cuervo, Santa Pe, August 18, 1706, in Historical 
Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 382.
^®Willard W. Hill, "Some Navaho Culture Changes dur­
ing Two Centuries (with a translation of the early eighteenth 
century Eabal Manuscript)," in Essays in Historical Anthro­
pology of North America (Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collec- 
tions, C) (Washington, 1940), 397.
^%obert Neely Bellah, Apache Kinship Systems (Cam­
bridge, 1952), 10.
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the beginning of the eighteenth century was perhaps about 
four t h o u s a n d . T h e y  were known as a warlike people, who 
not only raided their Pueblo neighbors regularly, but also 
made annual slaving raids each February against the Pawnee 
and Wichita villages on the plains to the east.^^
Cuervo lost no time in acting against the Navajos. 
Within two weeks after he arrived in New Mexico he sent a 
company of soldiers in pursuit of two large Navajo parties 
which had been stealing horses from San Ildefonso, Santa 
Clara and San Juan, and he established the practice of send­
ing Pueblo forces with a token Spanish representation to 
punish Navajo raids on the P u e b l o s . I n  1706 the governor 
reported that the principal captain of the Navajos had asked 
for peace, expressing the willingness of the tribe to accept 
baptism and reduction to formal settlements. Already the 
tribe were trading on a peaceful basis with the Spaniards 
and Pueblos.
The Navajos broke the peace in 1708, with a series 
of murders and robberies, taking many captives in the course
^%ill, "Navaho Culture Changes," in Essays in His­
torical Anthropology. 396; "Apuntamientos que sobre el ter­
rene hizo el padre Juan Amando Niel," in Documentes para la 
Historia de Mejico. 109.
41lbid.
^^Captain Rael de Aguilar, Certification, Santa Pe, 
January 10, 1706, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, 
III, 367.
^^Cuervo, Santa Pe, August 18, 1706, ibid., 382.
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of the h o s t i l i t i e s . 44 Orders came from Mexico City to exer­
cise great caution in the future in admitting either the 
Navajo or Hopi groups to peace, lest they feign peace only 
to gain access to the settlements and p u e b l o s . 45
Throughout 1709 the Navajos stole livestock in New 
Mexico, making themselves particularly objectionable at San 
Ildefonso, San Juan and Santa C l a r a . 4& The Spaniards asked 
the Pueblos to pursue the thieves whenever possible', but the 
pursuit did little to diminish the robberies. The climax of 
the insults came when the Navajos sacked Jémez, destroying 
the church and desecrating its sacramental vessels.4? Then 
the governor, the Marqués de la Penuela, assembled the forces 
of the province, Pueblo as well as Spanish, and carried the 
offensive into the Navajo country.4® The result was the es­
tablishment of a new truce with the Navajos in 1710.4^
44»»Belaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Ano de 1707. Gobierno 
del Marqués de la Penuela y Almirante," in Documentes para 
la Historia de Mé.iico. ser. 3, I, 197.
45Duke of Alburquerque to the Marqués de la Penuela, 
Mexico, December 4, 1708, S.A.N.M., no. 152.
4^Marqués de la Penuela to Sargento Mayor Juan de 
Uribarri, Alcalde Mayor de Santa Cruz, Santa Pe, February 21, 
1709, 8.A.N.M., no. 154.
47"Belaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Ano de 1707. Gobierno 
del Marqués de la Penuela y Almirante,” in Documentes para
la Historia de Mè.iico. ser, 3, I, 197.
4®Marqués de la Penuela, Santa Pe, December 8, 1709, 
S.A.N.M., no. 154.
4^”Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Ano de 1707. Gobierno 
del Marqués de la Penuela y Almirante,” in Documentes para
la Historia de Mé.iico. ser. 3, I, 197.
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Old habita prevailed again, and by 1713 Navajo raid­
ing posed a serious problem in the pueblos of San Ildefonso
50and Santa Clara, In 1714, further robberies and the mur­
der of a Jémez chief caused the dispatch of a punitive expe-
51dition to the Navajo country. Like those which had pre- 
ceeded it, the action produced only the most temporary and 
limited objectives. Yet within a few years the Navajo hos­
tility toward the Spaniards did cease, so that by 1720 they 
were no longer reckoned among the enemies of New Mexico.
The change was due, not to any great success of Spanish arms, 
but to increasing inroads upon Navajo territory and property 
by the Utes and Comanches. Although they persisted in their 
refusal to receive missionaries, the Navajos remained until 
the late eighteenth century among the most consistently friend­
ly of the nations surrounding New Mexico. Their trade in
textiles, skins and baskets, and in their war captives, grew
53to major importance in the commerce of the province.
^®Juan Ygnacio Flores Mogollon, Santa Fe, May 13,
1713, S.A.N.M., no. 193; Autos and Junta de Guerra on thefts 
committed by the Navajo Apaches, Santa Fe, October 18-23,
1713, S.A.N.M., no. 199.
^^"Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Ano de 1707. Gobierno 
del Marques de la Penuela y Almirante,” in Documentes para la 
Historia de Mé.iico. ser. 3, I, 205.
52Donald E. Worcester, "The Navaho during the Spanish 
Regime in New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review. XXVI 
(April, 1951), 112.
53"Apuntamientos," in Documentes para la Historia de 
Mé.iico. ser. 3, I, 108.
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Apache Pressures on New Mexico Increase 
on All Frontiers except the North
Although Apache raids remained commonplace, the set­
tlers of New Mexico also managed to maintain a considerable 
trade with many Apache groups, left unsupervised, the trade 
itself produced friction which led to further hostilities, 
so the New Mexican government moved to prohibit trade in 
areas beyond its supervisory facilities. In 1712, there was 
circulated throughout the province an order prohibiting 
settlers from going to trade with the non-Christian Indians,
under penalty of two months imprisonment and loss of any
54office which the settler might hold. The latter provision 
suggests that local officials were among the principal of­
fenders ,
Apache raids were generally directed against fron­
tier pueblos, as of old, or against the scattered ranches of 
the Spaniards, with theft of livestock as their main objec­
tive, In practice, Spanish policy seems to have been to 
tolerate minor depredations by the Apaches until the toll in 
livestock, and sometimes in lives, became really important. 
When the governor felt that such a point had been reached, 
he set in motion the ponderous machinery of Spanish colonial 
government, A council of leading citizens, with particular 
representation for the areas most afflicted, was called to
^^Plores Mogollon, Santa Pe, December 16, 1712,
S.A.N.M., no. 185,
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consider the reports of damages and weigh those damages 
against the probable success of a punitive campaign. Most 
often the council decided in favor of a restricted campaign, 
realizing that the Apaches would neither be exterminated nor 
cowed enough to make a genuine peace, but hoping to deter 
raiders by reminding them that there drd exist Spanish forces 
responsible for protecting the ranches and pueblos.
Expeditions against the Apaches sometimes resulted
in the acquisition of captives, who were purchased by local
settlers, either for resale or for service as slaves. The
welfare of those captives was a matter of concern to the
government, for the conversion of souls was still a prime
official objective of the province, and it was decreed in
1714 that Apache slaves must be baptized just as were Negro 
55slaves.
The chief offenders in the second decade of the 
eighteenth century were the Paraon Apaches, who lived in the 
Sandia Mountains, and from there preyed upon Pueblos and 
Spaniards from Isleta to Pecos. In July, 1714, the Paraones 
had taken so many cattle and horses that a council decided 
punishment must be made. Governor Juan Ignacio Flores 
Mogollon, on recommendation of the council, decreed that a 
force of eighty men, equipped for a two-month expedition.
no. 212.
^^Id.. Decree, Santa Pe, September 26, 1714, S.A.N.M.,
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would leave Santa Fe presidio at the end of O c t o b e r . B u t  
through July, Faraon depredations were so serious in the 
Bernalillo-Alameda area that a second council recommended 
immediate punitive action. Flores Mogollon therefore ordered 
that thirty-six men leave the Santa Fe presidio on August 
15, to be joined by settlers from Albuquerque and Canada and
c?Indians from Taos, Pecos and the Queres pueblos. Appar­
ently the expeditions had some effect, for the Faraones sued 
for peace at Pecos and at Isleta, Soon, however, they took 
advantage of the peace granted them at Isleta to enter the 
settled area, and not only committed new robberies but kid­
napped a Spanish child before retreating to their mountain 
camps. A council deliberated through the summer, wanting to 
punish the outrages but helpless before the problems of es­
tablishing the identities of the offending Apaches and of 
finding their mountain hide-aways.^® The problem of defend­
ing the province was further complicated in 1715, when A- 
pache raids in the west forced the Spaniards to disperse 
their limited forces even more widely by sending a squadron 
of twenty-five men to protect the Zuni area.^^
^^Auto and Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, June 30-July 
6, 1714, S.A.N.M., no. 206.
c?Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, August 9-14, 1714, S.A. 
N.M., no. 209.
Junta de Guerra, Albuquerque, and Santa Fe, June 
16-September 14, 1715, S.A.N.M., no. 224.
cq^Flores Mogollon, Decree, Santa Fe, September 27, 
1715, S.A.N.M., no. 231b.
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The Spanish expeditions against the APaches relied 
heavily upon the use of Indian auxiliaries, chiefly Puehlos. 
But the secular authorities of New Mexico did not trust the 
Pueblos sufficiently to acquiesce in their possession of 
firearms. When the military group demanded that the Pueblos 
be forbidden to own firearms, the religious objected that it 
would be quite unfair to deprive them of the advantage of 
guns in a province surrounded by enemies, and that in any 
case, the resentment which such an action would create among 
the Pueblos would far outweigh any good it might do. But 
after hearing arguments from both sides, the governor de­
creed that firearms might be owned in the future only by 
specially designated, highly trusted individuals among the 
Christian I n d i a n s . I t  was, therefore, always necessary 
for the Crown to supply fresh arms from its own stores when 
Pueblo auxiliaries were called into action.
Although the general rule was that the Pueblos and 
Apaches were deeply hostile to each other, there were cer­
tain ties between specific groups which had to be considered 
with care in the selection of Indian auxiliary forces for any 
given campaign. Por instance, it was believed that Pecos 
pueblo should never be allowed to send warriors on a puni­
tive expedition against the Paraones, because many Paraones 
were actually Pecos Indians who had fled at the time of the
^^''Govierno del Marqués de la Penuela y Almirante," 
Documentes para la Historia de Mé.iico. ser. 3» I, 201.
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reduction of P e c o s . T h e  Queres, also, were considered 
bad risks because they might warn the enemy of the approach­
ing force, so they were watched with great caution by the 
Spaniards on the occasions when they were called into ser­
vice.
On the other hand, the Jicarilla Apaches had by 1714
come to Taos to make a genuine peace with the Spaniards,
and they became a major reliance of the Spaniards for action
62against the Paraon Apaches. Again, there arose in this 
instance, a peaceful relationship between the Spaniards and 
a hitherto hostile group, not because of any success of 
Spanish arms, but because this northern Apache group was 
first to feel the brunt of the Ute-Comanche thrust from the 
north. They necessarily turned to the Spaniards for pro­
tection, indicating their willingness to accept pueblo life 
and Christianization.
Don Geronimo, Testimony, Santa Pe, July 29, 1715, 
in After Coronado. Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexi­
co 1690-1727 ed. by Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman. 1935), 81,
r PIbid.; Auto and Junta de Guerra on the matter of 
war with the Apaches Paraones, Santa Pe, June 30-July 6, 
1714, S.A.N.M., no. 206.
CHAPTER II
THE COMANCHES OVERTURN THE BALANCE OP POWER 
ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1700-1762
Even while the Spaniards were largely preoccupied 
with their holding action against the Apaches and Navajos on 
the New Mexican frontier, there had occurred an important 
change in the native population. The emergence of newly 
powerful bands from the north posed a serious danger to the 
existence of the province, even though it drove into alliance 
with the Spaniards former enemies such as the Navajos and 
Jicarilla Apaches.
The new situation stemmed from the further spread of 
the use of the horse, with all of its revolutionary implica­
tions in Indian life. The first groups north of the Apaches 
which were affected by the diffusion were the Utes and the 
Comanches, who, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
suddenly threatened the very existence of both Apaches and 
New Mexicans.^
The Utes had been known to the Spaniards since the 
administration of Governor Juan de Onate at the beginning of
^Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 29.
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the seventeenth century as the impoverished and relatively
harmless inhabitants of the mountains north of the New Mexi-
2can settlements. They caused little or no trouble to the 
Spaniards in the period before 1680, but they began to harass 
the northern Pueblos during the period of the expulsion of 
the Spaniards.^ Probably horse theft was the prime motive 
for their raiding activities, for de Vargas makes the earli­
est report of the use of horses by the Utes in 1692 at the 
beginning of the reconquest. Certainly, the Ute demand for 
horses became insatiable, for they not only supplied their 
own needs, but were also the principal purveyors of horses 
to tribes still farther north. By 1704, the horse thefts 
of the Utes had become a real problem to the New Mexicans.^
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Utes 
were joined by a far more powerful group, the Comanches, and 
their combined activities seriously menaced the northern 
frontier. The Comanches, a Shoshonean people, migrated 
south from the mountains of present Wyoming, attracted in 
part by the Horses available in the New Mexico region, and 
in part, perhaps, impelled by Siouxan pressures from the 
north and east. The Comanches apparently established them­
selves among the Utes to such a degree that the two peoples
2"Apuntamientos," in Documentos para la Historia de 
Mejico. ser. 3, I, 102, 107.
3See above, page 23.
4Alfred Barnaby Thomas (ed.) in After Coronado. 26.
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were regarded almost as one by the Spaniards by the second
cdecade of the century.
The first record of combined hostilities by the 
Comanches and Utes is in 1706, when Juan de Ulibarri, in 
charge of an expedition to recover some Picuris fugitives 
from the Cuartelejo Apaches, found Taos pueblo and the north­
eastern Apache groups fearfully awaiting an expected attack 
from the new enemies.^ The Comanche-Ute alliance did strike 
against two Apache rancher las marking the beginning of an
onslaught which would drive the Apaches from the region with­
in a few years' time, Ulibarri found the Cuartelejos ab­
sorbed in a fierce enmity with the Pawnees and Wichitas, who 
were associating themselves with the French traders from 
Illinois and were beginning to receive guns from their new 
friends.® In short, Ulibarri brought back with him news not 
only of mounting danger from increasing numbers of indios 
bârbaros. but also of approaches to the province by European 
rivals who were dealing in guns for the Indians. The north­
ern and eastern Apaches, bearing the brunt of the attacks, 
were turning now to the Spaniards for aid. A sweeping
^"Gobierno de D, Felix Martinez," in Documentos para 
la Historia de Mè.iico. ser. 3, I, 106.
®Juan de Ulibarri, Diary, July 13-September 1, 1706, 




reappraisal, and perhaps reversal, of Spanish policy in re­
gard to certain of the indios bârbaros was clearly in order 
if the northern frontier were to be maintained.
New Mexico Paces the Ute-Comanche Menace 
Pirst in urgency, if not in importance, was the 
Comanche-Ute problem, for those groups now menaced every 
pueblo and settlement north of Santa Pe, During the admin­
istration of the Marqués de la Penuela (1707-1712), the 
Comanches and Utes solicited a formal peace with the Span­
iards and were granted it.^ But the peace was frequently 
used only as a cloak under which to enter the province in 
order to steal horses. Friction between the Utes and Pueblos 
was climaxed in 1714 by a serious incident at Taos pueblo, 
beginning with horse theft and ending in bloodshed, which 
threatened to bring about a general war. Governor Juan 
Ignacio Flores Mogollon managed to arrange restitution for 
damages and calmed both Utes and Taos enough to avert dis­
aster, but the situation continued to be very dangerous to 
the province,
Continual robberies and murders led to a council of 
war at Santa Pe in 1716, when it was decided to send an
^Christobal de la Serna, Opinion, in Council of War, 
Santa Pe, August 19, 1716, ibid,, 105,
^®"Gobierno del Marques de la Penuela,” in Documentos 
para la Historia de Mè.iico, ser, 5, 1 , 201.
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expedition against the Utes and C o m a n c h e s T h i s  council 
marks the beginning of serious consideration by the Spaniards 
of the possibility of an alliance with the Jicarilla and Si­
erra Blanca Apaches against their mutual enemies, the Utes 
and Comanches.
Captain Christobal Serna led the expedition which 
left Taos in 1716 with a force of fifty soldiers, twelve 
settlers and fifty Tewa Pueblos. They achieved enough suc­
cess to deter the Ute-Comanche depredations for a short
time. The Utes begged earnestly for peace, and were formally
1 Pgranted it in 1717 by Governor Félix Martinez.
Shortly thereafter, the Utes and Comanches reverted 
to their old habits, and by 1719 the robberies and murders 
had mounted to such a degree that a council of war called by 
Governor Antonio Valverde y Cosio concluded that the provo­
cations were quite sufficient to justify making war against 
the Utes.^^ Interestingly enough, while it was pointed out 
by many members of the council that the Comanches were at 
least as blameworthy as their Ute allies, the punishment
^^Council of war concerning an expedition against 
the Utes and Comanches, Santa Pe, July 2-October 15, 1716,
S.A.N.M., no. 279.
12"Gobierno de Don Félix Martinez," in Documentos 
para la Historia de Mé.iico. ser. 3, I, 107.
^^Testimonies which were made in the matter of the 
campaign against the Utes for their murders and thefts in 
New Mexico, called by Governor Valverde y Cosio, Santa Fe, 
August 11, 1719, 8.A.N.M., no. 301; Council of War, Santa 
Fe, August 19, 1719, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 100-110.
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seemed destined to fall entirely on the Utes, who were much 
easier to find and less dangerous to fight. Governor Val­
verde himself led the expedition, but both the Utes and 
Comanches eluded his force completely. He did encounter 
many Apaches who begged for aid against the Utes and Coman­
ches , and heard further reports of Apache warfare with Paw­
nees and Wichitas, and of more permanent French establish­
ments among those t r i b e s . B e f o r e  turning back to Santa 
Fe, Valverde promised the Apaches the protection of Spain 
against the Frenchmen.
French Intrusion Alarms the Spanish Frontier
Prevention of intrusion by the French into New Spain 
had been a prime consideration on the northern frontier 
since before the eighteenth century began. La Salle’s 
abortive attempt to establish a French colony in Texas in 
1684 alarmed the colonial authorities and brought a flurry 
of counter-activity in New Spain, The strategy devised for 
defense of the rich north Mexican mining regions was a de­
fensive expansion of the frontier to the north, in effect 
the creation of a buffer zone to protect the real wealth of 
the empire. This was a principal motive, not only in the 
reoccupation in force of New Mexico, but also in the first 
penetration of Spanish forces into Texas in 1689-1693, and 
in the founding of Los Adaes in east Texas in 1716.
^^Antonio de Valverde y Cosio, Diary, September 15- 
October 22, 1719, ibid.. 110-153.
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There were no further attempts to establish French 
colonies so near the Spanish frontier, but the wealth of 
New Spain was by no means forgotten by the French. More 
interested in commerce than in colonization anyway, they 
now made earnest efforts to establish trade with New Spain. 
Spain was firmly committed to a policy of commercial ex­
clusiveness throughout her empire, and the overtures were 
officially rejected, though some local officials did en­
courage and profit by illicit trade on the frontiers. 
Natchitoches, founded on the Louisiana frontier in 1713, 
was established by the French primarily to open trade with 
northern New Spain, and its founder, Louis Juchereau de St. 
Denis, had some success in dealing with the Spanish border 
officials, though he never gained the official trade sanc­
tion which he sought.
While the French dreams of a flourishing open com­
merce with New Spain were thwarted, they achieved a very 
practical success in an area quite beyond the control of 
Spain, and thereby menaced the very existence of her north­
ern frontier. From the early eighteenth century, French 
traders in the Mississippi Valley worked at the Indian 
trade on the Great Plains. The venture carried with it a 
considerable immediate profit, and the traders never ceased 
to hope that it would someday be an avenue for the opening 
of trade with Santa Fe. Santa Fe, in turn, might eventually
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be the key to commerce with the rich and inaccessible north-
15ern mining provinces of New Spain.
Active manifestations of the Pranco-Spanish rivalry 
for New World empire now were concentrated in the area of 
the Great Plains lying between the Spanish outposts of New 
Mexico and Texas, and the French establishments in Illinois 
and Louisiana. Since neither the French nor the Spanish 
had the population resources which would have been necessary 
for effective colonization in that vast region, the rivalry 
took the form of a struggle for control of the Indian popu­
lation. Indian policy became not only the instrument of 
defense, of trade, or of the missionary, but the very founda­
tion of empire.
There probably was no formal French decision to 
drive out the Apaches. But they needed to make alliances 
with the Caddoan bands whose villages were the keys to the 
Plains trade, and later to conciliate the increasingly 
powerful Comanches. The natural way to win their gratitude 
and confidence was to aid them against the Apaches whom they
15In 1702, the French governor of Louisiana proposed 
consolidation of the ”Panis” Wichita groups on the Arkan­
sas and establishment of a post among them, not only to 
facilitate trade, but by strengthening the French influence, 
to discourage Panis raids on New Mexico. Pierre Le Moyne 
d'Iberville, "Mémoire sur le pays du Mississippi, la Mobile 
et ses environs, leur rivières, les peuples qui habitent, 
sur le commerce qui s ’y pourra faire dans moins de cinq a 
six années, en établissant ce pays, 30 juin, 1702, à bord de 
la Renommée," in Découvertes et Etablissements des Français 
dans le Sud de l’Amerique Septentrionale ed. by Pierre Mar- 
gry (Paris, 184^), IV, 599.
47
hated, and such a course was by no means novel in the his­
tory of Prench-Indian relations.
The French succeeded in establishing amicable re­
lations with the principal Caddoan groups of the present 
Nebraska-Kansas-Oklahoma area, the various Pawnee and Wichi­
ta bands, and their villages became the key posts in the 
French trade. The remaining barrier to the west then was 
the hostile Comanche nation which blocked the path to Santa 
Fe and was the terror of the village Indians, By 1724 the 
French were influential enough on the Plains to sponsor a 
general peace meeting of Otoes, Osages, lowas, Kansas, Panis
Mahas, Missouris and Illinois with the Comanches at a Kansas
16village. In 1747 the French sponsored an alliance between 
the Comanches and the Wichita b a n d s , T h e  French-Indian 
trade flourished, the road to New Mexico was open, and French 
traders with Comanche escorts knocked on the doors of Taos 
and Santa Fe,
^^Etienne Veniard de Bourgmont, Relation du Voyage 
de la Riviere Missouri, sur le Haut de Celle des Arkansas et 
du Missouri aux Padoucas, June 25, 1724, November 1, 1724, 
ibid,. 312 ff.
17Autos fhos sre averiguar que rumbo han ttraido 
trres franzeses que llegaron al Pueblo de taos con la Nazn 
Cumanche q benian a hazer sus acostumbrados regattes, and 
Testimonio de los Autos fhos a Consulta del Govor del nuebo 
Mexco sobre haver llegado dos franzeses cargados de efectos 
que conduzian de la Nueba Orleans, Archivo General y Pûblica 
de la Nacion (Mexico City), Provincias Internas, Tomo XXIV 
[William Edward Dunn Transcripts, Library of the University 
of Texas], Hereinafter cited as Autos de los Franceses,
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Local officials in Santa Fe naturally reacted in 
terms of meeting an immediate danger to the existence of 
their province. But they were subordinate to the policy 
makers at the viceregal court and in the Council of the 
Indies, who had to deal with the French threat in terms not 
only of the entire frontier, but also of the prevailing 
foreign policies of Spain.
Although Bourbons ruled in both Spain and France 
after 1700, the two countries were twice at war with each 
other in the early part of the century; from 1716 to 1720, 
followed by a period from 1721-1725 when Spain and France 
were formally allied; and from 1727 to 1729, when France and 
England were allied against Spain. In 1733 there was formed 
the first Family Compact between Prance and Spain. Follow­
ing this alliance with France, Spain then remained almost 
constantly at war, being involved in the War of the Polish 
Succession (1733-1738), the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-1741), 
and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). During 
the periods of war with France, the possibility of invasion 
of New Spain from the neighboring possessions of France had 
constantly to be considered by the colonial government. Per­
haps even more difficult were the periods in which France and 
Spain were formally allied in Europe, for the French colo­
nials never ceased their attempts to achieve at least a 
commercial penetration of New Spain. Convinced that the 
survival of New Spain depended upon the entire exclusion of
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the French from the viceroyalty, the policy makers had nev­
ertheless to exercise utmost care to give no overt offense 
to their nominal allies. One tragic factor was constant and 
ultimately overwhelming; the constant wars of Spain in 
Europe, while exposing her colonies to possible attack from 
every power on the continent, so drained Spanish resources 
that the forces which might once have defended the vast 
empire dwindled at last to pitiful inadequacy. Meanwhile, 
faced with the responsibility of maintaining an empire al­
ready extended far beyond the defensive capabilities of the 
mother country, the government could devise only one de­
fense: further expansion.
Texas Is Occupied as a Buffer 
against French Expansion
One move against the French was the reoccupation in 
force of the eastern Texas settlements which had been tem­
porarily abandoned in 1719 during the brief war of Spain and 
France. The Marqués de Aguayo led an expedition in 1721 
which reoccupied the area of eastern Texas, re-establishing 
the six missions and the presidio of Dolores, and establish­
ing at Los Adaes a presidio of one hundred men. This was 
the capital of the province.
While the prime objective of the reoccupation was to 
prevent total French ascendancy among the populous sedentary 
Indians of east Texas, the province soon became another front 
in the struggle with the indios b&rbaros. In the period
50
1722-1727, the hostilities of the Apaches against the San 
Antonio area increased markedly, although they were offi­
cially at peace with the province of Texas. This probably 
reflected the growing pressures of the Comanche and Caddoan 
groups which were steadily pushing the Apaches southward.
The first formal campaign of the Spaniards from San Antonio
nowas made in 1725, but the forces of Texas were too small 
to be at all effective against the scattered Apaches. In 
answer to appeals for assistance, the viceroy only urged 
upon Governor Fernando Pérez de Almazan the use of reason 
and kindness to control the Apaches, a policy which proved 
wholly impracticable.^^ Unfortunately, the Texans were not 
only denied the reinforcements which they requested, but the 
defenses of the province were weakened by Visitador Pedro de 
Rivera, who reduced the présidial garrison of San Antonio by 
ten men. Rivera considered the Apaches in the hills around 
San Antonio, then not very numerous, to be no real danger 
except to the horse herds. If all the soldiers of the pre­
sidio had to do was to punish the occasional horse thief,
Rivera was unwilling to spend the king’s funds to support a
20very strong garrison in Texas. Unfortunately, the penny-
1 QHerbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eight­
eenth Century (Berkeley, 1915), 27.
^^Pray Juan Augustin Morfi, History of Texas. 1675- 
1^79 ed. by Carlos Eduardo Castaneda (Albuquerque, 1935), 11,
^^Pedro de la Rivera, "Informe y Proyecto" in Diario 
y Berrotero de lo Caminado. Visto y Observado en la Visita
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wise policy of Rivera left Texas quite unprepared to face a 
greatly aggravated Apache problem in the succeeding decade.
There began in the 1720's some effort to coordinate 
the Indian policies in New Mexico and Texas, Even while 
Aguayo prepared his expedition for the reoccupation of Texas, 
the fiscal recommended that he be informed that the Apaches 
had come to solicit Spanish allegiance throughout New Mexi­
co. Aguayo was ordered to strive for such a settlement with
21the Apaches in Texas.
Apache outrages in Texas in 1731 were so bad that a 
formal campaign was undertaken against them in 1732 at the 
order of the Marqués de Casa Puerte, then serving as Viceroy 
of New Spain. It is interesting to note that Casa Puerte 
acted on the recommendation of Rivera in ordering the cam­
paign, although Rivera had depreciated the dangers of the 
Apaches in Texas at the time of his general inspection. The
expedition found and defeated a large Apache camp. The
22Apaches sued for peace, which they promptly violated.
The Apache depredations in Texas continued until 
1749, when the Apaches again asked for peace. They then
c|ue hizo a los Presidios de la Nueva Espana Septentrional 
el Brigadier Pedro de Rivera ed, by Vito Alessio-Robles 
{Mexico, 194é), 168,
21Juan de Olivan Revolledo to Marqués de Casa Puerte, 
Mexico, April 10, 1724, in After Coronado ed, by Thomas, 
192-193.
22Morfi, History of Texas, II, 280-281,
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almost ceased hostilities in Texas during 1749 and 1750.
The Lipans still felt friendly enough in 1750 to inform San 
Antonio that the Natagees were preparing for the warpath, 
and while the warning came too late to save the life of the
missionary at the Rio Grande presidio, it did help to avert
serious losses along the rest of that frontier sector.
New Mexico Meets the French Intruders
Santa Fe very early felt the repercussions of the
new situation on the plains to the east. First rumors of 
French intrusion came in 1695, when Apaches trading at the 
pueblo of Picurîs reported that many Frenchmen were coming 
to the Plain of Cibola, The Apaches claimed that they were 
being attacked so constantly by the French that they were 
being forced to retreat closer to the P u e b l o s , I n  1700, 
there came to Santa Fe rumors that a French force had at­
tacked and destroyed a village of Jumanos on the eastern 
26plains. Confirmation of French activities among the 
Plains Indians came with the reports of the Ulibarri expe­
dition of 1706 and the Valverde expedition of 1719.^^
Z^lbid.. 308-309.
^^Luis Granillo to Governor Diego de Vargas, Santa 
Fe, September 29, 1695, in Frederick Webb Hodge, "French 
Intrusion toward New Mexico in 1695,” New Mexico Historical 
Review. IV (January, 1929), 73,
^^Twitchell, Spanish Archives. II, 189,
^^See above, 41, 44,
53
The reaction in Santa Fe, like that in Mexico City, 
was akin to panic. Drilled in the long-standing policy of 
commercial exclusiveness, themselves lacking the French com­
mercial genius, and terrified at the thought of guns in the 
hands of new waves of indios hârbaros, the New Mexican Span­
iards could give no credence to the notion that the French
actually were trying to halt raiding activities against New 
27Mexico. Indeed, they contended that the devil himself was 
at work against them on the French frontier. The theory was 
bruited about that the French traders were Huguenots rather 
than good French Catholics and were therefore not to be en­
trusted with the welfare of the souls of any Indian popula- 
28tion. So missionary zeal was enlisted to support the op­
position to the French encroachments. The Marques de Valero, 
in his capacity as viceroy, urged the duty of the mission­
aries to aid in "subjugating and entertaining" the Apaches
2Qin order to use them against the French.
Valverde*s reports of French hostilities against the 
Cuartelejo Apaches, in alliance with the Pawnees and Wichitas,
27An example of the sincerity of the French in this 
matter is that Fabry de la Bruyere’s official errand for the 
governor of Louisiana on his expedition in 1741 was to ex­
hort the Osages, Panis and Comanches to quit attacking New 
Mexico. Jean Baptiste Le Moyne Bienville et Salmon, Lettre, 
New Orleans, April 30, 1741, in Découvertes ed. by Margry,
VI, 468.
pQ "Apuntamientos," in Documentes para la Historia de 
Méjico. ser. 3, I, 108-109.
^%arques de Valero, Order, Mexico, August 1, 1719* 
in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 138-139.
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added to news that France and Spain were now at war in Europe, 
brought action from the viceroy. To obstruct the French ap­
proach to New Mexico, in 1720 the viceroy ordered Valverde to 
establish a presidio at El Cuartelejo. The garrison was to 
be made up of twenty-five of the best soldiers from the Santa 
Fe presidio, married men who were to take their families with 
them to the new post for a permanent assignment. Several 
missionaries were to work there for the conversion of the 
Apaches, and a perpetual alliance was to be formed with the 
Apaches for the protection of the frontier. "In view of the 
fact that these Indians are so widely dispersed that they ex­
tend as far as the Texas and the Mississippi River, we can 
make use of their assistance in those parts for defense and 
for impeding the ingress of the F r e n c h . T h i s  order, cou­
pled with those to Aguayo in Texas, shows the idea of alli­
ance with the Apaches to be well accepted in Mexico City in 
1720 as one possible answer to the pressures on the north.
Valverde protested the order, and called a council 
of experienced New Mexican leaders, who testified in support 
of his a r g u m e n t s . E l  Cuartelejo was one hundred thirty 
leagues to the northeast, at such an exposed location that
^^Junta de Guerra, Mexico, January 2, 1720, in Pi­
chardo* s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas ed. 
by Charles Wilson Hackett (Austin, 1934), III, 204-205.
^^Valverde to Valero, Santa Fe, May 27, 1720, in 
After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 154-156; Council of War, Santa 
Fe, June 2, 1720, ibid.. 156-160; Valverde to Valero, Santa 
Fe, June 15, 1720, ibid.. 160-162.
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only an extraordinarily large garrison could hope to sur­
vive. To supply it at that distance from New Mexico was 
impractical, and the site was so poor that it could not 
possibly furnish the total subsistence for the proposed mis­
sion and presidio. Valverde and the council urged that in­
stead the presidio be established at La Jicarilla, only 
forty leagues northeast of Santa Pe, where the Apache popu­
lation had for some time been very well inclined toward 
Christianity. A presidio among the Jicarilla could serve 
not only to counter the French activities, but also to pro­
tect the sorely pressed Jicarillas from the Utes and Coman­
ches, and from the Paraon Apaches.
The New Mexicans won their point. On the advice of 
his council, the viceroy ordered Valverde to establish the 
presidio at La Jicarilla, There he was to provide for the 
conversion of the Jicarillas and establish a "perpetual al­
liance" with them.^^
Meanwhile, the Spanish forces in New Mexico suffered 
a devastating loss. In 1720, Valverde sent his lieutenant, 
Pedro de Villasur, with a reconnaissance group to determine 
the location of the French establishment. Near present North 
Platte, Nebraska, the force was almost wiped out by a group 
of Pawnees and Frenchmen. Only a dozen Spanish survivors 
made their way back to El Cuartelejo to be succored by the
^^Valero, Order, Mexico, September 26, 1720, ibid.,
234-239.
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Apaches, The fiasco cost New Mexico a third of its best 
soldiers, leaving it open not only to French invasion, but 
an easy mark for the Utes, Comanches and Faraones, who lost 
no opportunity to prey on the frontiers.
Mexico City found even more grave implications in 
the Villasur disaster. The war with France was already 
over, ended by the Treaty of the Hague in February, 1720.
The French attack upon Villasur's force amounted to an out­
right violation of the truce, and might therefore portend a 
general renewal of hostilities between the two countries.
In a flurry of alarm, the viceroy planned to send immediate 
reinforcements to New Mexico and ordered the prompt estab­
lishment of the projected presidio at La J i c a r i l l a .
Valverde protested that after losing thirty-two pre- 
sidials in the Villasur action, he could hardly spare twenty- 
five men for the founding of La Jicarilla presidio. He 
insisted, too, that it would be suicidal to send only twenty- 
five men to an isolated outpost among the Apaches, who could 
assemble two or three thousand warriors against them in a 
few days' time if they should ever turn against the 8pan- 
iards. The council in Mexico City authorized Valverde to
^^Valverde to Valero, Santa Fe, October 8, 1720, 
ibid.. 162-167.
^^Master Sainz to Valero, Mexico, November 4, 1720, 
ibid.. 167-169.
% cValverde to the Viceroy, Santa Fe, February 3,
1721, in Pichardo's Treatise ed. by Hackett, III, 215.
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increase the number of soldiers for La Jicarilla to fifty, 
recruiting them wherever he could. It further ordered that 
the soldiers be supplied with provisions in advance of the
. u. 36winter season.
But of course there were in New Mexico neither the 
potential recruits nor the supplies with which to implement 
the order of the council. Valverde turned his attention in­
stead to mustering the forces of the province for a campaign 
against the Apaches (probably in this instance the Faraones) 
in the hope that vigorous punishment might make them regret 
their "continuous insults and robberies on the frontiers and 
population of the province." All settlers, as good vassals
of the king, were called upon to present themselves with
37their arms and horses, to carry out the campaign.
Officials in Mexico City ceased to pursue the matter 
of the Jicarilla presidio after June, 1721, when Spain made 
an alliance with France. Action in New Mexico was paralyzed 
by a public outcry for a scapegoat for the Villasur fiasco, 
which led first to Valverde's dismissal from the governor­
ship, then to an investigation by the Visitor General, Pedro 
de Rivera, which ultimately resulted in a verdict of crim­
inal negligence and fines totaling two hundred pesos.
^^Junta de Guerra, Mexico, July 14, 1721, ibid..
218-219.
^^Valverde, Bando, Santa Fe, August 9, 1721, S.A.N.M.,
no. 313.
5®Revolledo to Casa Fuerte, Mexico, May 29, 1727, in 
After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 241-244.
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But the northern Apaches did not so easily forget 
the presidio project, for to them it now seemed to be the 
only chance of survival. Late in 1723, Captain Carlana led 
an Apache delegation to Santa Pe to appeal for protection 
against the Comanches. They offered to obey the Spanish 
king, to accept baptism, and to settle at La Jicarilla in
3qpueblos like those of the Christian Indians of New Mexico. 
Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante suspended a projected 
campaign against the Faraones in order to call a council to 
consider the new Jicarilla appeal. The council, concurring 
with Bustamante, thought the opportunity too good to permit 
delay. They hoped that the example of the Jicarillas might 
influence others of the Apaches to become settled Christian 
vassals of the king, and regarded the Apache settlements as 
valuable buffers against the French advance. Therefore, the 
council recommended that Bustamante proceed at once to La 
Jicarilla with fifty soldiers to establish the proposed pue­
blo.4°
The expedition convinced Bustamante of the sincerity 
of the Jicarillas and of the desirability of a presidio in 
their location. He promised the protection of Spanish arms, 
and tools to cultivate the soil. Upon his return to Santa
^^Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Decree, Santa Fe, No­
vember 8, 1723, ibid.. 193-195.
^^Council of War, Santa Fe, November 9» 1723, ibid..
195-197.
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Pe, he urged the viceroy to sanction the request of the 
A p a c h e s . C a s a  Puerte ordered the governor to keep the Ji­
carillas happy while the proper authorities in Mexico City 
deliberated upon a course of action. Unfortunately, while 
policy was debated at the viceregal level, the Comanche pres­
sures on the Jicarillas grew even worse.
A council of New Mexicans called in February, 1724, 
considered the reports of Comanche attacks on a Jicarilla 
rancherla. They had to decide whether the newly professed 
Christians of La Jicarilla should be considered vassals of 
the king, and therefore entitled to the protection of his 
arms. The council saw a clear obligation to defend the Ji­
carillas, and decided in favor of war on the Comanches.
A force dispatched from Santa Pe restored sixty-four Jicari­
llas to the band, thus winning their strong gratitude to the 
Spaniards. But since the presidio had yet to materialize, 
the frightened Jicarillas seriously considered moving to the 
Navajo c o u n t r y . I t  was generally realized, not only in 
Santa Pe but also in Mexico City, that this would result in 
the loss of a valuable buffer against the French, and might
^^Bustamante to Casa Puerte, Santa Pe, January 10, 
1724, ibid.. 201-205.
"̂ Îd. to Id., Santa Pe, May 50, 1724, ibid.. 208.
^^Junta de Guerra, Santa Pe, February 1-February 11, 
1724, S.A.N.M., no. 524.
^^Bustamante to Casa Puerte, Santa Pe, May 50, 1724, 
in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 208-209.
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also mean the loss forever of the opportunity to Christian­
ize the Jicarillas, The fiscal proposed that the Jicarillas 
be held in New Mexico by the gift of lands upon which to
settle near the pueblos, along with subsistence for the first 
45two years. Unfortunately, the viceroy decided at this 
point to refer the entire matter to Visitor General Rivera, 
who was then preparing to undertake a general tour of in­
spection of the entire northern frontier.
This meant, in the first place, a long delay, for it 
was not until June, 1726, that Rivera reached Santa Fe. Ri­
vera's opinion was that the Jicarillas were not sincere in 
their professed desire for baptism, but feigned it only to 
obtain protection from the Comanches. Recognizing that they 
must flee, and that they could turn only to New Mexico, he 
endorsed the suggestion that the Jicarillas be assisted to 
relocate in the vicinity of Taos. But he strongly recommend­
ed against the establishment of a presidio at La Jicarilla, 
arguing that it would only mean a useless expense for the
expansion of a province whose resources were too sparse even 
to make the most of its present e x t e n t . H i s  recommenda­
tions were accepted in Mexico City, and as a result, New
^^Fiscal to Casa Puerte, Mexico, October 20, 1724, 
ibid., 209.
^^Casa Puerte, Order, Mexico, October 21, 1724, 
ibid.. 209.
^"^Pedro de Rivera to Casa Puerte, Presidio del Paso 
del Norte, September 26, 1727, ibid.. 209-217.
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Mexico lost a valuable buffer to the north. Some of the 
Jicarillas settled in the vicinities of Taos and Pecos, 
others dispersed to unknown locations. The Comanches took 
over the region of La Jicarilla, and for more than fifty 
years the New Mexicans found them dangerous neighbors indeed.
Inspection by Rivera Checks Expansion 
of the Frontier
The Rivera expedition is a landmark in the history 
of the northern frontier. The Marqués de Casa Puerte had 
held the office of viceroy for only a short time when he 
realized that the remote northern frontier was in a state 
of serious deterioration. Vast sums were being spent on 
the maintenance of garrisons at various presidios, but his 
office was constantly besieged with reports of impending dis­
aster and appeals for further reinforcement. The new crises 
now arising, in the matters of foreign threats and shifting 
Indian alignments, clearly required a reappraisal of poli­
cies and procedures on the frontier. A personal visit by 
the viceroy to the remote interior provinces was totally im­
practicable, and it was highly unlikely that truly objective 
evaluations could be obtained from the frontier officials 
themselves. Therefore, in May, 1723, Casa Puerte asked the 
permission of the king to investigate conditions in the re­
mote frontier outposts and to reform their administration.
"^®Thomas (ed.), ibid.. 45-46.
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The request was authorized by the king in February, 1723, 
and Casa Puerte selected as his inspector general Brigadier 
General Pedro de Rivera y Villalon. Then serving as governor 
of Tlaxcala, Rivera was a veteran of thirty-four years' army 
service and an experienced administrator. After receiving 
the new appointment in July, 1724, he wound up his affairs 
in Tlaxcala and then went to Mexico City to receive his in­
structions from the viceroy. He left the capital on Novem­
ber 21, 1724, on a journey which lasted three years and 
seven months and covered some 3,082 Spanish leagues,
An unfortunate aspect of the Rivera visita, as noted 
above in the case of the proposed presidio at La Jicarilla, 
was that it caused something of a hiatus in policy on the 
northern frontier during a period of grave crisis. The 
journey itself took almost four years, and the deliberations 
of viceroy and council on Rivera's reports and recommenda­
tions took still more time. As a result, Casa Puerte's 
reglamento. based upon Rivera's recommendations regarding 
the presidios, was not issued until 1729. In the interval 
there was a tendency in Mexico City to postpone decisions 
concerning the north until the results of the general in­
spection were received.
4.0Rivera, Diario y Berrotero. 25-26; Lawrence G. 
Wroth, "The Frontier Presidios of New Spain: Books, Maps,
and a Selection of Manuscripts Relating to the Rivera Expe­
dition of 1724-1729," The Papers of the Bibliographical 
Society of America. XLill (New York, 195l), 191-194.
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It was not until 1726 that Rivera made his visit to 
New Mexico. On the way from El Paso to Islets the party en­
countered no one, but Rivera repeatedly commented in his 
diary on the ruins of abandoned pueblos and ranches which 
they passed. On June 1 he reached the pueblo of Islets, and 
a little further north the village of Albuquerque, whose 
population was largely dispersed on ranches. Proceeding 
further north the next day, he was met just above Santa 
Domingo pueblo by Governor Bustamante with a welcoming party. 
Bustamante had been informed five days earlier of Rivera’s 
approach by the Paraon Apaches, who had seen Rivera's de­
parture from El Paso on May 20 and had watched him, quite 
without his knowledge, throughout the journey.
Rivera remained in Santa Pe from June 4 to August
24, making his visita and completing reports to send back to
Mexico City. Meanwhile, between July 6 and August 5, the
engineer of the expedition, Francisco Barreiro, was engaged
SIin mapping the province. The Barreiro maps, which consti­
tute a major contribution to the cartographical development 
of the west, are perhaps the most lasting results of the 
Eivera inspection.
Rivera created considerable consternation in Santa 
Pe, as he did in many of the presidios which he visited.
^^Rivera, Diario y Derrotero. 51-52.
Sllbid.. 52.
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Investigating the conduct of the garrison, he found corrupt 
practice at every turn. In Santa Fe, as in the presidios 
of Sinaloa, Los Adaes and Coahuila, the governor acted also 
as head of the presidio. In each case, the governor received 
the full pay of a présidial captain as well as his guberna­
torial salary. Rivera thought that the services rendered
52hardly justified such lavish compensation. In addition, 
the governors followed a practice of appointing many more 
subalternate officials than were really needed in the pro­
vince, charging the Crown for their salaries and presumably
53getting a nice share of the proceeds.
Before the Rivera inspection, the number officially 
allowed for the garrison at Santa Fe was one hundred men. 
Rivera dismissed twenty of these, on the ground that they 
were such poor soldiers that they only prejudiced the safety 
of the province. He recommended that the garrison be re­
duced permanently to eighty, including subalterns, as suffi­
cient to garrison the province. He was convinced that the 
manpower among the more than seven hundred Spanish families 
and the Christian Indians were adequate reserves for times 
of crisis. There was a general protest from the population 
of the province against this recommendation, but Rivera 
argued that the opposition stemmed only from self-interest,
^^Rivera, Informe, ibid., 142.
Ŝ ibid.. 106.
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The fundamental weakness of the New Mexican economy was that 
practically all of the commerce consisted of that between 
the governor and soldiers. The few settlers who could get 
any merchandise also depended largely on trade with the 
military personnel. The suppression of twenty positions, 
which cut the payroll at the presidio by eight thousand 
pesos, was a telling blow. The fears of the friars in the 
frontier pueblos were dismissed by Rivera, on the grounds 
that they could send for additional help from Santa Pe if 
an emergency should arise. Recalling that New Mexico in 
rebellion had been reconquered by a présidial force of only 
one hundred men, Rivera ridiculed suggestions that eighty
54might not be an adequate number to garrison the province.
Rivera reported briefly on the Indian situation in 
New Mexico. He was very well impressed by the Pueblos, 
whom he counted at 9,747, living in twenty-four pueblos. He 
found them to be hard workers, with no poverty or drunkeness 
among them, and was quite charmed by their general use of 
the old greeting form, "Ave M a r i a . A p p a r e n t l y ,  in mat­
ters of strategy, Rivera chose to consider the Pueblos sole­
ly as an excellent source of auxiliary manpower for the prov­
ince. He differed sharply in this respect from the New 
Mexican Spaniards, who knew that a repetition of the 1680
54lbid.. 155-155.
55Rivera, Diario y Derrotero. 54.
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Revolt was always possible, and therefore wanted sufficient 
military strength to police the Pueblos as well as to fend 
off the indios barbaros and possible French invaders.
As to the indios barbaros. Rivera's comment ran as 
follows: "The enemy nations of this province are the Apaches,
Pharaones, Natajees, Gilas, Mezcaleros, Coninas, Quarteleros, 
Palomas, Jicarillas, Yutas, Moquinos and others, and all of 
them make peace when it is worthwhile and break into war any­
time they find a convenient o c c a s i o n . H e  noted also that 
the Comanches, "as barbarous as they are bellicose," entered 
New Mexico annually to trade, never in numbers less than fif­
teen hundred. They were described as perpetual wanderers, 
at war with all nations,
Rivera's reports to Viceroy Casa Puerte resulted in 
the Reglamento of 1729, the earliest body of rules for the 
administration of the frontier presidios which is known to 
have been formulated. With some modifications, it remained 
effective until superseded by a new code in 1772, Retro­
active to January 1, 1729» it provided for the abolition of 
two presidios and two guard posts, and reduced, in some in­
stances very sharply, the garrisons of the remaining posts.
It fixed the salaries of officers and men, and attempted to 
protect soldiers from exploitation by their officers. It 
also regulated the conduct of war against the Indians, and
S^Ibid.. 55.
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set rules for their just treatment in time of peace. The
57economies resulted in annual savings of 160,953 pesos.
The missionaries reacted bitterly against Rivera's 
reductions in garrisons and suppressions and relocations of 
presidios. Their case was stated some years after the event 
in an eloquent refutation of Rivera's report written by the 
Franciscan historian, Pray Juan Augustin M o r f i . H e  charged 
that Rivera's penny-wise approach in the late 1720's had 
laid the entire northern frontier open to hostile invasion. 
This, believed the Franciscans, had cost the missionaries 
their early chance to Christianize the Apaches and ultimately 
took a tremendous toll of the wealth of all the northern 
provinces.
Tendentious though the Morfi statement certainly is, 
the situation in regard to the indios barbaros on the north­
ern frontier did deteriorate gravely in the period following 
the Rivera inspection and the resultant reforms.
It was the missionaries who finally moved to re­
trieve the fading opportunity to convert the Jicarillas.
Fray Juan Mirabal was in charge of the mission which was 
founded on the Rio Trampas in the Taos area in 1733.^^ The 
friar appealed for government backing for the establishment
^"^Wroth, "Frontier Presidios of New Spain," Papers of 
the Bibliographical Society of America. XLIII, 201-202.
^®Morfi, History of Texas, II, 260-274.
^%witchell, Spanish Archives. I, 19-20.
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on the grounds that the Jicarillas could be used in warfare 
against the Comanches and Utes, a course which he justified 
with the argument that as Christians they had a sound moral 
right to make war on the non-Christian Indians. The gover­
nor, Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, seems to have endorsed the 
project in the beginning, but he dealt the venture a death 
blow when he suddenly cut off the trade in hides which was 
the livelihood of the Jicarilla neophytes. This act led to 
a dispersal of the disheartened Jicarillas.^®
The Comanche Trade in New Mexico
By 1730 the Comanches and Utes had managed to sweep 
the Apaches from the northern part of their old range. Now 
the dispersal of the Jicarillas, erasing the last barrier 
between the Comanche-Ute strongholds and New Mexico, gave 
the invaders virtually unlimited access to the province.
They came both to raid and to trade.
Commercial opportunities in New Mexico were so li­
mited that officials and settlers alike encouraged the 
Comanche trade, despite the fact that it might risk the 
destruction of the province. The missionaries criticized 
the trade, particularly the zeal with which the secular of­
ficials participated in it, but to no avail. The Taos fair 
became the hub of the commerce of the western plains.
^®Morfi, "Geographical Description of New Mexico," 
in Forgotten Frontiers; A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy 
of bon Juan Bautista de Anza. Governor of New Mexico. 1777- 
1787 ed. by Thomas (Norman. 1932). 97.
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The governors did take steps to supervise the trade 
in the hope of minimizing friction. As early as 1725, Gov­
ernor Bustamante gave notice that while the alcaldes mayores 
in the areas where any of the hârbaros came to trade should 
not interfere with the right of the settlers to trade freely 
with the Indians, they were to exercise careful supervision 
in order that incidents growing out of the trade might not 
lead to disturbances of the p e a c e , T h a t  there was some 
attempt to enforce the decree is evidence by records of 
proceedings against seven Spaniards who had caused trouble 
with some indios barbaros who were selling captives and 
skins at Pecos in the summer of 1726,^^
Later came even more elaborate trade regulations, 
setting such details as the hours in which settlers might 
trade with the Indians, in order to avoid controversy by 
giving rival traders an equal chance to bid for the hides. 
Eventually, no one was allowed to trade with the Indians 
without a royal license, because unsupervised trade, especi­
ally with the "gentile" rancherias. had proved too dangerous 
to the welfare of the province. The provision applied to
^^Bustamante, Bando, Santa Pe, September 17, 1725, 
S.A.N.M., no. 340.
pProceedings against seven Spaniards, Santa Pe, 
August 3-September 7, 1726, S.A.N.M., no. 340a.
^^Criminal proceedings against Diego Torres, Theni- 
ente de Alcalde Mayor of the Chama jurisdiction, on charges 
of violating trade regulations, Santa Pe, April 13-May 7, 
1735, S.A.N.M., no. 402.
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the Pueblos as well as the Spanish and mestizo population, 
and all violators were subject to very stiff fines.
In the 1740*8 there was a wave of Comanche hostili­
ties against the eastern frontier, which gradually caused 
the depopulation of that area. Settlers who could no longer 
bear the pressure against their ranches or villages aban­
doned them, and many came to live in Santa Pe, where the 
population grew from one hundred twenty families in 1744 to 
two hundred seventy-four families in 1779.^^
The Comanche depredations necessitated punitive ac­
tion by the Spaniards, and some expeditions were undertaken 
during the 1740’s . T h e  hatreds engendered by such warfare 
apparently led to violent excesses on the part of some in­
dividual Spaniards, which the government sought to curb. It 
was ordered in 1741 that defenseless enemy camps, that is, 
those occupied by women, children and the infirm, were not 
to be maltreated, as such conduct was not consistent with 
Catholic principles. The order applied to settlers as well
^^Governor Henrique de Olavide y Michelena, Bando, 
Santa Pe, January 7, 1757, S.A.N.M., no. 414.
^^Morfi, "Geographical Description of New Mexico," 
in Porgotten Prontiers ed. by Thomas, 91-92,
^^There are wide gaps in the documentary records for 
the 1740*8. According to Twitchell, Spanish Archives. II, 
213, large numbers of the documents covering the administra­
tion of Governor Joachin Codallos y Rabal (1743-1749) were 
removed from the Santa Pe archives in the 1870*s by a col­
lector, Alphonse Pinart, of whose collection they became a 
part.
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as soldiers. The order was reiterated by a new governor 
three years later, with a reminder that the chief objective 
of Spanish policy wherever possible was to attract the in­
fidels to the faith. All violators were subject to heavy 
fines, and soldiers guilty of violating the orders were to 
receive heavier penalties. A second offense by a soldier
68was punishable by beating and expulsion from the presidio.
The Comanche trade finally became so dangerous thai 
in 1746 all trade and commerce with the Comanches was for­
bidden to the New M e x i c a n s . I t  was believed in Santa Pe 
that the Comanches were carrying on a clandestine commerce 
at Taos pueblo, and that the Taos Indians were giving the 
Comanches information on Spanish troop movements, thus fa­
cilitating their considerable depredations against the 
Spaniards. To break up the dangerous coalition, it was de­
creed that any Taos Indian going more than one league from
70the pueblo should be executed.
The exclusion of the Comanche trade, however, seems 
to have been too great a strain on the economy of the prov­
ince, In 1748, Governor Joaquin Codallos y Rabal submitted 
to the viceroy a report of proceedings relative to permitting
c 7Governor Gaspar de Mendoza, Bando, Santa Pe, March 
21, 1741, S.A.N.M., no. 458.
^®Governor Joachin Codallos y Rabal, Bando, Santa Pe, 
May 30, 1744, S.A.N.M., no. 455.
^^Id.. Santa Pe, Pebruary 14, S.A.N.M., no. 495. 
7°Ibid.
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the Comanches to enter the pueblo of Taos for purposes of
71barter and trade.
However, the restoration of trading relations did 
not mark an end of the hostilities. For instance, late in 
174y, on the very day that ten parties of Comanches left 
Taos after a peaceable trading mission, there was a big Co­
manche attack on the pueblo of Galisteo and many other les­
ser depredations in the area. The Spanish authorities in 
the region wavered, totally uncertain which of the Comanches 
to punish for the offenses. At any rate, they feared that 
any move against them would result in a general assault on
the province, so they decided that it simply was not practi-
72cable to punish the Comanches at that time.
The all-conquering Comanches sometime during this
period offended their former close allies, the Utes, The
reason is not recorded, but by 1755 the two peoples were
75bitter enemies, and remained so throughout the century.
The Apaches Retreat before the Comanche Onslaught 
Comanche arrogance bore hardest of all upon the 
Apaches, The Comanche superiority derived in part from
^^Twitchell, Sp^ish Archives, II, 227. The docu­
ment, no, 497 in the Twitchell catalog, is now missing from 
the archives in Santa Pe,
7PLieutenant Carlos Fernandez to Governor Don Thomas 
Vêlez Cachupln, Taos, December 51, 1749, 8,A,N.M., no, 509.
75Proceedings against Diego de Torres on charges of 
violating trade regulations, Santa Fe, April 15-May 7, 1745, 
S.A.N.M., no. 402,
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their access to guns, which the Apaches were not able to ac­
quire in any significant quantity. In the early stages, 
however, the Comanche advantages resulted even more from cul­
tural differences between the groups. The comanches, when 
they adopted the horse, became complete nomads, abandoning 
agriculture entirely. The Apaches, on the other hand, con­
tinued to settle down in t he spring and summer to a relatively 
sedentary agricultural phase of their annual cycle. The Co­
manches easily located the horticultural campsites of the 
^paches, and concentrated their forces against the small 
encampments in surprise attacks which took a devastating 
toll. Attempts of the Apaches to retaliate were handicapped 
by the difficulty of locating the erratically moving Coman- 
ohes.^4
The Comanche pressures not only drove the Apaches 
much closer to the Spanish frontiers, but left them in a 
sadly impoverished state. The Comanche raiders were making 
a great drain on the horse herds of the Apaches, and also 
were carrying off significant quantities of metal goods from 
the Apache rancherias which they attacked. At the same time, 
the hunting operations of the Apaches were seriously cur­
tailed by the supremacy of the Comanches on the buffalo 
ranges, and the weakened Apaches were no longer able to seize 
the large numbers of war captives whom they had previously
'^^Secoy, Changing Military Patterns. 30-31.
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sold in Spanish markets. They thus had neither the quanti­
ties of hides and meat nor those of slaves which had pre­
viously been their chief stock in the trade with the Span­
iards. In addition, the Apaches now ardently wished to 
possess guns, which the Spaniards refused to sell to them.
As a result of all these factors, the Apaches were driven 
increasingly to steal the articles which they needed, rather 
than to depend as much on trade as formerly. This meant a 
continual raiding activity, which resolved by the 1740's 
into an almost constant state of war between the Spaniards 
and Apaches. In the past, raids had usually been concen­
trated largely on running off horses, without much close con­
tact or loss of life on either side. But it was now neces­
sary to come into close contact, often killing the enemy, 
in order to seize from his person or dwelling the guns, am­
munition and metal goods which the Apaches needed. The re­
sult was a pattern of larger raiding parties and of much
7 C5greater loss of life, particularly for the Spaniards.
The Spaniards could only resort to periodic punitive 
expeditions to check the raids. In 1724, Governor Bustaman­
te, in the midst of the French and Jicarilla crises, had to 
send a party of two hundred (fifty soldiers and one hundred
fifty Indians) to the Sandias to punish the Paraones for their
76livestock thefts in the vicinity of Albuquerque. As a 
75lbid.. 83-84.
^^Bustamante to Captain Antonio Tafoya, Santa Pe,
June 20, 1724, S.A.N.M., no. 329.
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result of this and perhaps of supplemental expeditions, the 
Paraones were moved to make a formal peace with the province. 
They then continued their raids from the Sandias, entering 
the settled areas under the convenient cloak of friendship, 
and by 1731 their damages to the province were so severe 
that a council met in Santa Pe to consider a course of ac­
tion. A token expedition was sent to the Sandias to find
and punish the offending rancherias. but with no genuine
77hope of success. The Paraon offenses continued until in
1744 the governor was driven by mounting complaints to send
a reconnaissance force of twenty soldiers, thirty settlers
and a number of Pueblo auxiliaries to comb the mountains to
the south (the Ladrones and Magdalenas), with orders to
78punish such Apaches as they might find. while these 
occasional expeditions seemed essential to keep the Apaches 
from becoming so arrogant as to override the province com­
pletely, they could hardly contribute to a definitive set­
tlement of the Apache problem. The Spanish soldiers, un­
accustomed to foot travel and handicapped by the very short 
range of their firearms, were woefully ineffective in moun­
tain combat against the Apaches, even in the rare event that 
they were able to locate their rancherias at all.
^^Junta de Guerra, Santa Pe, July 15-July 18, 1731, 
S.A.N.M., no. 362.
7®Godallos y Rabal, Santa Pe, December 2, 1744, S.A. 
N.M., no. 495.
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The Apaches Attack the Southern Tier 
of the Interior Provinces
Distressing though the Apache problem was in New 
Mexico, it became even more acute in the south at this time. 
The mines, missions and ranches of the north Mexican provinces 
were a source of plunder which inevitably attracted the Apa­
ches as they were pushed south by the Comanches, The horse 
herds at these establishments suffered especially, for as 
the Apaches lost their hold on the good buffalo ranges, they 
turned to horse meat as a substitute.
The Apache raids in the El Paso jurisdiction became
serious by 1707. There, as further to the south, the danger
to the Spaniards went far beyond any immediate damages which
the raiders might inflict. The disturbances created a grave
danger of uprising by the tribes native to the area, who
were nominally reduced to mission life, but who might ex-
79plode at any moment to destroy the interior provinces.
Apache raids in Sonora, beginning just before the 
close of the seventeenth century, found the Spaniards there 
preoccupied with serious native unrest. The Pimas of the 
Pimeria Alta revolted in 1695, and from 1696 to 1697 there 
was a general uprising by the Indians of the eastern Sonora 
missions. In 1699 there began a long series of wars with
^^Autos compiled for the Marqués de la Penuela,
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ftOthe perennially troublesome Seris. The Spanish forces 
could give at best only peripheral attention to the new 
Apache problem. As a result, by 1724 the Apaches had become 
so bold and their raids so frequent that unless more effec­
tive defenses could be devised, the entire province of 
Sonora was threatened with ruin. The forces of the province 
were still occupied in keeping the Seris in order, and pro­
tecting them from the attacks of the Pimas. The viceroy 
therefore ordered that the forces of Sonora confine their 
efforts against the Apaches to purely defensive warfare.
That is, they must wait until the Apaches attacked, and then 
punish the offenders promptly and on the spot. Since the 
Apaches never attacked a point where there were soldiers, 
the order meant in effect abandonment of any military action 
against them. Eecords do not show how far this suicidal 
policy was carried out by the Sonoran authorities, but the 
very existence of the instruction demonstrates the appalling
lack of understanding of the Apache problem at the viceregal
81level in the early years.
By the 1730's the constant Apache attacks had led 
to the abandonment of many mines in the province. Prospect­
ors no longer explored the hills for metals, lest they be
80Charles Edward Chapman, The Founding of Spanish 
California; the Northwestward Expansion of New Spain. ÏÏÏ87- 
1783 (New York. 1916). 17.
81Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Texas and the 
North Mexican States (San Francisco, 1890), I, 516-517.
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ambuahed; even traffic on the roads fell to a very small 
volume. Mission life was disturbed because the converted 
Indians had to have arms in constant readiness to defend
Qpthemselves from Apache and Seri attacks. The northern 
missions and ranches had lost most of their livestock, and 
if they were abandoned, nothing would remain to impede 
Apache passage to the very remote interior. The fifty sol­
diers at the lone presidio of Corodeguachi, already occupied 
in watching the Seris and Pimas Altas, had to patrol three 
hundred leagues of hostile frontier.®^
A very brief respite came in 1733 when the Apaches 
sued for peace at Corodeguachi. Captain Juan Bautista de 
Anza, mindful of the orders of king and viceroy that "Chris­
tian charity ordains that every effort be made to conciliate 
them by kindness," accepted the overtures, making generous 
gifts of goods and restoring captive women and children to 
the Apaches. It seemed at first a success, for some eighty 
Apache families settled in the neighborhood of the presidio, 
but they soon left under the pretext of visiting their homes, 
and stole some horses on the way. They then began to terrorize
82Ignaz Pfefferkorn, Sonora. A Description of the 
Province ed. by Theodore E. Treutlein (Albuquerque, 1949)»
207.
®^Don Agustin de Vildosola, Statement, Real Nuestra 
Senora de Aranzazu, July 26, 1735, in Donald Rowland, "The 
Sonora Frontier of New Spain, 1735-1745," in New Spain and 
the Anglo-American West; Historical Contributions presented 
to Herbert Eugene Bolton (nancaster. Pa.. 1932), I. 15^.
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the province, and the truce was only a memory.®^ Anza and 
other Sonorans appealed for new presidios, insisting that 
they could no longer hold the province without reinforce­
ments. As a result, two new presidios were founded in 1741; 
Pitio, or San Pedro de la Conquista, on the site of modern 
Hermosillo, to check the Yaquis, Seris, Pimas and Tepocas; 
and Terrenate, or San Bernardo Gracia Real, designed to pro­
tect the missions of Pimeria Alta from Apache raids.
1747 marked the first attempt at concerted action 
by New Mexican and Sonoran forces against their common ene­
mies. Viceroy Marqués de Altamira ordered New Mexico's 
Governor Codallos to cooperate in a campaign against the 
Gila Apaches and their confederates, to be launched from the 
presidios of Terrenate, Fronteras, Janos and El Paso, under 
the command of Captain Rubin de Cells of El Paso.®^ Santa 
Pe's assigned quota was thirty soldiers, forty settlers and 
seventy Indian auxiliaries. The governor issued the neces­
sary orders to assemble the force with arms, horses and pro-
R7visions, for about a four month campaign. Unfortunately,
R4Juan Bautista de Anza, Statement, Pueblo del Glori- 
030 San Miguel Arcangel de los Ures, August 13, 1735, ibid.. 
158-159. Captain Anza, commandant of the presidio of Santa 
Rosa de Corodeguachi, was the father of the Governor Juan 
Bautista de An%a who distinguished himself in Sonora and 
California in the 1770's and in New Mexico in the 1780's
®^Bancroft, North Mexican States. I, 528.
^^Marques de Altamira to Codallos, Mexico, June 22, 
1747, S.A.N.M., no. 497. “ 'Codallos, Santa Fe, August 4,
1747, S.A.N.M., no. 495.
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in September, just as the force was ready to depart for El
Paso, Abiquiû was attacked by Utes, and all the resources of
the province were required to defend that northern sector.
Not until December 10 was Governor Codallos able to send a
small force south against the Gilas: thirty soldiers, fif-
88teen settlers and ten Indians. As the force moved south, 
the Apaches simply retired into canyons in the mountains, 
made even less accessible than usual by heavy snows. To 
continue such a campaign was pointless, so the governor 
ordered his men back to Santa Pe.®^
Par from being checked, the Apache depredations 
spread into further interior provinces. The marked decline 
of Nueva Vizcaya dated from persistent Apache warfare be­
ginning in 1748. There resulted a serious depopulation of 
the province, and a dangerous lowering of the morale of the 
remaining residents. Some ranches were so deprived of live­
stock, particularly mules, that their work was sharply cur­
es 
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t a i l e d . A l s o  in 1748 came a Seri revolt that devastated
all of southern Sonora,
The northern frontier suffered a serious blow with 
the Pima uprising of 1751. The Pimeria Alta, an area of some
®®Id., Santa Pe, December 6, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 483.
^^Id.. Santa Pe, December 26, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 483. 
QOInforme de Hugo de 0*Conor sobre el Estado de las 
Provinclaa Internas del Norte. 1771-177Ü ed. by Prancisco R. 
Almada (Mexico, 1952), 20-22.
^^Pfefferkorn, Sonora. 151.
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four hundred square miles lying between the Gila River to 
the north and the Magdalena to the south, had been the scene 
of peaceful mission development. The Pimas who lived there 
had only recently assisted the Spaniards in campaigns against 
the Apaches and Seris. But the infection of revolt spread 
from the surrounding area, and November, 1751, saw a sudden 
uprising which took the Spaniards completely by surprise.
The reconquest took some months, and consumed resources of 
men and supplies whose diversion from the Apache wars Spain 
could ill afford. The result was the founding of two new 
presidios in the Pima country: Tubac, in 1752, and Altar,
in 1755.92
Despairing of ever tranquilizing the unruly natives, 
the government of New Spain hit upon the idea that hostile 
elements must be removed from the northern frontier. The 
Seris, Pimas and particularly the Apaches were considered 
most eligible for the program of deportation to the Tres 
Marias I s l a n d s . T h i s  panacea failed, however, for the 
Spanish forces were unequal to the task of catching enough 
Apaches to deport them in significant quantities.
Some improvement was made during the brief time that 
Don Bernardo de Galvez was commandant on the northern frontier.
^^Charles Russell Ewing, "The Pima Uprising of 1751:
A Study of Spanish-Indian Relations on the Frontier of New 
Spain," in Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert
Eugene Bolton (Berkeley. 1945). 275-279.
Chapman, Spanish California. 56-57.
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At his orders, Coahuila made war on the Mescalero Apaches, 
and succeeded at least in containing them. But the inacti­
vity of the Coahuila forces following the transfer of Galvez 
soon undid all that he had accomplished.^^
Texas Becomes Embroiled in the War of the Apaches 
and the Rations of the North
A considerably different situation prevailed in 
Texas, for the balance of power among the Indians in that 
province had been importantly altered. The Comanches con­
tinued to push their range ever southward and eastward. In 
addition, the Wichita bands, who had lived in the region of 
present Kansas and northern Oklahoma since the time of 
Coronado, now moved to the northern frontiers of the province 
of Texas. Hard pressed by the hostilities of their northern 
neighbors, the Osages, and at the same time strongly at­
tracted by the trading opportunities offered by the French 
traders at the Louisiana post of Natchitoches, the sedentary 
Wichita bands completed their southward migration to the Red 
River region in the 1750's. The most powerful of the bands, 
the Taovayas, established a village on Red River at the Cross 
Timbers, in present Montague County, Texas, and from that 
vantage point, for the rest of the century they exercised an 
influence far out of proportion to their numbers on the 
history of the northern frontier. Since 1747, the Taovayas
94lbid.. 33-34.
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had been allied with their former enemies, the Comanches, 
under the auspices of the French. Their village served as 
the chief center for trade between the French and Comanches; 
thus its establishment on the Red River attracted the eastern 
Comanche divisions much more closely into the Texas sphere.
The southward movement of the Wichita bands and the 
Comanches drove the Lipan Apaches, who had ranged the Red 
River region, back onto the Spanish frontier in Texas. Al­
though Apache hostilities had been a continual problem in 
Texas in the period 1723 to 1749, the pressures from the 
Nations of the North (as the Comanches and their allies came 
to be called) were so severe as to drive the Apaches to the 
Texans for protection. The Comanches were seen in the vici­
nity of San Antonio for the first time in 1743.^^ Not long 
after, in 1749, the Lipans and their allies made a peace 
with the Spaniards at San Antonio. Some Apache groups then 
crossed over into Coahuila to continue their raiding activi­
ties unhampered by the Comanches, but those who remained in
Texas, largely Lipans, did a reasonably good job of keeping
Q7their peace with the Spanish Texans. As the strength of




Frontier rade and Diplomacy. 1719 to 1768," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma. XXXI (Autumn, 1953), 277 ff.
Morfi, History of Texas. II, 294.
^^Al B. Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde and the Rio Grande 
Frontier, 1777-90" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Depart­
ment of History, University of California, 1957), 183.
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the Comanches was considerably augmented by the arrival on 
the Red River of the Wichita bands in the 1750's, the anxie­
ty of the Apaches to attach themselves to the Spaniards grew. 
They professed an ardent desire for conversion to Christiani­
ty, and in spite of understandable skepticism on the part of 
both secular and religious authorities, their appeals were 
answered in 1756 with the founding of a mission and presidio 
on the San Saba River at present Menard, Texas. The Apaches 
boasted far and wide about the strength and splendor of their 
new refuge. This earned for the Spaniards of Texas the con­
firmed hostility of all the numerous enemies of the Apaches, 
without accomplishing the reduction of the Lipans, who were 
quite faithless about settling at the mission as they had
q gpromised to do,
March, 1748, saw a disastrous attack of more than 
two thousand mounted warriors of the Nations of the North 
against the San Saba mission. The punitive expedition sent 
by the Spaniards to the Taovayas villages on Red River was 
a dismal failure, and the attack marked the beginning of a 
prolonged series of hostilities by the Nations of the North 
against Texas,
The hostilities of the Nations of the North in Texas 
were motivated by more than their resentment of the refuge 
given the Apaches by the Texas Spaniards, The Taovayas
^®Morfi, History of Texas, 372,
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villages became a center where the Nations of the North 
were able to trade hides, livestock and captives to the 
French traders of Louisiana in exchange for guns and the 
other articles of European manufacture which were becoming 
important in the Indian economy. The Texas settlements were 
a natural source of plunder for the powerful Nations of the 
North, and the fact that their booty could so readily be ex­
changed for French goods stood as a constant and powerful 
incentive to raiding activities. The volume of trade was 
such that the Nations of the North were usually far better 
equipped with guns than were the Spaniards of Texas. This 
made it quite impossible for the Texans to deal effectively 
with the Nations of the North, for they were too powerful 
to be coerced by Spanish arms and had too much at stake in 
their profitable system of raiding and trading to consider 
seriously a peace with the Texans. The problem of the Na­
tions of the North thus quite overshadowed that of the Apach­
es in Texas in the 1750's and 1760*s.
New Mexico Sees the First Effective 
Comanche-Spanish Peace Settlement '
The first encouraging developments on the northern, 
frontier came in New Mexico, with the administration of Don 
Thomâs Vêlez Cachupin, who became governor in 1749. In 1751 
Vêlez Cachupin followed and defeated a force of some three 
hundred Comanches who had attacked Pecos pueblo after 
promising the governor at the Taos fair that they would
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refrain from all hostilities while in the province. After 
administering a decisive defeat, Velez Cachupin treated the 
survivors kindly, and persuaded them that a real peace with 
New Mexico would be highly desirable. He then sent them 
back to their people in the hope that they might bring the 
rest to treat for a formal peace.
Reports of the victory were enthusiastically re­
ceived in Mexico City, where it was thought that there might 
at last be a real chance of friendship with the Comanches 
and relief for the northern frontier. If the restored cap­
tives should be able to persuade their fellow tribesmen to 
make a real peace, the viceroy proposed the use of all pos­
sible means to cement the good relations with the Comanches. 
Although necessary precautions against the guns of the Co­
manches would have always to be maintained, the Comanches 
were to be freely permitted to enter New Mexico to trade 
their hides and captives, and were to be conciliated by fre­
quent and handsome gifts.
The reports of Velez Cachupin had apparently clari­
fied the Comanche problem to an unprecedented degree in of­
ficial circles in Mexico City. The viceroy now saw alliance 
with the Comanches as a potential key to friendship with many
^^Thomas Velez Cachupin to Conde de Revilla Gigedo, 
Santa Pe, November 27, 1751, in The Plains Indians and New 
Mexico. 1751-1778: A Collection of Documents Illustrative
of the History of the Eastern Frontier of New Mexico ed. by 
Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Albuquerque, 1940), é8-7é.
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less powerful nations, which would not dare resist the Span­
iards if they were effectively allied with the Comanches.
He also realized the necessity of dealing with the various 
bands of the Comanches according to their individual des­
serts , acknowledging that the autonomy of the separate bands 
meant that the nation would almost never be unanimous either 
in hostility or in friendship towards the Spaniards. This 
new comprehension at the viceregal level of the nature of 
the Comanche problem argued well for official support for 
possible new approaches which the governor of New Mexico 
might devise.
While waiting to see whether his victory in the field 
would result in a solid peace with the Comanches, Vêlez Ca­
chupin took measures to protect the province in case they 
sought vengeance instead. In the summer of 1752 he organized 
a formal militia of one hundred and fifty settlers, instruct­
ing them in the use of arms and cavalry tactics. The gover­
nor was quite convinced that any future Comanche attack would, 
in view of their growing commerce with the French, be a well- 
armed one on a very large scale, quite possibly in concert 
with the Taovayas with whom they were now allied. In that 
case, forces with some concept of order and discipline would 
be essential to the defense of the province. In another 
measure to strengthen his province against a possible Comanche
^^^Marques de Altamira, Opinion, Mexico, April 26, 
1752, in ibid.. 76-80
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onslaught, the governor encouraged the Carlana, Paloma and 
Cuartelejo Apaches to remain in the Pecos area, where they 
had come to winter with their families. He counted on their 
support in case of Comanche attack, and meanwhile used them 
as spies to keep him informed of Comanche activities.^®^
The hard-won tranquillity of the province was some­
times disturbed through the folly of subordinates. For in­
stance, in 1752 the Apaches joined mission Indians in the El 
Paso district in an uprising occasioned when a Spanish captain 
killed his Zuma servant for stealing fifty ears of corn. The
servant's kinsmen were understandably incensed, and the con-
102sequences were serious losses to the entire region.
But, on the whole, the firmness and caution of the 
governor bore fruit. He was able to turn over the province 
to his successor in 1754 with not only the Comanches, but 
also the Utes and certain Apache groups at peace with the 
province.
The Utes particularly required very careful handling, 
because in the period just proceeding the governorship of
^^^Vélez Cachupin to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Pe, Sep­
tember 29, 1752, ibid.. 118-125.
102Father Fray Juan Sanz de Lezaûn, "An Account of 
Lamentable Happenings in New Mexico and of Losses Experienced 
Daily in Affairs Spiritual and Temporal, written . . .  in 
the year 1760" in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 
477.
^^^Velez Cachupin, Instruction to his successor, Don 
Francisco Marin del Valle, August 12, 1754, in Plains Indians 
ed. by Thomas, 129-143.
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Vêlez Cachupin they had suffered a treacherous massacre at 
the hands of a Spanish force from New Mexico with which they 
were presumably allied against the Comanches. Velez Cachu­
pin managed to rewin their confidence. His policy was that 
an individual offense by a Ute, such as the stealing of a 
horse, should not occasion punishment for the whole tribe. 
Rather, the Ute chiefs were to be induced to punish the cul­
prits and, if possible, make proper restitution.
The Comanches required protection in trade from the 
settlers and Pueblos, whose bent for extortion constantly 
threatened to upset the good relationship which Velez Cachu­
pin had achieved with that tribe. He had found it wise to 
provide a guard for their rancheria and horse herd v/hen they 
attended the Taos fair, and the Comanches had responded most 
gratefully to that courtesy.
The Carlanas, Cuartelejos and certain other eastern 
Apaches lived at peace in the Pecos region. Vêlez Cachupin 
urged that care be exercised to prevent their making alliance 
with the Natagêes and Paraones. The two latter were behav­
ing fairly well in New Mexico at the time, but were stealing 
horses in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora.
In the unlucky event that the Comanches, Utes and 
Apaches all came to Taos to trade at the same time, the Utes 
and Apaches had to be prevented from annoying the Comanches. 
Vêlez Cachupin claimed that he had managed this delicate 
trick, even supervising exchanges of horses and arms and
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ransoming of captives between the enemy groups without al­
tercation.
The administration of Vêlez Cachupin also saw Ute- 
Navajo warfare on a considerable scale. The Navajos wiped 
out a Ute encampment, and in revenge the Utes made such fre­
quent and effective raids into the Navajo country as nearly 
to force the Navajos to abandon it. The Navajos were taking 
refuge at La Cebolleta, in the Laguna and ZuSi neighborhoods. 
Vêlez Cachupin sympathized with the justice of the Ute cause, 
and hoped to use the occasion to persuade the Navajos to 
move to the abandoned missions of the Socorro region on the 
El Paso road. Efforts to reduce the Navajos to mission life 
consistently failed, however, because the Navajos were quite 
convinced, from their observation of the Pueblos* lot, that 
to become Christians would mean the loss of their liberties
Having achieved such a favorable equilibrium among 
the most dangerous of the indios barbaros in his jurisdic­
tion, Vêlez Cachupin felt that the arms of the province should 
whenever possible be used against the Paraones to punish 
their invasions of Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. He was thus 
anticipating the policy of coordinated action which would 
become effective on the northern frontier only with the 
creation of the Provincias Internas some twenty years later.
^^^Benturo, Christian Genizaro Indian, Declaration of 
the state in which he found the Navajo Province and its in­
habitants, Santa Pe, June 20, 1748, S.A.N.M., no. 494; Father 
Sanz de Lezaûn, "An account of lamentable happenings in New 
Mexico," in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 471-474.
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The stakes involved in the complex administration of
Indian affairs in New Mexico were succinctly stated by the
retiring governor;
The condition of this government and its circumstances, 
due to its organization and the diversity of the nations 
which surround it, must be ruled more with the skillful 
measures and policies of peace than those which provoke 
incidents of war; the latter is never favorable and may 
be calamitous. The small forces which this province has 
would be crushed by tribes of their size if they conspired 
against it. As the province, the bulwark of la Vizcaya 
and Sonora, is remote from the rest, support for it is 
the most precarious task that the king has in New Spain,
It was particularly important that the administra­
tion of Velez Cachupin saw the beginnings of successful 
dealings with the Comanches, for it saw also a new wave of 
intrusion by French traders from Illinois and Louisiana.
The Mallet brothers blazed the trail from Illinois to Santa 
Fe, thence to Louisiana in 1739, causing a new upsurge of 
French interest in the northernmost Spanish o u t p o s t . I n  
1749 there came the first to exploit the new route, a party 
of three French traders with Comanche escorts. Seven more 
followed in 1750. Another party of four arrived in 1751, 
and two more in 1752.^^^ The men were arrested, interrogated
^^^Vèlez Cachupin, Instruction, in Plains Indians 
ed, by Thomas, 137.
^^^Voyage des Freres Mallet, avec Six Autres Fran­
çais, depuis la Rivière de Panimahas dans le Missouri jusqu’à 
Santa-Fé (1739-1740), Estrait du Journal, in Découvertes ed, 
by Margry, VI, 457,
^^^Bolton, "French Intrusions into New Mexico, 1749- 
1752," in The Pacific Ocean in History ed, by H, Morse Ste­
phens and Herbert Eugene Bolton (New York, 1917), 389-407»
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and eventually deported, some being taken to Spain. But the 
alarm which the visits aroused was deepened by the traders'
accounts of a French-sponsored alliance between the Comanches
TORand Taovayas. This meant not only a significant numeri­
cal reinforcement of the Comanche war potential, but also a 
permanent trade connection between the Comanches and the 
French', through the Taovayas villages. The French trade 
meant guns in abundance, and Vêlez Cachupin warned that the 
horrors of Comanche warfare would be greatly increased in 
the future.
But the successes of Vêlez Cachupfn with the Comanches 
did not long survive his retirement from office. Certainly 
his successor, Governor Francisco Marin del Valle, went 
through the motions of observing the instructions in regard 
to supervision of the Indian trade. He proclaimed severe 
penalties to be imposed upon any who did not treat the Indi­
ans fairly and in good faith, explaining to the settlers that 
failure to keep the rules would surely result in robberies 
and murders in the province. Prices were regulated, and the 
sale of arms, horses, mules and burros to the indios barbaros
IQQwas banned.
The regulations seem, however, not to have been en­
forced very long, as appears from this description of the
108Autos de los Franceses.
^^%arin del Valle, Santa Fe, November 26, 1754,
S.A.N.M., no. 530.
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Taos fair seven years later:
The Indian trading embassy . . . is . . . some 200, or 
at the very least, 50, tents of barbarian, heathen In­
dians , Comanches as well as other nations, of whom the 
multitude is so great that it is impossible to enumerate 
them. Here the governor, alcaldes, and lieutenants 
gather together as many horses as they can; here is 
collected all the ironware possible, such as axes, hoes, 
wedges, picks, bridles, machetes, belduques. and knives 
(for the enemy does not lack iron and these other com­
modities) .
Here, in short, is gathered everything possible for 
trade and barter with these barbarians in exchange for 
deer and buffalo hides, and. what is saddest, in ex­
change for Indian slaves.110
Out of this explosive trade situation grew some in­
cident which broke the peace, and Marin del Valle soon as­
sembled Ute and Pueblo allies to campaign against the Co­
manches. The Comanches harried New Mexico through the 
remainder of Marin del Valle's administration, but when he 
was succeeded in 1760 by a two-year ad interim governor, Don 
Manuel del Portillo y Urrisola, they apparently hoped for a 
restoration of the peace which they had enjoyed with Velez 
Cachupin. A party of Comanches came to Taos to negotiate
for a peace. At the order of the new governor, all were
112captured and the men of the party were killed. Naturally,
^^^Pather Pray Pedro Serrano to the Marqués de Cru- 
illas, Report in regard to the Custodia of New Mexico, in 
the year 1761, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 
489.
111mInformation Communicated by Juan Candelaria, Res­
ident of this Villa de San Prancisco Xavier de Alburquerque, 
born 1692— age 84” trans. by Don Isidro Armijo, New Mexico 
Historical Review. IV (July, 1929), 288-297.
I I O Ibid.: Velez Cachupin to Marqués de Cruillas, Santa 
Pe, June 27, 1762, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 149-150.
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even more serious hostilities occurred in the following 
months,
The news from New Mexico and other portions of the 
Bishopric of Durango of the incursions of the indios bàrba- 
ros aroused the concern of Bishop Pedro Tamaron y Bornerai, 
who set forth in the autumn of 1759 for a visitation of his 
vast d i o c e s e , T h e  New Mexican portion of the visitation 
began in April, 1760. Tamaron considered the helplessness 
of New Mexico before the indios barbaros one of its gravest 
problems, and he observed the situation carefully. At El 
Alamo, near the pueblo of Santo Domingo, he was visited by 
the "captain of the peaceful Apache Indians," who was highly 
regarded throughout the province because of his long-estab­
lished loyalty. He was relied upon to warn of the coming 
of the Comanches, and he and his men were trusted allies.
In the valley of Taos, Tamaron observed further encampments
of peaceful Apaches, who had come there to be protected by
listhe Spaniards from the Comanches.
The hostilities of the Comanches were, of course, a 
source of the deepest concern to Tamaron, He left Taos in 
June, just a few days before the Comanches began drifting
113Bishop Pedro Tamaron y Bornerai to his Majesty, 
Durango, October 5, 1759, quoted in "Bishop Tamaron’s Visi­
tation of New Mexico, 1760" ed. by Eleanor B. Adams, New 
Mexico Historical Review. XXVIII (April, 1953), 101.
^^^Tamaron, "The Kingdom of New Mexico, 1760," 
ibid.. (July, 1953), 203.
^^^Ibid.. 215.
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in for the annual summer trade fair, but he was well aware 
that this did not mean the end of hostilities.
The character of these Comanches is such that while 
they are peacefully trading in Taos, others of their 
nation make warlike attacks on some distant pueblo. And 
the ones who are at peace, engaged in trade, are accus­
tomed to say to the governor, 'Don't be too trusting. 
Remember, there are rogues among us, just as there are 
among you. Hang any of them you catch.
The Bishop's forebodings were quite justified. He 
left New Mexico at the beginning of July, and on August 4, 
nearly three thousand Comanches made an attack on the valley 
of Taos. They meant to finish off the ranches and pueblo, 
moved to revenge because earlier that summer the Taos Indians 
had staged a scalp dance for them, using Comanche scalps.
The pueblo survived the attack, but many ranches were aban-
11 7doned after the furious onslaught. Governor Marin del 
Valle pursued the Comanches with a large force for nearly 
two hundred leagues, but in vain.
Nonetheless, the bishop recognized the peculiar use­
fulness of the Comanches to Spanish New Mexico;
Intelligent persons have told me that they (the 
Comanches] are useful in holding the rest of the Indians 
in check, because they all fear them and realize that 
the method of defending themselves against them is to 
resort to the Spaniards for aid. The Ute tribe is very 
numerous on the New Mexico border. Formerly they waged
^^^Ibid.. 216.
117Francisco Atanasio Dominguez, The Missions of New 
Mexico. 1776; A Description, with other Contemporary Docu­
ments ed. by Eleanor B. Adams and Angelico Chavez (Albuauer- 
que, 1956), 251.
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war, and now they are at peace because of their fear 
of the Comanches. The same applied to the Faraon 
Apaches.
Fortunately, Velez Cachupin returned to the gover­
norship of New Mexico in 1762, and set at once about re­
storing the broken peace with the Comanches. He found the 
Comanches discussing plans for a general war on the province. 
Hearing their grievances, and acknowledging that they had 
suffered some injustices from certain governors, he was able 
to persuade them to restore the peace. But he warned his 
government that it would be short-lived "unless the gover­
nors who are sent to this frontier assignment are zealous 
and exact in the observance of the laws and possess the 
charity and discretion with which they must conceive the 
pious, Christian intentions of the king . . . .”H ^
Velez Cachupin had struck at the very heart of the 
problem, for the quality of the administrators proved to be 
the key to successful Indian policy. A solution to the 
Indian problem was begun only when men of extraordinary per­
ception and integrity attacked the problem at every level 
from the provincial to the viceregal. The next quarter- 
century saw the emergence of a few such men on the scene in 
New Spain.
^^®Tamarôn, "Kingdom of New Mexico, 1760," New Mexi­
co Historical Review. XXVIII (October, 1953), 301-302.
^^^Velez Cachupin to the Marqués de Cruillas, Santa
Fe, June 27, 1762, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 148-154.
CHAPTER III
THE PROVINCIAS INTERMS UNITE TO MEET 
THE THREAT OP THE BARBAROS. 1762-1786
The mid-century brought major changes in the Spanish 
Empire, the impact of which was soon felt even on the remote 
northern frontier.
First came a new emperor, Charles III, who succeeded 
to the throne in 1759. An exemplar of the "enlightened des­
pots" of the era, he undertook at once an extensive program 
of economic and administrative reform throughout his decay­
ing empire. To lay the basis of reforms in New Spain he 
sent a corps of inspectors, of whom the chief was the visi- 
tador general. José de Galvez. Gâlvez found that the north­
ern frontier posed one of the principal problems, both ad­
ministrative and economic. In order to collect the informa­
tion necessary for the planning of basic reform, the Marqués 
de Rubi was assigned to inspect and report on the military 
defenses of the frontier.
Re-examination of the frontier could not have been 
more timely, for the events of mid-century had totally al­
tered the context in which it existed. The second Family
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Compact with Prance was signed in 1761, and in the following 
year Spain joined Prance in her Seven Years' War with Eng­
land. In the Treaty of Paris, 1763, a victorious England 
gained the Spanish possessions of Minorca and Florida, and 
virtually drove Prance from the North American continent. 
Toward the close of the war, when it became apparent that 
Prance could not hold her American colonies, she offered 
her vast province of Louisiana to Spain. Spain, already 
burdened with more territory than she could effectively con­
trol, was reluctant to accept the gift. But the alternative 
was a British Louisiana, and such a danger to the northern 
mining provinces of New Spain had to be avoided at any cost. 
The contract for the cession of Louisiana to Spain was made 
in 1762, although the actual transfer was not completed 
until 1769.
A new situation now prevailed in New Spain. The old 
French threat had, of course, been eliminated with the de­
parture of Prance from the continent. But there was substi­
tuted perhaps an even more formidable danger of aggression 
from the new neighbor, England, on the Mississippi Hiver 
frontier. In addition, there emerged new hazards in the 
northwest, where England was rumored to have plans for ex­
pansion and the Russians were becoming alarmingly active.
In January, 1768, the king ordered Viceroy Antonio de Buca- 
reli to resist Russian aggression at any cost. Bucareli 
and Visitador General Galvez concluded that the only
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practicable defense would be to forestall Russian, or for 
that matter English, expansion by occupying Upper California. 
There resulted an extension of the Spanish system of missions 
and presidios, with a few colonists, into Upper California, 
with emphasis on the occupation of strategic harbor loca­
tions. The expansion began with the founding of San Diego 
in 1769, and by the end of the century there were twenty-one 
missions in the new province. Contact with these distant 
outposts of the empire depended in the beginning entirely 
upon sea communication between Mexico and California, but 
authorities in Mexico City were eager to open a land trans­
port route from Sonora to California. Such a route was 
pioneered by Juan Bautista de Anza in 1774, though the pro­
blem of defending the traffic from the indios b&rbaros was 
never solved sufficiently to make the road very useful.
The problems involved in administering such a vastly 
extended frontier area were staggering. Louisiana was in­
habited by numerous Indian groups, most of which had pros­
pered under the French commercial system. They were resent­
ful of the change of government, and totally unwilling to 
submit to the mission syst: a which had thus far been Spain* s 
only effective method of controlling an Indian population.
If Spain failed to establish satisfactory relations with the 
Indians of Louisiana, the vacuum left by the French would 
be filled by the English, who would presumably use the 
Indians to undermine Spain’s control of her North American
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territories. But the only hope of keeping the tribes at 
peace was to maintain the flow of trade goods around which 
their economies were now oriented, and Spain was woefully 
short of the necessary resources. Even the routine adminis­
trative costs for a province as vast as Louisiana were great, 
and the necessity of maintaining an effective defense of the 
frontier against the English meant tremendously increased 
expenditures.
The implications for the provinces of the old north­
ern frontier were overwhelming. Once the strategic fron­
tier of New Spain, they now found themselves relegated to 
the position of rather remote interior provinces. The ex­
ception to that rule was New Mexico, the far northern out­
post, which now was alerted to the danger of English incur­
sion and was in addition newly important as a possible key 
to land communication with the newly occupied province of 
Upper California. But on the whole, at a time when the 
interior provinces desperately needed reinforcements in 
their crucial struggle against the indios barbaros. it be­
came necessary to economize at their expense in order to 
maintain the new frontiers of Spain in America. Fortunately, 
there were compensations. While some of the economies crip­
pled the provincial defenses, the accompanying administrative 
re-organization resulted in the first unified formulations 
of policy for the entire region, and in much more effec­
tive coordination of military operations against the Indians.
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The Eubt Inspection
The basis of the reforms in the northern provinces 
was the report of the Marques de Rubl, whose tour of inspec­
tion of the frontier began in 1766.
The Rubi party was in Santa Pe from August 19 to 
September 15, 1766. The province was found in seriously 
weakened condition, and the engineer of the party, Nicolas 
de Lafora, urged that the population and economy be strength­
ened so that New Mexico could be made "an impenetrable bar­
rier" against those Indians who threatened to destroy Spain’s 
interior provinces.^
The total population of the province was 20,104, of 
whom only 9,580 were Spaniards, and 10,524 were Pueblo or 
genizaro Indians. Santa Pe itself had a population of 
2,324 persons, including the company of eighty soldiers 
maintained at the presidio at an annual cost of 34,070 pesos.
^Nicolas de Lafora, Relacion del via.ie que hizo a 
los presidios internes, situados en la frontera de la Ameri­
ca septentrional, perteneciente al rey de Espaïïa ed. By Vito 
Alessio Robles (Mexico, 1939), 105.
2In New Mexico, the term genizaro was applied to non- 
pueblo Indians who lived in more or less Spanish fashion.
Many of them were captives who had been acquired from the 
indios barbaros. and their mixed New Mexico-born descendants 
inherited the designation. Records concerning genizaros 
show such diverse origins as Apache, Comanche, Navajo, Ute, 
Kiowa, Wichita and Pawnee. Many had some Spanish blood.
All of the genizaros bore Christian names from baptism and 
Spanish surnames from their former owners. Belonging no 
longer to any Indian tribe, they spoke a broken Spanish.
Adams and Chavez (eds.) in New Mexico Missions, footnote 72, 
page 42.
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Lafora regarded Santa Pe as quite Indefensible. He wanted 
a small fortification built at once in order to safeguard 
persons and property in case of a general uprising. Failure 
to do so, he thought, invited a general disaster which could 
result in the loss of the province.
The ill-armed settlers depended largely on the lance, 
which they had learned to handle quite well. Guns were used 
very little, because powder was scarce and costly. Since 
the settlers were required to furnish powder at their own 
expense when called upon for military duty, they usually 
carried very small charges when they went on campaign. They 
thus lost the advantage of firearms, which might have helped 
to equalize the disparity between the small numbers of the 
Spanish forces and the infinite numbers of the hostile In­
dians.
According to Lafora, in 1766, the only really hos­
tile Indians in New Mexico were the Gila and Faraon Apaches. 
There was also "a little trouble” with the Comanches, but 
they were coming every year to the Taos trade fair. Thanks 
to the guns which they were supplied by the still-active 
French traders of Louisiana through the Taovayas, the Co­
manches were better armed than the New Mexican Spaniards.^ 
Rubi's impression of the problem of the indios barbaros was 
strongly influenced by the lull in hostilities with the Co­
manches which he saw in New Mexico.
^Lafora, Relacion. 81 ff.
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The Rubl reports were the basis not only of impor­
tant changes in the military procedures of the northern 
provinces, but also of very fundamental changes in Indian 
policy. Having observed that the Comanches were at peace 
in New Mexico, and that they seemed to know how to keep 
their obligations, while the Apaches seemed totally unreli­
able in their peace agreements, Rubl recommended a policy 
designed to conciliate the Comanches and exterminate the 
Apaches. Texas was to cultivate the friendship of the Na­
tions of the North, including the Comanches, in order to 
parallel the peace established in New Mexico. This would 
presumably drive the Apaches to the frontier missions and 
presidios for refuge, but Rubi strongly advised against 
peace with them unless they would agree to re-settlement in 
very small groups far south in Mexico. There they could be 
expected to disappear, or be assimilated by other tribes. 
This would leave the Comanches in a very strong position on 
the northern frontier, but Rubi considered them far more 
desirable as neighbors than the amorphous Apache bands, for 
he was convinced by his observations in New Mexico that the 
Comanches were a reasonable people, capable of making and 
keeping formal treaties.^
As for specific military recommendations, Rubi sug­
gested that the frontier be guarded by fifteen presidios, to
^Thomas (ed.) in Plains Indians. 36-37.
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be spaced at regular intervals so as to form a cordon from 
the Gulf of California to the Bahia del Espiritu Santo in 
Texas. This meant relocation of all but three of the ex­
isting presidios. In New Mexico, a new presidio was to be 
founded at Robledo, near present Port Selden, in order to 
restrain the Gila Apaches from joining the Natagées.^ The 
El Paso garrison was to be shifted eighty leagues south to 
Carrizal.^ These recommendations, effected by the Reglamento 
of 1772, resulted in the movement of many of the presidios 
far beyond the line of actual settlement, on the theory that 
they would prevent Indian raiders from reaching the settled 
region. The results were appalling, for the enemy easily 
slipped through the line of defense and virtually had a free 
hand in the unprotected interior. Rubi's impressively or­
derly approach to the military problem of the northern fron­
tier apparently stemmed from an impressive ignorance of the 
realities of Apache warfare.
The tragic consequences of the policy were described 
in 1775 by two noted frontier priests, who appealed for an 
increase in the number of troops on the frontier at least 
long enough to punish, or even exterminate, the Apaches who
^Worcester (ed.) in Galvez, Instructions for Govern­
ing the Interior Provinces. 10-13.
^Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla and Spanish Plans for 
the Defense of New Mexico, 1772-1778," in New Spain and the 
Anglo-American West. I, 186.
"^Nelson, "Juan de ngalde," 53-54.
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had reduced the provinces to such deplorable conditions.
The frequent assaults by the Apaches had left the presidios 
almost without saddle animals, and thus unable to pursue 
the marauders. Such strong detachments were required to 
guard the remaining horse herds, that the effective fight­
ing forces of the frontier were seriously depleted, Further­
more, many soldiers were occupied in moving their presidios, 
in compliance with the Reglamento of 1772, This left almost 
no soldiers available to pursue their ostensible objective,
Ûthe defense of the frontier against the Apaches,
The picture drawn by the priests was painfully ac­
curate, and it was eventually necessary for the government 
to recognize that the relocation plan was a failure. The 
attempt to salvage an effective line of defense began in 
1781, when Commander General Teodoro de Croix authorized 
the abandonment of the Monclova, Aguaverde, La Bahia, and 
San Saba posts, with their troops to be concentrated in the 
villas of Monclova, Santa Rosa and San Fernando, The Coahuila 
posts were restored to the positions which they had occupied 
before 1772,^
8 /Pray Francisco Garcés and Fray Juan Diaz to Viceroy
Antonio de Bucareli, Ures, March 21, 1775, in Anza's Cali­
fornia Expeditions ed, by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley, 
1930), V, 282,
^Worcester (ed,) in Galvez, Instructions for Govern­
ing the Interior Provinces. 17.
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The responsibility for carrying out the Rubi plan 
was given initially to Hugo O'Conor, appointed in 1772 to 
become commandant inspector. His time was occupied entirely 
with effecting the présidial transfers and with campaign­
ing against the Apaches, two entirely incompatible activi­
ties, since troops engaged in the one project could hardly 
work effectively at the other. The Apache problem was compli­
cated because they now had some firearms, which they were 
obtaining from the Bidais Indians of Texas, and had a 
plentiful supply of stolen horses. In 1773, however, the 
Lipans made a peace, which, on the whole, they kept tolerably 
well, although some individuals from the band joined the 
Mescaleros in occasional breaches of the peace.
O'Conor met with some military success in 1773 when 
he led a campaign into the Bolson de Mapimi and drove the 
Apaches north. This relieved the Apache pressure on Nueva 
Vizcaya, but the Apaches then simply increased their activi­
ties further west. In 1775, O'Conor assembled the troops 
of Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya for a general campaign against 
the Apaches. New Mexico was unable to meet its quota of 
troops because it was almost destitute of horses, and Sonora 
did not participate because all of its resources were needed 
to mount the Anza expeditions to California. Nevertheless, 
some fifteen defeats were inflicted on the Apaches, and two
Conor, Informe. 79-80
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thousand horses were recovered. With that encouragement, 
in 1776 O'Conor led another joint effort to exterminate the 
Apaches. New Mexico sent two hundred fifty men this time, 
having received a fresh supply of fifteen hundred horses in 
the preceeding year. But the campaign met with little suc­
cess. O'Conor's health broke under the severe strain of 
the job, and he appealed for transfer, which he was granted 
by the Crown.
Mendinueta's War with the Comanches in New Mexico
Perhaps the most disturbing developments in the per­
iod following Eubl's inspection were those in New Mexico.
The peace which prevailed with certain indios barbaros. par­
ticularly the Comanches, at the time of his inspection had 
greatly impressed Rubi and had influenced his recommenda­
tions concerning Indian policy. But within a year after 
Rubi's visit to New Mexico those conditions no longer existed. 
Governor Velez Cachupin was succeeded in 1766 by Don Pedro 
Permin de Mendinueta, who for some unknown reason found it
12necessary within a year to campaign against the Comanches.
New Mexico then remained at war with the Comanches for the 
next two decades.
^^Worcester (ed.) in Galvez, Instructions for Govern­
ing the Interior Provinces. 8-12; Thomas (ed,) in Teodoro de 
Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain. 1776-1783 
(lïorman, l94l), lé-Ï7.
^^Thomas (ed, ) in Plains Indians. 58.
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While the reason for the initial breach with the 
Comanches seems not to be recorded, Mendinueta's own reports 
document the years of his administration as a dreary series 
of Comanche attacks on pueblos and towns. Mendinueta con­
tinually organized punitive campaigns, occasionally inflict­
ing some damage on the Comanches when he could catch them,^^ 
Ke took considerable pride in his achievements against the 
Comanches, and apparently considered war with them such a 
normal state of affairs that he refused to entertain any 
idea of peace, A Comanche delegation which sought peace at 
Taos in 1774 was seized at the governor's order, when the 
prisoners attempted to escape, they were killed. Mendinueta 
congratulated himself that as a result they did not succeed 
in giving any news to their tribe I I n  1775 he ordered 
the trade of the province closed to all but chiefs who came 
to Santa Fe to make peace with him in person, but in view of
the fate of the Comanche peace party in 1774, the Indians
15showed no enthusiasm for treating with him.
Viceroy Bucareli, however, began to entertain seri­
ous misgivings about Mendinueta's activities.
^^Pedro Permin de Mendinueta to Marques de Croix, 
Santa Pe, June 18, 1768, ibid., 159-162; Croix to Arriaga, 
Mexico, January 30, 1769, ibid.. 165-168; Mendinueta to 
Bucareli, Santa Pe, September 30, 1774, ibid.. 169-173.
^^Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Pe, October 20, 1774, 
ibid.. 175-176.
^^Id. to id., Santa Pe, August 18, 1775, ibid.. 180.
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Although the successes so happily won on the three 
principal occasions against the barbarous Comanches 
appear to overcome the injuries received, according to 
your lordship's account of everything, these reports 
have disturbed me, both because I consider these faith­
ful settlements assaulted too much and exposed to the 
sacrifice of the inhumanity and fury of the enemies who 
attacked them and because, in place of teaching them 
lessons, the punishment can have exasperated them and 
thus be the motivating reason for their uniting to seek 
the vengeance to which they are accustomed. Otherwise 
terror would occupy their minds or the fear of greater 
defeats restrain them. This fearful situation, I assure 
your lordship, leaves me with considerable concern until 
I have contrary reports.
The viceroy's concern for New Mexico was entirely 
justified. In addition to the many encounters with the Co­
manches, Mendinueta found it necessary, at least by 1774, to 
campaign against the Navajos. The Comanches were able to 
stage a major raid on the Albuquerque area in August, 1774,
virtually unopposed, because the militia of the jurisdiction
17were absent on campaign against the Navajos. Gila Apache 
raids also became a problem in the Albuquerque vicinity at 
this time,^®
An exception in Mendinueta's general war with the 
bârbaros were the Eatagée and Sierra Blanca Apaches, who 
came to Albuquerque in May, 1768, to seek p e a c e . T h e y
^^Bucareli to Mendinueta, Mexico, February 8, 1775, 
ibid.. 177.
^^Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, September 30, 1774, 
ibid.. 172.
^®Id. to ^ . ,  Santa Fe, May 12, 1775, ibid.. 175.
^^Mendinueta to Marques de Croix, Santa Fe, June 18, 
1768, ibid.. 162.
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observed their agreement quite well for a time, to the 
governor's great surprise. It was later learned from a 
captive who escaped them that the reason these Apache groups 
sued for peace was that the Comanches had made a particularly 
severe raid against the Natagees, and that they had learned
about the same time that armed forces from Nueva Vizcaya were
20being sent against them. In peace with the New Mexican 
settlements, therefore, the Apaches saw their only possible 
refuge from converging enemy forces.
The Utes, also suffering at the hands of the Coman­
ches , remained friendly to the Spaniards, but Mendinueta 
tampered with that relationship too. In 1775, he prohibited 
any settler or friendly Indian from going to the Ute country 
to trade, operating on the theory that if the Utes were forced 
to come to New Mexico the trade could be supervised to pre­
vent abuses and the extension of the Christian faith would 
be facilitated. Since the Ute trade was vital to the com­
mercial life of the northern settlements, the order was 
subject to repeated and flagrant violations, often with the
collusion of the local officials responsible for enforcing
21it. It was also in 1775 that Mendinueta reported that he 
had persuaded the Utes to attack the Gilas and Navajos, with
20Marqués de Croix to Don Julian de Arriaga, Mexico, 
January 30, 1769, ibid.. 167-168.
21Governor Francisco Trebol Navarro, Bando, Santa 
Pe, September 13, 1778, S.A.N.M., no. 740
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whom "they had always been friends," for fear they might 
otherwise be persuaded to join in concerted raids against
the province, and that Ute pressure had forced the Navajos
22to make a new peace with New Mexico. Since large-scale 
warfare between the Utes and Navajos had been so marked dur­
ing the first administration of Velez Cachupin that the 
Navajos were nearly forced to abandon their country, the 
report of Mendinueta in this matter indicates that he was 
either extraordinarily ill-informed about the indios bar­
baros with whom he dealt, or that he deliberately misled the 
viceroy in the hope of forwarding his own career.
Viceroy Bucareli became so concerned about the sur­
vival of the province that he urged Commander Inspector 
O'Conor to consider whether reinforcements should not be 
sent to New Mexico from the troops of Nueva Vizcaya, He 
himself offered to send arms from the royal warehouse to be
sold at cost to the settlers, if the governor felt that this
23would help to strengthen the defenses of the province, 
Mendinueta replied that the settlers were not destitute of 
arms, since they had been able to barter produce for the old 
arms of the présidial soldiers. The governor had counted 
some six hundred guns and one hundred fifty pairs of pistols
^^Council of War, Chihuahua, June 9-15, in Plains In­
dians ed, by Thomas, 199,
^^Bucareli to Mendinueta, Mexico, February 8, 1775, 
ibid,. 178,
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in fair condition in the province. However, the enemy raids 
had resulted in the theft or destruction of all the breeding 
stock, so that the Spaniards were left almost entirely with­
out horses, and thus were quite unable to pursue the enemy.
A horse herd of perhaps fifteen hundred was essential to the
p  j
maintenance of the province. So impressed by the New 
Mexican emergency were the authorities who deliberated thé 
request that it was granted with unusual promptness in the 
fall of 1775.25
Mendinueta wanted more than reinforcements, however, 
to cope with the general war which faced the province. The 
dispersed ranch homes of the Spaniards were quite indefensi­
ble, and as a result, many were being abandoned in panic 
and some advantageous frontiers were thus being lost. Mendi­
nueta wished the settlers to congregate in pueblos built a-
round plazas or streets, in order that their homes could more
26easily be defended against attack. But he fo’Jind the an­
tagonism of the settlers to such a move so great that no 
mere gubernatorial order by Mendinueta could accomplish the 
resettlement, and he urged a firm viceregal order for the 
consolidation of the settlers. The governor asked also for
2^Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Pe, August 19, 1775, 
ibid.. 184.
^^Bucareli, Order, Mexico, October 31, 1775, ibid..
189.
26Actually, the movement for consolidation of the 
settlements dates back to the administration of Governor
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the establishment of a presidio at Taos, ”a pueblo of warlike 
Indians," to protect from Comanche raiders the pueblos of 
Abiquiu, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso and Picuris, as well as 
the various districts of Spanish settlers in the jurisdic­
tion of La Canada. Such an establishment in the north should 
then leave the présidial force at Santa Pe free to look af­
ter the rest of the frontiers and to carry on the Apache 
27wars.
Not only the settlers but also the Pueblos were 
alleged to be reluctant to cooperate with Mendinueta in the 
defense of the province. He reported that the Pueblos of 
Zuni, Acoma and Laguna were quite numerous, but that they 
refused to help in the campaigns against the barbaros. since 
they themselves were at a great distance from the worst 
threats, and had to make very little effort to defend them-
poselves from the Apaches. Mendinueta blamed the Acomas, 
Lagunas and Zunis for only defending themselves from the 
Gilas and leaving the way open for Gila raids against the 
Navajo country. Mendinueta felt that this aroused Navajo 
suspicion of the Spaniards, and feared they would start a
Velez Cachupin, who had in 1754 congregated the settlers of 
Truchas around two plazas in order to protect them from Co­
manche incursions. Dominguez, Missions of New Mexico, 83.
71Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Pe, March 26, 1772, 
in "Governor Mendinueta’s Proposals for the Defense of New 
Mexico, 1772-1778," ed. by Thomas, New Mexico Historical Re­
view. VI (January, 1931), 27-30.
ZGlbid.. 28.
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new war against the province. The governor persisted in 
his request for the Taos presidio, and now urged one at
Socorro as well in order to stop raids of the Sierra Blanca
20Apaches.
The effect of the crisis on the morale of the New 
Mexicans was devastating, and by 1770, a paralytic despair 
gripped much of the Spanish population. Terrorized by the 
constant attacks of the indios bârbaros. ever more urgently 
in need of supplies and reinforcements, they began to doubt 
that human succor would ever reach them. They began to seek 
some powerful patron saint who might adequately represent 
their sufferings and obtain a miraculous divine intercession 
to save the province.
These, then, characterized the temper of the settlers 
under stress: an intense religiosity, and a stubbornly con­
servative resistance to Mendinueta’s attempts to reorganize 
the settlements on a more defensible basis. But neither 
mysticism nor obstinacy sufficed to spare any sector some 
serious upheaval.
By 1770 the Comanches raids had become so severe 
that a block of settlers at the present site of Fernandez 
de Taos had abandoned their plaza and, with the consent of
^%endinueta to Croix, Santa Fe, November 3, 1777, 
ibid.. 36-37.
30"Information Communicated by Juan Candelaria,”
New Mexico Historical Review. IV, 294.
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the Indians, moved to the pueblo. They were still living 
there in 1776, waiting for Governor Mendinueta to furnish 
the plaza which he had promised to build for them amidst 
their farms, apparently at the present Ranchos de Taos.^^
The church at Picuris pueblo was torn down at Mendinueta's 
order in 1769, and in 1776 the congregation was still wait­
ing for the new building which he had promised to erect for
■52them in a safer place. The Tiwa and Hopi groups who had
maintained separate plazas at Sandia pueblo were ordered to
move together to consolidate their defenses against the Co- 
33manches.
Comanche pressures forced the Pecos Indians to aban­
don the use of their irrigated fields north of the pueblo, 
and as a result they were suffering famines every year after 
January because their small harvest was no longer sufficient 
to last until a new crop could be produced. Even harder 
pressed were the Indians of Galisteo pueblo, who, giving 
way before the combined forces of the Comanches and famine, 
were beginning to leave their pueblo by 1776. By 1792 the 
pueblo was extinct, and the remnants of the population lived 
at Santo Domingo.








Other districts were equally injured by Apache wars. 
The friars of Acoma reported that the population of that 
pueblo, thanks to the Apaches and various epidemics, had 
declined by more than one half.^^ Carnué and Nutria, set­
tlements in the Sandias east of Albuquerque, were abandoned 
because of Apache raids, though they had good irrigated farm­
lands and excellent pastures. Navajo uprisings in 1774
forced the abandonment of the Rio Puerco settlements, six
37leagues northwest of Albuquerque.
So grave was the threat to the existence of the prov­
ince that even the long-standing quarrel between church and 
state authorities was momentarily suspended. Many friars 
felt that the province was on the verge of being wiped out, 
and the Franciscans gave their strçng support to the cam­
paigns of Mendinueta against the Comanches and of 0*Conor 
against the Apaches.^® Father Sylvestre Vêlez de Escalante 
urged that the Gila Apaches be driven by the joint forces 
of New Mexico, Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya eastward toward the 
Buffalo Plains, "where are found the two most obnoxious
tribes, the Comanches and Apaches, who by their fighting
3Qwould soon destroy each other."
3^Ibid.. 195.
3?Ibid.. 254.
^®Dominguez to Provincial Fray Isidro Murillo, El 
Paso, November 4, 1775, ibid.. 270-272.
^^Sylvestre Vêlez de Escalante, Pageant in the Wil­
derness: the story of the Escalante Expedition to the
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Authorities above the provincial level realized
that if New Mexico were lost now, reconquest would be far
more difficult than it had been in 1694. Antonio de Bonilla,
adjutant-inspector of the northern presidios, pointed out
the danger in 1776:
The Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Apaches do not con­
sider being converted nor even the rest of the heathen 
nations. Their idols are liberty and war. The fre­
quent trade, unwisely permitted with the Spaniards, had 
made them lose that respect which the first conquerors 
could instill in them, whom they looked upon as people 
immortal and unusual. Firearms do not intimidate them, 
because they use and manage them with more dexterity 
than their masters and the successful results which they 
enjoy in all their attacks, irruptions and undertakings 
have made them unconquerable.
The important barrier of New Mexico lost, the In­
dians master of that immense country, and accustomed to 
live by robbery, will undoubtedly come nearer to us.
If today an army is needed only to make war on the 
numerous and vagrant body of Apaches, what forces will 
be sufficient to hold back the rest of the nations, and 
even the very Indians who are conquered, who, lovers of 
liberty, will throw off the yoke and attack us as do­
mestic enemies in the same manner in which they have 
done and are doing in the various uprisings suffered in all time?40
Repercussions of the hostilities reached ever fur­
ther into Mexico proper. By 1776, both the Lipan Apaches 
and the Comanches had begun sporadic raids into Nuevo Leon 
and S a n t a n d e r . I n  1774, the remote presidio of Altar
Interior Basin. 1776. including the Diary and Itinerary of 
Father Escalante ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Salt Lake 
City, 1950), 247.
^^Antonio de Bonilla, "Notes Concerning New Mexico," 
in Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla and the Defense of New Mexico," 
in New Spain and the Anglo-American West. I, 202.
^^Morfi, Via.ie de Indios y Diario del Nuevo Mexico 
ed. by Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, 1935), 213-214.
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had been considered quite safe from the A p a c h e s , b u t  two 
years later the coast road to Altar had been made entirely 
unsafe by their constant attacks.
Croix Establishes the United Command 
of the Provincias Internas
The continued deterioration of the entire northern 
region led to a drastic governmental reorganization in 1776, 
when the provinces of New Mexico, Texas, Coahuila, Nueva 
Vizcaya, Sonora, Sinaloa and California were detached from 
their normal relationship to the viceroyalty of New Spain 
and placed under a new military government called the Com- 
mandancy-ffeneral of the Interior Provinces of New Spain. 
Teodoro de Croix was appointed as first commander general 
of the new unit.^4 a veteran of many years* military ser­
vice, Croix had also had some New World administrative ex­
perience during the period 1766-1770, when his uncle, the 
Marqués de Croix, was viceroy of New Spain. However, he had 
no personal knowledge of the northern frontier, and he had 
spent the last four years in Spain. There was, therefore, 
a considerable lapse of time while Croix studied the prob­
lems of his new charge, both in the archives and by a per­
sonal tour of inspection. Pending the formulation and
^^Juan Bautista de Anza, Diary, 1774, in Anza's 
California Expeditions ed. by Bolton, II, 11.
4^Pedro Pont, Diary, ibid.. IV, 517.
^^Thomas (ed.) in Teodoro de Croix. 17.
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activation of the new policies, the beleaguered provinces 
simply held on as best they could against the indios bâr­
baros .
Croix, beginning his inspection of the frontier in 
1777, faced a major decision at once. The Apaches, having 
been pushed by the Comanches and allied nations to the very 
threshold of the Spanish settlements, began to sue for peace 
all along the frontier. Strongly influenced by the Rubi 
reports, which he had studied thoroughly before leaving 
Mexico City, Croix was quite skeptical of the good faith of 
the Apaches. He preferred, rather to bet against them on 
the Comanches, hoping to make allies of the latter and use 
them to destroy the former. However, bound by the king's 
standing order that gentle means must be preferred to war 
with the Indians whenever possible, Croix outlined the terms 
upon which the Apaches would be admitted to peace. He re­
quired that they settle themselves in pueblos in designated 
locations and accept instruction in Christianity, As ex­
pected, the offer produced no peace agreements, and Apache 
depredations became even worse for a time. Croix then re­
solved upon a policy of carrying the war to the enemy coun­
try with well-coordinated expeditions which he proposed to 
launch from all affected provinces.
To gain the counsel and support of experienced per­
sonnel on the frontier, Croix called a series of councils
^^Thomas (ed.) in Forgotten Frontiers. 15-19.
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during the course of his inspection tour. The council at 
Monclova in December, 1777, and the one at San Antonio in 
January, 1778, both deliberated the pros and cons of alli­
ance with the Comanches against the Apaches, and vice versa. 
Both bodies were decisively opposed to any suggestion that 
confidence be placed in agreements with the Apaches, and 
both were willing to gamble on the Comanches as possible 
a l l i e s . T h e  third and final council, at Chihuahua in June, 
1778, agreed that "in none of the provinces should peace be 
extended to the Apaches because their friendship will al­
ways produce very funereal effects."^7 The reasoning in 
regard to the Apache problem ran thus;
. . . the known bad faith of the Apache does not give 
any hope that they may ever reduce themselves or main­
tain the friendships which they promise; secondly, that 
they found it necessary to maintain their rancherias 
upon our frontier to protect themselves from the raids 
of their enemies, the Indians of the north; thirdly, 
that t^gy can not subsist without incessant robberies.
Deciding in favor of alliance with the Nations of 
the North, including, of course, the Comanches, the council 
arrived at this argument:
^^Report of the Council at Monclova, December 11, 
1777, in Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas Fron­
tier. 1768-1^80 ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Cleveland. 
1914), II, 152-163; Report of the Council at San Antonio de 
Béxar, January 5, 1778, ibid.« 163-170.
^^Council of War, Chihuahua, June 9-15, 1778, in 
Plains Indiana ed. by Thomas, 199.
4Blbld.. 201.
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Finally, in support of the useful alliance with the 
nations of the north, it was recalled that these In­
dians live in very open and fertile lands abounding in 
deer and buffalo, which are delicacies in their diet; 
that, accustomed to live on the plains and make war in 
plains country, it would be difficult for them to ac­
comodate themselves in territories of rough hills, arid 
and scarce in all kinds of food. This is the reason 
why the Apaches eat the larger part of the mules and 
horses which they steal. Further, it is only when the 
nations of the north find themselves driven back by 
their enemies, the Osage, that they would be obliged to 
approach our frontiers. These frontiers would breathe 
easily for a long time, and that would be sufficient 
for them to be on guard against these new e n e m i e s . 49
The officials of the northern frontier, then, united 
to back Croix in the calculated risk of attempting alliance 
with the Nations of the North in order to launch an all-out 
campaign against the Apaches. Reviewing the devastation of 
the provinces at the hands of the Apaches in recent years, 
the assembled officials bitterly assailed the relocation of 
the presidios according to the strategy of Rubi as a costly 
error. This marked the first official step toward restoring 
the defenses of the province to a basis practicable for 
Apache warfare.
De Mêziêres Strives to Win the Comanches 
to Spanish Allegiance
Fortunately for Croix's plan, some progress toward 
conciliating the Nations of the North had already been made 
in Louisiana and Texas, chiefly through the efforts of Atha­
nase de Mézières. A veteran in the French colonial service
49lbid.. 202-203.
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at the border post of Natchitoches, de Mêziêres had trans­
ferred his services to the Spanish government at the time 
that the ownership of Louisiana changed. De Mézières had 
met with remarkable success in his difficult assignment of 
reconciling the Indians of the Red River region to the 
change in masters. In 1771, he had made a treaty with the 
Taovayas, the foremost of the Wichita bands allied with the 
Comanches since 1747, in which they had agreed to transfer 
their allegiance from the French to the Spanish crown, and
to stop their hostilities against Spanish establishments
SOand citizens. The Taovayas had also signed the treaty as 
mediators for the Comanches, who on that front, at least, 
now appeared willing to relax their enmity towards the 
Spaniards. The Taovayas had agreed to suspend intercourse 
with and consider as enemies any allied tribes, particularly 
the Comanches, which committed hostilities against the 
Spaniards.
In the spring of 1772, a Taovayas delegation had 
appeared as promised, in San Antonio to ratify the treaty 
before Governor Juan Maria de Ripperdâ and receive presents 
from him.
Actually, since their economic dependence remained 
entirely upon the Louisiana post of Natchitoches, which was
CQTreaty with the Taovayas, Natchitoches, October 
27, 1771; in Athanase de Mêziêres ed. by Bolton, 256-260.
^^Governor Juan Maria de Ripperdâ, Certification, 
San Antonio, April 27, 1772, ibid.. 260.
124
still run largely by the old French personnel, the northern 
Indians did not take very seriously their treaty obligations 
to the Spanish settlements of Texas, and their raiders con­
tinued to harass that province. But de Mézières had proved 
to the Spaniards that it was possible to deal with the Nor- 
tenos, and he was commissioned by Croix’s council of 1778 
at San Antonio to negotiate with the northern bands for the 
Texans, and to advise the province on practicable means of 
cooperating with the Nortenos against the Apaches.
Croix thought that it might be possible to launch 
an offensive against the eastern Apaches at once, if there 
were assembled a body of Norteno warriors, to be recruited 
and handled by de Mézières, and three or four hundred Lou- 
isianans led by Governor Bernardo de Galvez. This force 
was to act jointly with the army of the Provincias Internas 
under Croix’s personal c o m m a n d . G a l v e z ,  however, felt 
unable either to leave Louisiana or to spare the men asked 
for by Croix, because his province bordered upon the growing 
Amerloan-English c o n f l i c t . T h u s ,  Croix encountered the 
first of the series of obstacles to his work in the Interior 
Provinces which sprang directly from the American conflict.
^^Report of the Council at San Antonio, January 5, 
1778, ibid.. II, 163-170.
^^Croix to Bernardo de Galvez, Chihuahua, September 
11, 1778, ibid.. 137.
^^Bernardo de Galvez to Don Josef de Gâlvez, New Or­
leans, June 9, 1778, in Spain in the Mississippi Valley. 1765- 
1794 ed. by Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, 1946), I, 286-287.
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There also arose difficulty in the critical matter 
of establishing the authorized alliance with the Comanches.
De Mézières, who traveled as far as the Taovayas villages 
on Red River in 1778 to lay the groundwork for Croix’s pro­
posed campaign, became very discouraged about the prospects 
of making a substantial peace with the Comanches. He found 
that, in spite of their commitments to the contrary, they 
were again perpetrating outrages in Texas. Abandoning his 
plan to visit them, he sent instead a threat that he would 
go to war against them if they did not reform, and he began 
to speculate about the possibility of turning lesser tribes- 
like the Taovayas against the Comanches to fight Spain’s 
battle in the north.
Pending the arrival of reinforcements which would 
enable Croix’s troops to launch the projected offensive 
against the Apaches, de Mézières was transferred from Louisi­
ana to Texas to maintain good relations with the Nations of 
the North and to try to win the Comanches to Spanish allegi­
ance. But the campaign was postponed indefinitely in 1779, 
when Croix received a royal order to avoid open war with the 
Indians where possible and to use only gentle means of win­
ning them to Spanish a l l e g i a n c e . A  short time later came
^^De Mézières to Croix, Taovayas, April 19, 1778 
[Letter No. 8 ], in Athanase de Mézières ed. by Bolton, II, 
212-214.
^^Thomas (ed.) in Teodoro de Croix. 43.
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the news that no additional troops could be assigned to the 
Provincias Internas, for Spain was about to enter the Ameri­
can war and must concentrate all her resources against the
57English. Croix now faced the painful fact that, as com­
mander of an interior frontier, he would not only lack the 
forces to carry out his elaborate plans for an all-out of­
fensive against the enemy; he would even be denied the re­
inforcements which seemed vital to an effective defense of 
his command.
The crowning blow to Croix's ambitious plans came 
in November, 1779, with the death of de Mézières, who had 
just been appointed governor of T e x a s . N o  Indian diplo­
matist of comparable ability existed in Texas, or even in 
Louisiana, so prospects for winning the Nortenos to Spanish 
allegiance in that region became dim indeed.
Anza Achieves Peace with the Comanches 
in New Mexico
Fortunately, Croix found an administrator for New 
Mexico who was able to triumph over the Comanche problem. 
Governor Mendinueta resigned just as Croix was taking charge 
of the Provincias Internas, and Colonel Don Juan Bautista 
de Anza, appointed in May, 1777, to succeed him, took office
^^Croix to Galvez, Chihuahua, September 10, 1778, 
in Athanase de Mézières ed. by Bolton, II, 218-219.
58Bolton (ed.) ibid.. 118-121.
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in Chihuahua on August 8, 1778. Croix advised Anza to 
make peace with the Comanches if possible, in line with the 
recommendations of the councils of war, but he recognized 
the extreme difficulties which would prevail. The disheart­
ened commander general therefore outlined the minimum ob­
jectives to be achieved in the province: that the Comanches
make less frequent visits to the territories of New Mexico; 
that the Utes remain faithful to their alliance with the 
Spaniards; and that the Navajos be deterred from taking 
sides openly with the Apaches against the Spaniards.
Anza determined at once that it would be impracti­
cable to carry out the Rubi recommendations to which the 
Reglamento of 1772 still bound the province. He found the 
proposed location of a presidio at Robledo entirely imprac­
tical, and suggested Socorro as an alternative. Croix con­
cluded that the limited resources at his disposal did not 
warrant the establishment of a new presidio at this time, 
and, contrary to Rubi, it was decided that the military con­
tingents at Santa Fe and at El Paso each should be kept 
undivided for maximum effectiveness in the defense of the 
province,
^%oyal Title of Appointment, Aranjuez, May 19, 1777, 
in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 115-119.
^*^Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix 
ed, by Thomas, 114,
G^Ibid,. 107.
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Anza found his new command in a pitiful condition.
The Comanches had swept over the province in the year 1778,
meeting virtually no resistance from the widely dispersed
Spanish settlers. The result was that in a single blow the
province lost one hundred twenty-seven persons, dead or cap- 
6 2tured. The arrogance of the successful Comanches now knew 
no bounds. To prevent a recurrence of the disaster, Anza 
at once pushed forward the plan, advanced by Mendinueta and 
endorsed by Croix, of reorganizing the population in defen­
sible plazas. Progress toward consolidation of the settlers 
was made at Encinal, Albuquerque, Canada, Taos and at Ojo 
Caliente,^^
Certain that the Comanches would be in no mood to 
make peace until the New Mexican forces humbled them with 
a decisive defeat, Anza took the field against them in 
August, 1779, Pursuing a Comanche force w611 beyond the 
Arkansas River in present eastern Colorado, Anza inflicted 
a telling blow by killing the chief Cuerno Verde, who was 
responsible for much of the Comanche activity against New 
Mexico, Cuerno Verde's hatred for the Spaniards reputedly 
stemmed from the fact that his own father had been killed in 
action against the Spaniards, The removal of that bitter
G^lbid.. Ill,
^^Thomas (ed,) in Forgotten Frontiers, footnote 59»
379-380,
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and Influential personal hostility was a first step in the 
betterment of Spanish-Comanche relations.
Anza continued to improve the defenses of the prov­
ince, and to pursue and punish the Comanches whenever pos­
sible, By May, 1780, he was able to report to Croix that 
the Comanches had repeatedly requested p e a c e , A n z a  con­
sistently told Comanche delegates asking for peace that the 
Spaniards would be happy to treat with them, but that nego­
tiations would be feasible only when all their groups should 
unite to seek a binding peace between all Comanches and all 
Spaniards
Croix felt encouraged by the reports which he re­
ceived from Anza, and did everything in his power to support 
the governor's policies with the resources of the Provincias 
Internas, The commander general attached prime importance 
to the job of keeping the Comanches peacefully in their own 
area, in order to end their devastating hostilities against
^^Anza, Diario de la Expedition Que Sale a Practiear 
Contra la Nacion Cumancha El Infraescripto Teniente Coronel, 
Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governador y demandante de la Pro- 
vincia de Nuevo Mexico con la tropa, milicianos e indios, 
Santa Fe, September 10, 1779, in ibid,, 121-139,
^^Croix to Anza, Arispe, July 14, 1780, S,A,N,M,,
no, 799,
^^Pedro Garrido y Duran, An Account of the Events 
which Have Occurred in the Provinces of New Mexico Concern­
ing Peace Conceded to the Comanche Nation and Their Recon­
ciliation with the Utes since November 17 of Last Year and 
July 15 of the Current, Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, in 
Forgotten Frontiers ed, by Thomas, 294,
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the Spanish settlements. But he was gravely disturbed by a 
realization that the well-established friendship of the Span­
iards with the Utes and the Jicarilla Apaches might be a 
major obstacle in the way of making peace with the Comanches, 
Loath to risk a proven alliance for a tentative, experimental 
one, Croix therefore urged that even while Anza conciliated 
the Comanches, he must carefully conserve the friendship of 
the Utes and Jicarillas. If the Comanche problem were solved, 
it was hoped that the older allies might then be used against 
the hostile Apaches. If the Comanche peace failed, then the
loyalty of the Utes and Jicarillas would be essential to the
67preservation of New Mexico.
Croix tried to support Anza’s efforts with a peace 
offensive aimed at the Comanches from the adjoining province 
of Texas. Acting in accord with the governor of Texas, he 
sent Lon Nicolâs de la Mathe to visit the friendly Nations 
of the North, in the hope of regulating their activities and 
reaffirming their friendship for the Spaniards. If the 
diplomatic climate in the north seemed at all propitious, de 
la Mathe proposed to go on to the camps of the Comanches to 
see whether they would listen to his peace proposals. Such 
a journey could carry the agent to the Santa Fe region, in
6ftwhich case Anza was enjoined to give him all possible aid.
^^Orolx to Anza, Arispe, July 14, 1780, S.A.N.M., no.
799.
^®Id. to id., Arispe, March 25, 1781, S.A.N.M., no.
819.
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By February, 1783, Croix was able to report that his 
Texan agents were actually treating for a general peace 
with the Comanches and other Nations of the North. If the 
Comanches broke it, they were to be deprived of their trade 
with the Taovayas, who now seemed in a mood to cooperate 
with the Spaniards. Anza was urged to back up the Texan 
efforts by negotiating with the Comanches as much as pos­
sible in his own region.
The eventual success with the Comanches was won in 
New Mexico rather than in Texas. In accordance with Anza's 
requirement the principal groups of the Comanche nation in 
the New Mexico region met in council in November, 1785, de­
termined that they all wished a general peace, and appointed 
representatives whose treaties with the Spaniards they all 
agreed to honor. The meeting was promoted by chief Ecuera- 
capa, of the Cuchanec branch, and was attended by the Yupe 
and Yamparica divisions of the Comanche nation. The only 
Comanches not represented were those far to the north, who 
were prevented by deep snows from traveling to the council
on the Arkansas River, and the easternmost branch who lived
70near the Taovayas in the jurisdiction of Texas. The
^^Id. to id., Arispe, February 24, 1783, S.A.N.M.,
no. 858.
70Garrido y Duran, An account of the events . . . 
concerning peace conceded to the Comanche nation . . ., 
Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by 
Thomas, 294-295.
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negotiations, conducted between Ecueracapa and Anza, pro­
gressed without dissension, and were climaxed in February,
711786, with a peace treaty signed at the pueblo of Pecos.
The treaty represented a total triumph for Anza, for in ad­
dition to the long-desired peace between the Comanches and 
New Mexicans, there was effected at least a paper reconcilia­
tion of the explosive quarrel of the Utes and Comanches. 
Furthermore, the Comanches agreed to take the offensive in 
cooperation with the Spaniards against the hostile Apaches. 
The terms of the treaty thus operated to fulfill all the 
highest hopes of Commander General Croix.
The Spaniards exerted every possible influence to 
assure that Ecueracapa, whom they considered a man of proved 
reliability, would continue to act as commissioner-general 
in charge of the comanches. They were quite prepared to rig 
the tribal election in order that they could deal with some 
recognized, stable authority representing their new allies, 
Don Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, now in command of the Provincias 
Internas, urged that the peace be cemented by turning the 
Comanches to war against the Apaches as soon as possible.
At the same time that their warlike proclivities were being 
exploited, however, the Spaniards hoped to work gradually
71Articles of peace agreed upon and arranged in the 
villa of Santa Fe and the pueblo of Pecos between Colonel 
Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of the Province of New 
Mexico, and the Comanche captain, Ecueracapa, Commissioner- 
General of the nation on the days, 25th and 28th of February 
of 1786, ibid., 329-332.
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toward inducing the Comanches to settle down and accept an 
agricultural way of life. To allow the Comanche way of 
life to remain totally oriented around war and hunting would 
be to invite serious trouble for Spain once it was no longer 
desirable for her to use the Comanches as warriors. Look­
ing towards the future, then, every effort was to be made 
to teach the Comanches the Spanish language, customs and 
religion. It was planned that, if possible, some Spanish 
settlers and Pueblo Indians should be established near the
Comanches to serve as examples of the way of life which they
72were expected ultimately to adopt.
On the heels of Anza's treaty with the Comanches at 
Pecos in 1786, came the news that the eastern rancherias 
of the Cuchanec had made peace with the Texans. If Anza 
were now able to call in to ratify the peace the northern­
most Yamparicas, who had been unable to attend the winter 
negotiations because of snow, the Spaniards would have in
their grasp the long-sought objective of a general peace
73with the Comanches,
Although Anza's principal fame in New Mexico rests 
upon his success in making peace with the Comanches, he 
faced the problem of the bârbaros on all fronts, as had all 
of his predecessors. The Navajos, though nominally at
72Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola to Anza, Chihuahua, October 
5, 1786, S.A.N.M., no. 943.
75lbid.
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peace with the Spaniards, frequently took advantage of the 
obvious weakness of the province to make damaging raids.
The temptation was overpowering because the Navajos lived 
in such sterile desert country that they were almost obliged 
to rob in order to live. Only by the constant threat of 
turning the Utes upon them were the Spaniards able to hold 
them in check at all.^^
During the Anza administration, it became apparent 
that the Navajos were secretly operating in collusion with 
the Gila Apaches against New Mexico. Breaking up that dan­
gerous combination was Anza's job, and he put such pressure 
on the Navajos that they were obliged not only to reaffirm 
their peace treaties with the Spaniards, but to make war on 
their erstwhile Gila allies. Following the same policy 
which he used so successfully in dealing with the Comanches, 
Anza required the Navajos to elect a superior chief who
would be the authority responsible to the Spaniards for the
75maintenance of the peace.
The Navajos at that time were the victims of the 
conflicting forces which so often plagued a tribe caught in
^^Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix 
ed. by Thomas, 113-114.
^^Garrido y Duran, Account received of what was done 
in the province of New Mexico by Governor Don Juan Bautista 
de Anza to break the secret alliance which the Navajo nation 
maintained with the Gila Apaches, their separation,.and al­
legiance of the former to our side having been assured. Chi­
huahua, December 21, 1786, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by 
Thomas, 345-350,
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a squeeze between the power of the Spaniards and that of a 
neighboring group of Indians. Although their natural sym­
pathies lay with their Gila kinsmen, in becoming owners of 
flocks, fields and other tangible wealth, the Navajos had 
acquired a stake in the Spanish order. A cold-blooded analy­
sis of the situation written early in 1786 by ^  interim 
Commander General Joseph Antonio Rengel shows that certain 
officials responsible for Indian policy on the northern 
frontier clearly understood the dilemma of the Navajos and 
were prepared to exploit it to their fullest advantage. The 
new insight into the problems of dealing with the indios bâr­
baros marked a significant step in development of effective 
Spanish policies toward them.
. . . the Navajos are not entirely resolved to break 
with the Gilas, although they do not refuse it, knowing 
our friendship is more useful to their interests than 
that of the latter; but they might wish to enjoy the one 
without losing the other. This being incompatible with 
our principles, it is necessary that they decide. . . .
. . , the irresolution of the Navajos is more from being 
accustomed to the trade of our enemies, with whom they 
have old contacts of kinship; and because their close 
situation makes it hard for them to violate these rela­
tionships, To this is added not a little the fear of 
experiencing all the force of their Gila attacks with 
which they have been threatened since they began to 
manifest and prove by acts their disposition in our fa­
vor, Although there predominates in the minds of the 
majority the consideration of the good which they have 
enjoyed in their trade with the pueblos of New Mexico, 
from which they are recently cut off, and of the danger 
of losing, if they displease us, their herds, woven goods 
and cultivated fields, possession of which they all have 
some, the opposite idea still sustains itself among some 
of distinction who are holding back their case . . . '°
^^Joseph Antonio Rengel to the Conde de Gâlvez, 
Chihuahua, February 4, 1786, ibid.. 264.
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The succeeding commander general, Jacobo Ugarte y 
Loyola, was enormously relieved to hear that the Gila-Nav- 
ajo coalition had been broken, and he urged that all re­
sources now be mustered to exert maximum pressure on the 
Gilas. Navajo and Comanche warriors were to be used to the 
fullest extent possible; the commander general hoped thus to 
assemble enough Spanish forces and Indian auxiliaries to hit 
every Gila rancheria at least once in a general campaign. 
Ugarte y Loyola recommended that trade be used to tie Navajo 
interests firmly to those of the Spaniards, and ordered that
grave punishment be meted out at once to any settler who
77jeopardized the peace by sharp trading practices.
Navajo wars created still another problem for the 
Anza administration. The Navajos had long warred upon the 
isolated Hopi pueblos, which had maintained their indepen­
dence since the revolt of 1680. Spanish friars visiting the
Hopis had reported in 1776 that the hostilities had reached
78a severe intensity. By 1780, the Navajo pressure and 
droughts had reduced the Hopi population to such a degree 
that their survival as a people was in grave doubt. Anza
went to the Hopis to offer aid, at the price, of course, of
their return to the life of the Spanish missions. A hard
^^Ugarte y Loyola to Anza, Chihuahua, October 5, 
1786, S.A.N.M., no. 942.
”̂ ®Escalante , Pageant in the Wilderness. 235; Domin­
guez to Murillo, Zuni, November 25, 1776, in Dominguez, New
Mexico Missions, 289.
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core were adamant in their resistance to reconversion, pre­
ferring to remain on their mesas and await death at the 
hands of the Navajos or of famine. Some two hundred did 
return to New Mexico with the governor, and were settled on 
land grants at various pueblos. Anza felt that it might be 
necessary to force the remainder to come to the settled re­
gion of New Mexico for protection, in order that they not 
be captured by the Navajos and thus increase the numbers of 
that troublesome nation. He was forbidden, however, to use 
any means other than peaceable persuasion for the reduction 
of the Hopis.
Despite his own reservations regarding the Hopi pro­
blem, with its implication of an ultimate increase in Nav­
ajo strength, Anza had in large part solved the problem of 
the indios bârbaros in New Mexico. Having brought the Co­
manches to Spanish alliance without disrupting the Spanish 
friendship with the Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, Anza now had 
his province in a position to concentrate its resources a- 
gainst the hostile Apaches. Indeed, the forces would now be 
so strongly augmented by powerful Indian allies that un­
precedented pressures could be exerted against the Apaches.
The consequences were far-reaching throughout the 
Provincias Internas. With the Comanches and Navajos sub­
stantially under control at Santa Pe, the rest of the
'^^Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix 
ed. by Thomas, 109-110.
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provinces could join with renewed hope in a concentrated 
offensive against the Apaches, Long denied effective rein­
forcements of Spanish troops, the provincias Internas now 
had a much more effective weapon against the Apaches. The 
Comanches, who had for two generations threatened the very 
existence of the northern frontier, would now be the instru­
ment by which New Spain at last effected control of her 
turbulent northern borderlands.
CHAPTER IV
A SUCCESSFUL INDIAN POLICY EMERGES,
1786-1800
Teodoro de Croix was not present on the northern 
frontier to see the successes achieved by Anza in New Mexi­
co, for in 1782 his services to the Crown were rewarded with 
the appointment as viceroy of Peru. Upon the departure of 
Croix in 1783, his ^  interim successor as commandante gen­
eral of the Provincias Internas was Felipe de Neve, who 
served until his death in 1784. Neve was followed by an­
other ad interim appointee, Joseph Rengel, who lasted until 
a general shake-up in the administration of the Provincias 
Internas occurred in 1785.
Viceroy Bernardo de Gâlvez Attacks the Problem 
of the Northern Frontier
In 1785 there arrived in Mexico a new viceroy, Ber­
nardo de Galvez, who had already served with distinction as 
governor of Louisiana, and who had very early in his career 
displayed conspicuous merit as commander of the frontier of 
Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. With the beginning of the Galvez 
administration in New Spain, supervisory authority over the
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Provincias Internas was restored to the viceroy. Since 
Gâlvez believed that the Provincias Internas was too vast a 
unit to be supervised effectively by one man, he divided it 
into administrative districts. Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola be­
came commandante general. Juan de Ugalde was appointed 
comandante de armas. in charge of the districts of Texas and 
Coahuila. Rengel was made comandante inspector. in charge 
of Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico. Commandante General Ugarte 
y Loyola himself was to take charge of Sonora and the Cali- 
fornias, and to exercise direct authority over Rengel and 
Ugalde. Because of its remoteness from the other Provincias 
Internas, New Mexico was left very much on its own. For in­
stance, the governor of New Mexico was made sub-inspector 
of troops in his own province in order that Rengel and his 
aides should not be required to attempt frequent trips to 
New Mexico.^
During the period of a^ interim administrations, 
there had been a great deal of confusion and insecurity in 
the Provincias Internas. Some progress had been made, how­
ever, in the war against the Apaches. For instance, in the 
years 1781 to 1783, Juan de Ugalde, then governor of Coahuila, 
had led three campaigns against the Apaches, driving them 
temporarily from the Bolson de Mapimi and closing one of 
their favorite entrances to the more populous regions of the
^Gâlvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Pro­
vinces ed. by Worcester, 28-34.
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Provincias Internas, The campaigns did much to restore the 
morale of the Spaniards on the eastern frontier and im­
pressed upon the eastern Apaches a new respect for Spanish 
arms.̂
It was generally feared on the northern frontier 
that the restoration of the Provincias Internas to direct 
viceregal authority might seriously hamper the conduct of 
the wars against the Apaches. However, Galvez was unique 
among viceroys in his extensive frontier experience and his 
grasp of the problems of Indian relations. His extraordi­
nary perspectives stemmed in part from his experiences in 
Louisiana, where he had observed the effects of French In­
dian policies which differed radically from traditional 
Spanish approaches, but which were in general much more ap­
plicable to the indios bârbaros. In Louisiana, Galvez gain­
ed not only fresh ideas about dealing with the Indian popu­
lation, but also a realization that the Apaches and Coman­
ches represented only the initial waves of a succession of 
indios bârbaros who would sweep toward the Spanish frontier. 
A knowledge of the Osage and Pawnee menaces, with some idea 
of the Siouxan pressures which fermented still further north 
of those nations, gave Gâlvez a new appreciation of the 
urgency of solving the immediate Apache problem, if only to 
gird the northern frontier against fresh onslaughts.
^Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde," 60-65.
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Gâlvez Issues a Definitive Statement 
of Indian Policy
The statement of policy which Galvez Issued in 1786 
to govern the conduct of war and peace with the Indians is
a landmark in the history of Spanish Indian policy, the
fruit of two and a half centuries of Spain's experience in 
dealing with the people of the New World, heavily seasoned 
with the practical French approach.
With the Comanches, Utes and Navajos at peace in New 
Mexico, and with the Nations of the North behaving relatively 
well in Texas, there now existed an unprecedented opportu­
nity to muster all of the resources of the northern frontier 
to meet the Apache menace, Galvez was prompt to exploit the 
advantage,
War [he insisted] must be waged without intermission in 
all of the provinces and at all times against the A-
paches who have declared it. They must be sought out
in their rancherias, because it is the only method of 
punishing them* and the only one by which we may be ? 
able to achieve the pacification of the territories.
Appraising the military problem involved, Galvez 
pointed out that troops and presidios had never been suffi­
cient for the defense and security of the Provincias Inter­
nas, In 1729 the presidios had seven hundred thirty-four 
men, with an annual pay of 283,930 pesos. With gradual in­
creases over the years, by 1786 there were approximately
^Gâlvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior 
Provinces ed, by Worcester, 34,
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four thousand men in the presidios, not counting those in 
the Californias, at an annual cost of more than one million 
pesos. Nonetheless, there were still the "same complaints 
of sanguinary hostilities, approaching ruin, and complete 
desolation" which had been raised from the beginning.^ In 
view of the clear inadequacy of the prevailing procedures, 
therefore, Galvez intended to reform existing military prac­
tices on the northern frontier, and perhaps more importantly, 
to institute a new approach to the problem of the Apaches.
The viceroy pointed out that the very nature of A- 
pache warfare almost precluded pitched battles between op­
posing forces. Unlike European armies, the Apaches "never 
concern themselves with glorious demonstrations of power 
against power." Aspiring to nothing more than killing and 
robbing with impunity, they simply took advantage of negli­
gence or weakness wherever they found it among the Spaniards. 
Skilled in self-preservation for centuries, they watched 
with utmost care from their hidden rancherias to avoid being 
surprised by Spanish forces, and avoided battle whenever 
possible. Apache warfare, then, called for extraordinary 
skill and experience on the part of the Spanish military
5leaders.
Perhaps because of his own experience as a frontier 




planning of military actions. Ugarte y Loyola, Rengel and 
Ugalde were to distribute the troops of their respective com­
mands in the posts which seemed most advantageous to them. 
Commandants of detachments or independent forces on campaign 
were to be allowed complete freedom of action, unlimited by 
any restrictions. Wherever possible, troops were to be ex­
cused from such unnecessary duties as escort, courier and 
care of animals. Extreme care was to be exercised to gar­
rison the remount stations adequately, and any commander who 
was careless in the matter would be required to replace at 
his own expense any losses which were suffered.^
No displays of temperament by the officers would be 
tolerated. Newly arrived officers, no matter how senior or 
experienced elsewhere, were to recognize that they were no­
vices in Apache warfare, and they were to learn the techni­
ques at once from veterans of the campaign, regardless of
7considerations of rank or seniority.. Because pursuit of 
the Apaches was useless unless carried out with the utmost 
skill, Gâlvez resolved that the commands of the detachments 
would be confided only to officers of proved experience in 
Indian warfare, well acquainted with the country, and again 
without regard for seniority. The viceroy notified all of­
ficers in advance that no complaints or appeals in this 




Gâlvez demanded that all attention now be concen­
trated on the Apache problem. The Tarahumares of Nueva 
Vizcaya were to be offered a general amnesty so as not to 
divert troops of that province which should be campaigning 
against the Apaches. The settled Indians of Sonora were to 
be kept busy in the mines, in order that idleness should not 
lead them to imitate the escapades of the Apaches. Unless 
a matter of extreme urgency arose, there was to be no attempt 
to open travel between Upper California and Sonora, because 
the necessity of protecting the road would create a shortage 
of troops in Sonora. The Seris, Tiburones and the tribes 
of the Colorado River were to be ignored as far as possible, 
because "once the Apaches are conquered, or at least se­
verely punished, the other domestic enemies could be sub­
jected with less difficulty, and the menace of the tribes
Qof the Colorado would be negligible."
But warfare was by no means the sole, or even the 
most important, aspect of Galvez's Indian policy. He had 
comprehensive plans for peaceful dealings with even the 
Apaches. Because his analysis of the factors in Indian poli­
cy is perhaps the most cogent ever presented by a top-rank­
ing authority on this or any other North American frontier, 




Provided that our incessant campaigns produce desired 
results of intimidating and disheartening the Indians to 
such a degree that one or more of the Apache groups sue 
for peace, it should he conceded to them immediately 
under definite rules and points of capitulation. An ac­
count of the terms should be sent to me in order that I 
may warn others that they must observe them. For it is 
my intention to establish with the Indians a commerce 
which will attract them to us, which will interest them, 
and which in time will put them under our dependency.
It is permissible to refer to the wiles, the advan­
tages, and the security with which the barbarous Indians 
wage war against us. We well know that this is their 
unrivalled occupation, and that they execute it with 
courage, swiftness and dexterity. They never fail in 
their attacks; but even if we should be able to dislodge 
them from the rough mountain ridges and impenetrable 
woods which cover the immense territories of these fron­
tiers, they would seek better asylum in the fastnesses 
of the Sierra Madre.
In the event that this should happen, the number of 
our enemies may be augmented by the addition of those 
infidels who now live peacefully in the great gorges of 
the same sierra, and by those malcontents in the mission 
pueblo, extending the hostilities to the quietest prov­
inces of the viceroyalty. In such a case there would 
not be sufficient forces with which to prevent the cruel 
outbreaks of a multitude of barbarians.
I am certain that the vanquishment of the heathen 
consists in obliging them to destroy one another. They 
are not capable under their present system of being re­
duced to the true religion or to vassalage, without a 
miracle of the Almighty, or of preserving constant faith 
in their armistices; but I also understand that in the 
state in which they keep our provinces a bad peace with 
all the tribes which ask for it would be more fruitful 
than the gains of a successful war.
It should not seem strange that in these provinces 
they should make peace with the Indians. All the Na­
tions of the North are at peace in Texas; so are the 
Lipan Apaches in the same province and in Coahuila, as 
well as the Jicarillas, Navajos, Utes, and even the Co- 
manches in New Mexico; and the Seris and Tiburones in 
Sonora. In 1771, the Apaches made peace in the town of 
El Paso, as did the Gilenos with the presidio of Janos 
and with Nueva Vizcaya.
147
No one can ignore the fickleness and bad faith of 
all the Indiana, but good faith has not always been en­
countered in our own actions. There are a thousand an­
cient and very recent examples of this truth that never 
should be mentioned.
Peace is founded, as everything else, on private in­
terests, and the Indians, in general, have not been able 
to have advantages in peace treaties which they have en­
joyed up to now. They live by hunting and warfare.
These are not enough to supply the prime necessities of 
existence. And so, if they do not rob, they perish of 
hunger and misery.
This is the motivating cause by which we might have 
peace by deceit, and it actually comes to this. For our 
grants are sufficient to maintain them, nor can other 
assistance, which is absolutely necessary for their ex­
istence, be lent.
They lack horses and mules, and the Apaches suffer 
the greatest risks in their efforts to acquire these 
animals to eat, because they are their favorite food.
And all of the Indians desire them for hunting and for 
campaigns against us and against each other.
They desire most anxiously to provide themselves with 
guns, powder, and munitions; for by the use of these arms 
they find pleasure and security in hunting, and they be­
lieve mistakenly that they are the most advantageous in 
war.
They also have other whims that can only be classed 
as folly. They attempt to cover their nakedness, to 
make the men fierce and the women attractive, with paints 
or vermilion, and they adorn themselves with ornaments 
which to our sight appear ridiculous.
We shall benefit by satisfying their desires. It 
will cost the king .less than what is now spent in consi­
derable and useless reinforcements of troops. The In­
dians cannot live without aid. They will go to war a- 
gainst one another in our behalf and from their own war­
like inclinations, or they may possibly improve their 
customs by following our good example, voluntarily em­
bracing our religion and vassalage. And by these means 
they will keep faith in their truces.
We always have these experiences in our colonies and 
newly conquered territories; and the truth is that also
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in the Provincias Internas the deceitful peace pacts of 
the Indians produce better results than open war.
In time of peace the Indians alleviate their neces­
sities partially with our limited gifts and with the 
miserable barter of skins, seeds, and wild fruit. They 
receive no affronts from our arms which incite them to 
vengeance, and as a natural consequence hostilities are 
fewer,
Some hostilities are usually experienced in the prov­
ince, presidios, or town where peace has been establish­
ed, and the Indians never desist from committing out­
rages in other territories. All these arise from the 
same causes; the unsatisfied necessity which obliges 
them to rob in order to eat and greediness to acquire 
the things that they desire— liberty, idleness, and the 
same poverty that engenders and foments their perverse 
inclinations. If their hunger is great, they do not 
relieve it by committing robberies where they have been 
offered friendship. If it is not great, they preserve 
the peace with good faith, and truly they do not break 
it, for they commit their hostilities in other places. 
More than once they have made this candid confession, 
persuading themselves that they do not offend their 
friends by the harm which they impute to other subjects 
of the king who live in territories where actually no 
peace has been made. This happened with all the Apaches 
in the town of El Paso and the presidio of Janos, with 
the Mescaleros in Nueva Vizcaya, with the Jicarillas, 
Navajos, Utes, and Comanches in New Mexico, with the 
Lipans in Coahuila, and with the Nations of the North in 
Texas, and the practice continues.
One can see that this brings some inconveniences 
which make problematical the utility of peace; for it 
is manifest that where the Indians proclaim it, they 
leave their families in safety in order to operate with 
greater peace of mind in their outbreaks; and also they 
undertake them with greater confidence, because they are 
better informed concerning our ideas, customs, and move­
ments, These are the interests which today stimulate 
the Indians to solicit our friendship; and undoubtedly, 
it would be more advantageous for us to wage war if we 
do not find better means to establish peace.
The interest in commerce binds and narrows the de­
sires of man; and it is my wish to establish trade with 
the Indians in these provinces, admitting them to peace 
wherever they ask for it.
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Peace will be broken many times because of their 
volatile character, the difficulty of compromise by some 
people who do not recognize anything greater than their 
unbridled impulsiveness or their whims, or because it 
will be necessary to punish them justly. But once war 
is declared and prosecuted with vigor, the Indians will
again seek peace, and we should always concede it when­
ever they ask for it.
Meanwhile, being at peace, we should for our part 
observe scrupulously the terms made and endeavor to com­
pel the Indians to do the same, overlooking certain 
trifling defects which arise from their ignorance, rough 
character, and bad customs. Serious defections should 
be punished when there is an opportunity to teach them 
a lesson and when there is no peril of risking the re­
spect of our arms.
One should also foment skillfully the discord and 
hostility between the factions of the same tribe and 
the irreconcilable hatred of the Nations of the North 
for the Apaches.
In the voluntary of forced submission of the Apaches, 
or in their total extermination, lies the happiness of 
the Provincias Internas'; because they are the ones who 
have destroyed these provinces, live on their frontiers, 
and cause the apostatism and unrest of the reduced In­
dians ,
I do not believe that the Apaches will submit volun­
tarily (God alone could work this miracle), but we may 
contribute to the means of attracting the different 
factions of this tribe, making them realize the advan­
tages of rational life, which should please them. They 
should be made accustomed to the use of our foods, drinks, 
arms, and clothing, and they should become greedy for 
the possession of land . . .  .9
Galvez favored encouragement of the old feud be­
tween the Lipan and Mescalero Apaches in order to weaken 
both groups. He believed that in time intra-tribal hosti­
lity and the inroads of the Nortenos might combine to ex­
terminate the Apaches. Then the Provincias Internas would
9lbid.. 36-43.
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at least have time to strengthen and consolidate their 
forces, in preparation for the hostilities of the other 
powerful tribes which, in view of his observations in Loui­
siana, Galvez thought were undoubtedly approaching the Span­
ish frontiers.
The peace with the Nortenos in Texas was to be care­
fully preserved, almost any lengths being justified to pre­
vent their becoming annoyed. To forestall action against 
the Nortenos by some rash frontier official, Galvez reserved 
to himself alone the power to decide whether infractions by 
the Nortenos should be punished by Spanish forces.
Galvez urged the immediate establishment of the 
trade with the Apaches. He realized that it would not be 
easy, but thought that the Lipans at least might cooperate. 
"The Lipans have better opportunities for acquisition and 
profit from the fur trade, and because of this frequent 
intercourse with the Spaniards they are more inclined to 
barter.
Trade with the Apaches could be carried on by any 
one of three methods; private traders; government traders; 
a free trade open to all settlers of the provinces. Galvez, 





the important thing was that only one must he established, 
and then, whichever method had been chosen, "it will require 
the vigilance of the government to prevent the harmful re­
sults that arise from the excesses of cupidity.
In return for the furs of the Indians, the viceroy 
proposed to trade the following items: horses, mares, mules,
cattle, dried meat, sugar loaves, maize, tobacco, brandy, 
guns, ammunition, knives, clothing or coarse cloth, ver­
milion, mirrors, glass beads and other trinkets. No more 
radical departure from the traditions of Spanish practice 
could be imagined than to trade the Indians livestock and 
guns. But Galvez argued that to trade livestock to the 
Apaches would enable them, under peaceful conditions, to de­
velop abundant herds to supply their needs. This would re­
move the primary cause of their robberies, and thus contri­
bute significantly to the establishment of lasting peace.
Galvez observed that, although the Nortenos already 
liked liquor, the Apaches did not yet know it. He felt it 
important that they should be taught the use of brandy or 
mescal, for once they acquired a taste for liquor, it would 
become the most profitable item for the merchants in the 
Indian trade.
After all, the supplying of drink to the Indians 




their secrete, calming them so that they will think less 
often of conceiving and executing their hostilities, 
and creating for them a new necessity which will oblige 
them to recognize their dependence upon us more direct­
ly.
They will admit the dependence without doubt in the 
barter of guns and munitions, which the Lipans wish with 
great anxiety, and it is an error to believe that fire­
arms used by the Indians do us greater harm than bow and 
arrow.
Nobody is ignorant of the agility and certainty 
with which they discharge their arrows without inter­
ruption, the force and power of this arm, the havoc 
which it causes, and that the Indians provide themselves 
with them wherever they can without need for factory or 
supplies.
Firearms, on the other hand, require much careful 
attention in order to preserve them in a useable condi­
tion, continuous exercise to handle them with dexterity, 
knowledge to avail oneself of the good qualities of 
these arms and to correct their defects, and finally, 
opportunity to repair and replace those that become 
damaged or useless.
All this is very difficult for the Indians who, as 
vagrants in their nomadic life, suffer the inclemencies 
of the elements, and they will not be able to preserve 
their firearms. They need our aid for the use and ac­
quisition of them, as . . . has been affirmed by my own 
observations and experience.
Firearms will be advantageous to them in their hunt­
ing, as I have already said, and in the warfare of the 
heathen tribes with one another, but not in their hos­
tility to us; for if the Indians should abandon the ar­
row for the firearm, they would give us all the advan­tages. ̂ 5
Considering all these factors, G-âlvez made the sug­
gestion, revolutionary in Spanish practice, that guns be 
furnished in the Apache trade. He specified that they 
should be long and ornate, but of weak construction. The
l^ibid.. 47-48.
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size would be awkward on horseback and thus result in fre­
quent breakage. He wished powder supplied regularly and 
abundantly, in order that the Indians would use guns to the 
exclusion of the bow and arrow, and would begin to lose 
their skill with their native weapons. Then, if a war began, 
the Spaniards could check the Apaches quite effectively 
simply by cutting off their ammunition supplies. Admitting 
that it would be necessary for the government to lose quite 
heavily in the Indian trade at first, Galvez argued that it 
would be a relatively small price to pay to diminish hosti­
lities and restore the prosperity of the beleaguered north­
ern provinces.
Galvez summarized his policy as follows:
By proceeding unceasingly against the declared ene­
mies it will be possible to punish, restrain, àhd in­
timidate them to the point that they will depart from 
our frontiers or solicit peace. By conceding peace to 
them they may be attracted gently to the advantages of 
rational life and to necessary dependency on us by the 
interesting means of commerce and by discreet and op­
portune gifts. If peace is broken by the fickleness of 
the Indian or because of his intolerably bad faith we 
should rightly return to incessant and harsh war, al­
ternating war and peace as often as the haughty or 
humble behavior of the barbarous Indians requires.
These essentially are the rules on which.the pro­
posed system is based; they appear to me just, and they 
employ the ancient hatred, factional interest, and in­
constancy and perfidy of the heathen tribes to their 
mutual destruction.
I am very much in favor of the special ruination 
of the Apaches, and in endeavoring to interest the 
other tribes and even other Apache bands in it, because 
these Indians are our real enemies in the Provincias 
Internas; they cause its desolation and are the most 
feared because of their knowledge, cunning, warlike
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customs (acquired in the necessity of robbing in order 
to live), and their number. ”
Galvez did not live to see his plans executed, for 
he died within the year that the Instruction was issued.
But the policy had been endorsed by the king, and it re­
mained the official guiding principle in the Apache wars 
through the remainder of the century. The next viceroy, 
Manuel Antonio flores (1787-1789), protested strongly to the 
king against the idea of making treaties with any Apache
tribe, and he declared the proposed Apache trade to be to-
17tally impracticable. But his objections apparently did
not impress the Crown, for upon his retirement in 1789 
flores instructed his successor that the principles of Gâl- 
vez on Indian policy which had been approved by the king
1 Qwere still in effect. In 1788, flores notified the new
governor of New Mexico, Fernando de la Concha, that the Gâl- 
vez Instruction was still to be vigorously p u r s u e d . A  
year later, Ugarte y Loyola, transmitting to New Mexico the 
orders of the new viceroy, the Conde de Revilla Gigedo,
^^Tbid.. 79-80.
17Bancroft, North Mexican States. I, 649.
18Don Manuel Antonio Flores to Conde de Revilla Gi­
gedo, August 26, 1789, in Instrucciones que los Vireyes de 
Nueva Esnaïïa De.iaron a Sus Sucesores; Anadense Algunas que 
los Mismos Tra.ieron de la Porte y Otros Documentes Semejan- 
tes a las Instrucciones . I . (Mexico, 187^),' I, é42.
19Flores to Governor Fernando de la Concha, Mexico, 
January 2, 1788, 8.A.N.M., no. 981.
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ordered the scrupulous observance of the Gâlvez order, par­
ticularly in the matter of war and peace with the Apaches.
Flores did carry further the administrative divi­
sion of the Provincias Internas which Gâlvez had begun.
Croix had stated very early in his administration that the 
Provincias Internas was too unwieldy for effective adminis­
tration, and had recommended that it should be divided into
0 * 1eastern and western parts, each under its own commandante. 
Gâlvez had divided the administration of the Provincias In­
ternas among the commander general and two high-ranking as- 
22sistants. Now Flores made the absolute division recom­
mended by Croix, establishing the Provincias Internas del 
Oriente (Coahuila, Texas, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander) 
under Commander General Juan de Ugalde, and the Provincias 
Internas del Occidente (Californias, Sonora, New Mexico, and
Nueva Vizcaya) under Commander General Jacobo Ugarte y Lo- 
23yola. In 1790, Brigadier General Pedro de Nava succeeded 
to the post of commander general in the west, and also ad 
interim in the east. Three years later the Provincias 
Internas were again consolidated into a single command, but
20Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, November 21, 
1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1067.
21Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde" (citing Croix to Gâlvez 
Chihuahua, June 29» 1778), 190.
^^See above, 141.
23Flores, Instruccion, in Instrucciones que los Vir­
eyes de Nueva Esnana De.iaron a Sus Sucesores. I, 644.
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the Californias, Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander were de­
tached and placed directly under viceregal control. The Prov­
incias Internas were again made independent of the viceroy, 
although Revilla Gigedo objected vigorously. No further im­
portant changes were made in administrative organization 
during the eighteenth century.
The New Mexican Alliances with the Barbaros 
Survive a 6hange in Administration
There were also changes in the government of New 
Mexico just as the new policies were promulgated. Anza was 
succeeded as governor by Fernando de la Concha, who appar­
ently took office in 1787. Concha found that the Gâlvez 
instruction had delegated to the governor of New Mexico an 
extraordinary amount of discretion and responsibility. "In 
New Mexico, as the province is very distant and surrounded 
in all directions by different enemies, the troops must o-
perate, if not by themselves, with only the aid of the Span-
25ish settlers and the Indians of the pueblos." The gover­
nor was to command the war operations of the province freely, 
but to combine movements when possible with those of Sonora 
and Nueva Vizcaya, The primary aim was to press hard against 
the hostile Apaches. El Paso was to be used as a center "for 
establishing peace and maintaining commerce with the Apaches,"
^^Worcester (ed.) in Galvez, Instructions for Govern­
ing the Interior Provinces. 26.
^^Galvez, ibid.. 72.
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and also as a post for spying on Apaches who were at peace 
there in order to prevent their attempting hostilities in 
Nueva Vizcaya. The hostilities of the Navajos against the 
Grilas were to be promoted vigorously, using trade to bind 
the interests of the Navajos firmly to the Spaniards, The 
Utes were to be carefully cultivated, in order that they 
might be used against the Comanches or Navajos if either 
should act in bad faith. The peace with the Jicarillas was 
to be conserved, and no effort was to be spared to keep the 
Comanches happy.
The task outlined for Concha was a formidable one, 
but the New Mexican alliances with the former enemies of the 
province seem to have been built on astonishingly stable 
foundations, and Concha achieved remarkable success in car­
rying out the Galvez order.
The Comanches were a bit wary of the change in ad­
ministration, but Concha was able to assure them that he 
would carry out Anza's commitments to them in perfect faith. 
The agreement was formalized in November, 1787. Concha also 
managed to continue uninterrupted the peaceable relations 
with the Utes and Navajos.
Concha faced the difficult task of managing the use 
of the new Indian allies in the all^out offensive against
P AFlores to Concha, Mexico, January 2, 1788, S.A, 
N.M., no. 981.
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the Apaches. The policy of the Provincias Internas was 
that in order to maintain constant control over the cam­
paigns of the gentile allies against the Apaches, their
chiefs should be required to give an account of all their 
27campaigns. The Comanches cooperated quite willingly in 
that matter, giving accounts of casualties, prisoners and 
livestock taken, and usually informing Concha of their 
movements in advance when practicable.
The Comanche campaign against the Apaches began in
earnest in July, 1787, with action against the Paraon A-
28paches. In 1789 they campaigned against the Llanero and 
Sierra Blanca Apaches. Interestingly enough, at least one 
of their forays was inspired by information which the Jica- 
rilla Apaches gave to their old enemies, the Comanches, about
t 2Qthe locations of the rancherias of other Apache groups.
The Comanches were rewarded for their cooperation 
with the Spaniards. In the fall of 1789, Concha provided 
at the expense of the province a supply of corn which the 
Comanches needed to prevent a winter of hunger in their 
camps. The act was enthusiastically endorsed by the com­
mander general.
27Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Arispe, January 23, 1788, 
8.A.N.M., no, 998.
ZGlbid.
oq^Concha to ugarte y Loyola, Santa Pe, November 20, 
1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1066.
^^Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, November 21, 
1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1067.
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Concha went even further in demonstrating his grati­
tude to the Comanches in 1790, when he acceded to their re­
quest for a Spanish military escort to protect them from 
the Pawnees when they went far to the northeast to hunt buf­
f a l o . F o r t u n a t e l y ,  no contact with the Pawnees occurred. 
Commander General Nava was alarmed at the venture, and re­
primanded the governor in a severe letter which caused Con­
cha to acknowledge that aiding the Comanches against the
Pawnees might only serve to attract the Pawnees to the New
32Mexican frontier in search of the Comanches. The Coman­
ches were an invaluable barrier between the Pawnees and New 
Mexico, but Nava vigorously rejected any course of action
which risked attracting their distant enemies by going far
33afield to hunt them. Concha promised that there should 
be no repetition of the incident.
The concerted pressures of the Spanish offensives 
from the south and the Comanche forays from the north began 
to tell on the Apaches. They were no longer able to arrange 
exchanges of prisoners at their pleasure in order to regain 
lost Apaches, as had usually been true in the past, because
^^Juan de Dios Pena, Diary and Derrotero of the cam­
paign made at Concha’s order with the Comanches against the 
Pawnees, Santa Pe, August 8, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 1089.
32Concha to Pedro de Nava, Santa Pe, November 1, 
1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1164.
33Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, December 17, 1791, S.A. 
N.M., no. 1178.
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in 1788 the Provincias Internas adopted a policy of deport­
ing Apache captives in chains to M e x i c o . B y  the summer 
of 1789» both the Gila and Sierra Blanca Apaches began to 
inquire about making peace in New Mexico. Concha put them 
off while he inquired about their raiding activities in the 
south, for he was determined that they should not be allowed
to make peace in his province only to use it as a base for
5 5continuing hostilities to the south in greater safety.
Some of the results of the inquiry apparently satisfied Con­
cha, for a year after the initial request, he admitted a 
group of Gila Apaches to peace under the following terms:
The Apaches agreed to keep a firm peace; to tell the 
Spaniards at once of entrance by the Natagees or other A- 
paches not included in this peace, and to aid the Spaniards 
in expelling them; to turn in any of their own members who 
should violate the peace by horse theft or other crimes; 
always to be ready to aid Concha in campaigns against the 
Natagees and other hostile Apaches; to exhort their people 
not to commit hostilities against El Paso, Pronteras or 
Nueva Vizcaya; to report to Concha any such infraction, and 
not to permit the offenders to come back into the rancherias; 
to establish themselves on the bank of the Rio Grande, from
^^Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Arispe, January 23,
1788, S.A.N.M., no. 993.
^^Concha to Flores, Santa Pe, July 6, 1789, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1052.
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Cebolla to Socorro, ten leagues from the southernmost New 
Mexico settlement; to try agriculture, for which the neces­
sary tools would be furnished by the Spaniards. Concha 
hoped that the good"'example of the Navajos and Jicarillas 
would facilitate the "civilization” of this Gila group, and 
that the new peace would do much to relieve the pressures
•7 C
on Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya.
Experiments in Reducing the Bârbaros 
to Village Agriculture
Concha's optimism was not unjustified. In November,
1790, he was able to report that the Gila Apaches who had
made peace in July had scrupulously observed their agreement 
37in New Mexico. In July of the following year. Concha re­
ported that the Gilas were keeping their promise to settle
down to agriculture on the Rio Grande, south of Sabinal,
*58and were receiving Spanish aid in the project. They had 
demonstrated anew their good faith in keeping the peace 
treaty when they warned Concha of some depredations which 
the Natagees planned on the New Mexican frontier.
Late in July, Concha held a council with the Apaches 
at Sabinal about their taking up agriculture. Local settlers
^^Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Pe, July 13, 1790, 
S.A.N.M., no. 1086.
^^Id. to id., Santa Pe, November 19, 1790, S.A.N.M.,




who were able were each contributing to the project live­
stock, which was to form the foundation of the herds of the 
Apache farmers. Already the Apaches were regularly culti­
vating three fields, and Concha felt quite encouraged about 
their progress toward a settled agriculture. He saw this 
as the only method for establishing a stable peace, because 
when the Apaches lived scattered in the mountains, depend­
ing for subsistence upon natural products and the scant agri­
culture which they could manage under pressure by Comanche 
raiders, they had to rob in order to live.^^
The experiment was a more durable one than many 
skeptics believed possible. The Apaches remained in their 
settlement at Sabinal until the autumn of 1794, when they 
broke their treaty for the first time by withdrawing to the 
mountains. Commander General Nava ordered that they be 
brought back if possible, with no particular punishment for 
this first offense, and with the greatest vigilance by the 
Spaniards to prevent a second w i t h d r a w a l . T h e  Apaches did 
return to Sabinal before the end of 1794.^^
The same policies had earlier led to two experiments 
in settling the indios bârbaros. one among the Comanches
^^Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 22, 1791, S.A.N.M., no.
1203.
^^Nava to Governor Fernando Chacon, Chihuahua, Octo­
ber 11, 1794, S.A.N.M., no. 1290a.
4.?Id. to id.. Chihuahua, December 31, 1794, S.A.N.M.,
no. 1303a.
163
and another among the Navajos. Concha decided early in his 
administration that in order to establish a permanent peace 
with the Navajos, it would be necessary to settle them in 
formal pueblos in the vicinity of New Mexico, not only to 
strengthen the influence of the Spanish and Pueblo examples, 
but also to protect the Navajos from the depredations of 
the Gila A p a c h e s , D e s p i t e  the severity of the Gila raids, 
by 1791 the Navajos were settling doTO nicely in substantial 
houses, tilling the soil in the Spanish fashion and posses­
sing a great deal of l i v e s t o c k . T h e y  were also engaged 
in a flourishing trade with New Mexico in skins and tex­
t i l e s . U n t i l  1796 the Spanish officials had reason to 
feel quite optimistic about the progress in the "civilization" 
of the Navajos.
Although the Comanche alliance ultimately proved 
more durable than the Navajo one, an experiment in settling 
them down to agricultural pursuits was very short-lived.
Chief Paruanarimuco, of the Yupes Comanches, came twice in 
July, 1787, to urge Anza to aid his people to settle them­
selves in permanent dwellings on the Arkansas River. Anza 
agreed to the experiment, and by October the Comanches, with
^^Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Pe, November 12, 
1788, S.A.N.M., no. 1022.
^^Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Pe, July 12, 1791, 
S.A.N.M., no. 1132.
Revilla Gigedo to Concha, Mexico, December 14, 
1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1176.
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Spanish aid, had completed nineteen dwellings. Many more 
were in various stages of construction. The Spaniards con­
tributed sheep, oxen, maize, and seed to subsidize the new 
agricultural economy. The pueblo, christened San Carlos de 
los Jupes, apparently was located well within present Colo­
rado, on the Arkansas River near a lesser stream, and on 
rich lands. Unfortunately, just as the experiment was get­
ting well underway, Anza retired from the governorship of 
New Mexico, and the distressed Comanches thought that this 
automatically meant the end of Spanish support for the pue­
blo. They returned the implements to the Spaniards who had 
been sent to the village to help them, and sent them all 
back to New Mexico.
Ugarte y Loyola, who had followed the experiment 
with great interest, ordered Governor Concha to go ahead 
with the Yupe pueblo project. Concha won the confidence of 
the Comanches, and they stayed on, completing their houses 
with the aid of the Spaniards. However, in January 1788, 
they abruptly abandoned the pueblo, and all efforts to per­
suade them to return were fruitless. Concha learned that the 
favorite wife of the chief had died there, and that the su­
perstitions of the Comanches surrounding death required them 
to leave the spot.^^
^^•’Expediente sobre la Poblacion de San Carlos de 
los Jupes en el Nuevo Mexico, Ano de 1788,” in Thomas, "San 
Carlos, A Comanche Pueblo on the Arkansas River, 1787,” 
Colorado Magazine, VI (May, 1929), 79-91.
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Ugarte y Loyola was so distressed at the thought of 
losing the strategically located establishment on the Ar­
kansas that he ordered it settled by a Spanish population, 
to facilitate the "civilizing" of the Comanches if they 
could be persuaded to return, and to be fortified as a base 
of operations against them if they should break the peace. 
Concha managed to convince Ugarte y Loyola that the expense 
involved in occupying the site with Spanish settlers would 
far outweigh any advantage gained, and the commander general 
contented himself with ordering Concha to make every effort 
to persuade the Comanches to return to the site.^® The 
governor, realizing the psychological harm which might be 
done by trying to make the Comanches defy one of their well- 
established superstitions, quietly let the matter drop.
Dissension among the Indian Allies 
in New Mexico
While the Concha administration saw no break in the 
excellent relations of the Spaniards with all four of the 
friendly bârbaros nations, Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and 
Jicarillas, there were troubles among the Indian allies.
As early as 1789, there were repeated incidents all caused 
by Ute raids on the Comanche horse herds. The Comanches,
^^Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, July 22,
1788, S.A.N.M., no. 1015.
^®I_d. to id., Valle de San Bartolomé, January 28,
1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1039.
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becoming thoroughly annoyed, followed the Utes after one 
raid in July, 1789, and destroyed a Ute rancheria. The Ute 
survivors fled to Concha, who managed to call in represen­
tatives of both nations and smooth over that particular in­
cident. The governor had no conviction that real tranquil­
lity could be established, however, because it was extremely 
difficult to control the young men of either nation. All he 
could do was to minimize friction between them, avoiding the 
general war which would inevitably place New Mexico in the
center of the battle, and could quite possibly destroy the 
49province.^
Meanwhile, the Comanches pursued with considerable 
zest their campaigns against the Apaches. In combination 
with campaigns by Concha's forces, the offensive was so ef­
fective that in July, 1790, the governor could report that 
the Natagées had made only two entradas into New Mexico 
since the previous November; in one of those instances, the
raiders had been successfully followed and punished for hav­
ening stolen three animals at Bernalillo. A Spanish party
of one hundred fifty men left Santa Fe in July, 1790, to
campaign against the Natagees, but they combed the mountains
61until August ended without finding any Apaches at all.
^^Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Fe, November 18, 
1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1064.
^®Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 14, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 
1087. ■”
51ld. to id., Santa Fe, September 7, 1790, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1090.
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The following year saw pressure on the Apaches from still 
another direction, with one thousand Comanche warriors as­
sembled in the Taovayas region to campaign against the eas­
tern division of the Apaches (Lipans, Mescaleros, and Lipi- 
yanes.)
The Natagées were impressed enough to come in May, 
1792, to El Paso to dicker almost a week about peace. But 
they returned to their rancherias without making any com­
mitment , and the Spaniards soon learned that the Natagées, 
Lipans, and Llaneros had contracted an alliance with the
Utes against the Comanches. Their immediate objective was
53a campaign for vengeance into the Comanche country. The 
viceroy was so disturbed at the report of the combination of 
the Utes with the hostile Apaches that he ordered, if the 
rumor be true, that the Lipan chief Calvo be taken into cus­
tody and sent to Chihuahua to prevent him from carrying out
54.the plan.
The Comanches apparently solved the problem for 
themselves by maintaining such a strong offensive against 
the Apache country that the Ute-Apache coalition never had 
a chance to mount its proposed campaign. In May, 1792,
52Pedro de Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, July 22, 1791, 
8.A.N.M., no. 1135.
^^Don Domingo Diaz to Nava, El Paso, April 30, 1792, 
S.A.N.M., no. 1196
54.Nava to Concha, Janos, December 8, 1792, S.A.N.M.,
no. 1219.
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Ecueracapa came by Santa Pe to inform the governor that he
was leading a war party of one hundred warriors against the
Lipans, Lipiyanes and Llaneros, in the region of the Nueces
55and San Saba rivers. Concha contributed forty carbines
and a supply of munitions to the war party. Many of the
Apaches from the Nueces and.San Saba area were at that time
camped near El Paso, waiting to see whether the viceroy would
grant the peace which they had come to s o l i c i t , H o w e v e r ,
Ecueracapa*s force successfully raided the three rancherias
which they found, and put to flight some Apache parties
which they encountered on the plains. They brought home
thirteen captives and many horses, winning the oongratula-
57tions of the Spanish government on their success.
The ascendancy of the Comanches continued to annoy 
the Utes, Since nothing had come of their alliance with the 
Apaches, the Utes turned in 1793 to their old enemies, the 
Navajos, and those two nations joined forces to attack the 
Comanches, Finding a Comanche camp where the men were ab­
sent on a buffalo hunt, they destroyed it,, capturing or 
killing the women and children, and stealing all the horses,
A considerable Comanche force set out for vengeance, found
^^Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Pe, July 20, 1792, 
S.A.N.M., no, 1200,
^^Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, August 6, 1792, S.A.N.M,, 
no, 1205,
57Concha to Nava, Santa Pe, November 10, 1792, S,A, 
N.M., no, 1218,
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a Ute rancheria. and destroyed it. Concha, relieved that 
hoth battles had taken place at a great distance from New 
Mexico, and that the score seemed even on both sides at the 
moment, hoped to reconcile the quarrel before the Comanches 
had time to seek vengeance in the Navajo country. To that 
end, he ordered the Navajos to bring all their Comanche 
captives into Santa ?e to be restored to their tribe.
Governor Concha was succeeded by Fernando Chacon in
1794. After that time a deterioration seems to have begun 
in the New Mexican relations with the indios barbaros.
Whether this was due in part to the change in administration, 
or solely to the increasing tensions surrounding the prov­
ince, is problematical. As noted above, the ascendancy of 
the Comanches goaded their traditional enemies, the Utes and 
Navajos, into hostilities against the Comanches, and almost 
certainly into some resentment towards the Spanish govern­
ment as well.
New Pressures from the North Test the Comanches 
and the Spaniards Alike
The Comanches themselves were subject to increasing 
pressures from powerful and well-armed plains tribes to the 
north, the Osages and Pawnees. New Mexico tried to meet the 
Pawnee threat in 1794 by sending Pedro Vial to establish 
good relations with the Pawnees, but no permanent connection
^®Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Pe, May 6, 1793, 
S.A.N.M., no. 1234.
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KOwas achieved. In 1795, Vial, then an employee of the 
Spanish government in New Mexico, returned to the Pawnee 
villages and established a peace agreement between the Paw­
nees and C o m a n c h e s . I n  the same year, the Osages were 
turned over to the trader, Pierre Chouteau, who managed to 
establish an unprecedented degree of tranquillity among 
them. He made peace agreements between his Osage charges 
and the Kansas, Pawnees, and C o m a n c h e s . T h e s e  measures 
helped in some degree to relieve the pressures upon the Co­
manches, and therefore upon New Mexico.
The Comanches gained reinforcements on their northern 
perimeter about 1790 when they made peace with the Kiowas, 
newcomers to the plains. The two nations held much terri­
tory in common thenceforth, although the Kiowas usually 
camped more in the northwest in the region of the Arkansas 
River, while the Comanches now inclined to range more in the 
region of the Llano Estacado, from the Texas frontier to New
r  p
Mexico and far to the south.
5Q ,Nava to Governor Fernando Chacon, Chihuahua, De­
cember 31, 1794, S.A.N.M., no. 1303a.
^^Zenon Trudeau to Senor Baron de Carondelet, St. 
Louis, July 4, 1795, in Before Lewis and Clark: Documents
Illustrating the History of the Missouri. 1785-1804 ed. by 
A. P. Nasatir (Ôt. Louis, 1952), I, 329-330.
G^Id. to id., St. Louis, April 18, 1795, ibid., 320- 
321. ----
6 2James Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa Indi­
ans ," Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American 
Ethnolo'gy. Ft. 1 (Washington. 1898). 162.
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The new pressures from the north and east made the 
Comanche alliance more vital than ever to the New Mexicans, 
for the Comanches constituted the buffer which protected New 
Mexico from the warlike Osages and Pawnees, and from the 
increasingly aggressive Americans and Englishmen operating 
in the fur trade in the Mississippi Valley. The Comanche 
peace in Texas was broken in 1791,^^ but since this had al­
ways been quite imperfect, and the real center of control 
had been in New Mexico, the incident did not cause deep a- 
larm. Real concern arose among the Spaniards in 1794, when 
there occurred the first breach in the New Mexican peace 
with the Comanches. A Comanche war party, operating in the 
area of the Rio Grande presidio to attack the Lipan Apaches, 
stole some horses at the presidio. Other little robberies 
by the Comanches occurred in the region of the presidio of 
Aguaverde, and all along the Coahuila frontier. The acts 
were called to the attention of the chiefs, who were thus 
given a chance to control and punish their own people, but 
with the warning that future offenses would be punished by 
Spanish troops.
The uneasy Spaniards feared that the American strate­
gy now would be to gain the friendship and alliance of the
^^Luis de Blanc to Don Estevan Miro, Natchitoches, 
March 30, 1791, in Spain in the Mississippi Valley ed. by 
Kinnaird, II, 409.
^^Nava to Chacon, Chihuahua, January 27, 1795, S.A. 
N.M., no. 1308.
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Indians of New Mexico, especially the Comanches, as a first 
step to conquest of New Spain, Chacon was ordered to keep 
in close contact with the Comanches, keeping them dependent 
on the Spaniards and forestalling all American moves in 
their direction.Fortunately, though some depredations 
continued, no real break with the Comanches occurred, and 
they continued through 1800 to cooperate with the Spaniards 
in campaigns against the hostile A p a c h e s . T h a t  the Co­
manches continued to honor the terms of their peace with 
Anza was evidenced in 1799, when the eastern chief, Jampiri- 
nanpe, came to Pecos. He had been elected the general chief 
by all the other Comanche chiefs, so he came to Pecos to 
receive the baton which would be the insignia of his author­
ity, and royal recognition. He received also the lavish
gifts which were designed to identify his interests with the 
67Spanish cause.
New Mexican relations with the Navajos were far from 
satisfactory during the Chacon administration, although as 
late as 1795 they were actively aiding in policing New
^^Id. to id.. Chihuahua, January 31, 1795, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1309.
^^Chacôn to Nava, Santa Fe, November 19, 1797, S.A. 
N.M., no, 1405; Joseph Manuel de Ochoa to Chacon, Rio de 
Pecos Abajo del Bosque, December 27, 1800, S.A.N.M., no. 
1521.
67Chacon to Nava, Santa Fe, November 18, 1799, S.A. 
N.M., no. 1404.
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68Mexico against Apache incursions. The powerful pressures
gqof the Gilas upon them continued strong. In 1796 there 
occurred a Navajo uprising, staged in concert with the Gila 
Apaches. Some breakdown in Spanish intelligence occurred,
3 0 that Chac6n had no idea that an insurrection was pending 
in the Navajo country. The governor was ordered to do every­
thing in his power to win the Navajos back to peace, and if 
that failed, to concentrate on preserving the alliance with
the Comanches, Jicarillas and Utes, and to use them against 
70the Navajos. By 1799 the Navajos were brought to a very
shaky peace with New Mexico, but they were continuing to rob
in the Jémez area. Chacon tried to keep friction to a min-
71imum by preventing settlement near the Navajo country. In
May, 1800, the Navajo situation had grown so troublesome
that Chacon led a force of five hundred men into the Navajo
country. The Navajos soon came to terms, promising to end
their hostilities and their alliance with other barbaros.
72and to resume their general trade with New Mexico. But
^®Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 15, 1795, S.A.N.M., no.
1335.
^^Id. to id., Santa Fe, November 19, 1793, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1266.
*^^Nava to Chacon, Chihuahua, July 8, 1796, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1366.
^^Chacon to Nava, Santa Fe, November 18, 1799, S.A. 
N.M., no. 1471.
^^Id. to id., Socorro, June 21, 1800, S.A.N.M., no.
1492.
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7"5they began hostilities again in 1803, and several Spanish 
campaigns were necessary before they sued for peace in 
1805.^^ This settlement marked a reasonably stable renewal 
of their alliance with the Spaniards,
No general peace with the Apaches was ever achieved 
in the Provincias Internas. In 1796, Apache depredations
73occurred in the lower Rio Grande settlements of New Mexico.
In 1797 the Mescaleros treacherously broke the peace which
they had contracted at El Paso, and united with the Lipi-
yanes and Faraones to harry the Spanish settlements. Gila
Apache groups continued their depredations in New Mexico to
the end of the century, although they frequently protested
77intentions of making peace in the province. Bad faith 
was so often displayed by the Apaches that in 1798 the com­
mander general ordered Chacon not to admit to peace in New
n ’zPedro Bautista Pino, Exposicion, in Three New Mexi­
co Chronicles; The Exposicion of Don Pedro Bautista Pino. 
1812; the O.jeada of lie. Antonio Bareiro. 183^: and the 
additions by Don Jose Augustin de Escudero. 1849. ed. by 
J. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (Albuquerque, 
1942), 152-133.
^^Governor Joaquin del Real Alencaster to Comandante- 
General Nemesio Salcedo, Santa Pe, May 15, 1805, S.A.N.M,, 
no. 1828.
^^Nava to Chacon, Chihuahua, July 8, 1796, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1366.
^^Id. to id., Chihuahua, October 19, 1797, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1399.
^^Chacon to Nava, Santa Pe, November 18, 1799, S.A, 
N.M., no. 1471.
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Mexico the Lipans, Lipiyanes, Llaneros, or Mescaleros. They 
had too often pretended to make peace in order to take re­
fuge at Spanish presidios from Comanche invasions. In Fe­
bruary, 1798, the Lipanes had made peace at the Rio Grande 
presidio, then made war posing as Faraones and Llaneros.
Their common practice of making peace in one Spanish prov­
ince and using it as a safe base for depredations against 
other provinces had finally led to a policy which virtually
npiexcluded consideration of Apache peace overtures.
Conclusions
Obviously, then, the successes of New Spain in deal­
ing with the indios barbares on her northern frontier were 
never perfect. But if total peace with the barbares was 
never achieved, certainly by the end of the eighteenth cen­
tury there no longer existed the state of siege which had 
almost destroyed the interior provinces in the first eighty 
years of the century. That no general outbreak of the bar­
bares ever occurred was in itself a triumph for the Spani­
ards, and the sporadic Apache depredations could now be 
countered with effective action by the forces of Spain and 
her Indian allies.
This equilibrium of the forces of Spain and the in­
dios bârbaros evolved over the eighteenth century in a series
'^^Nava to Chacon, Chihuahua, April 19, 1798, S.A.N.M., 
no. 1416.
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of distinct stages. The initial stage saw the Spaniards 
falling heir to the traditional warring-trading relationship 
which their Pueblo vassals had long maintained with the A- 
paches and Navajos who lived on the periphery of the Rio 
Grande agricultural region. The second stage became much 
more complex, for the Utes and Comanches pressed in from the 
north, driving the Apaches from their northern and eastern 
ranges into the Spanish frontier, where they had to fight 
for their existence. Trade with the Apaches was almost 
totally disrupted, and war with them became far more serious. 
However, the Apache problem became secondary in New Mexico 
to that of survival against the Utes and Comanches who now 
threatened the very life of the province. The Apaches, 
driven steadily to the south, began to menace the existence 
of the southern tier of the Provincias Internas.
overwhelmed by the diversity and numbers of the in­
dios bârbaros. the Spaniards could survive only by playing 
off Indian enemies against each other. In the 1720's there 
was briefly considered the possibility of alliance with the 
Apaches to halt the Comanche-Ute invasion. But the problems 
of dealing with the amorphous Apache bands were deemed in­
surmountable. The Spaniards decided at mid-century to gam­
ble instead on alliance with the Comanches to vanquish the 
Apaches.
The pattern of Spanish alliances with the indios 
bârbaros dates back to 1720, when both the Navajos and the
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Jicarilla Apaches were driven to Spanish alliance as the 
only refuge from the Comanches. By 1740, the Utes broke 
with the Comanches and turned to Spanish alliance to bolster 
them against their former allies. The system of alliances 
became truly effective in 1786, when Anza brought the Co­
manches into firm alliance with the Spaniards. The Coman­
ches were then used to break the power of the Apaches, and 
also to hold less powerful tribes to Spanish allegiance for 
protection from the Comanches. The peace achieved with the 
Comanches in New Mexico was probably as important to the 
survival and control of the Provincias Internas as the first 
alliances of Cortés had been to the conquest of the Aztec 
empire.
This represents, however, only a skeletal outline of 
the story of Spain and the indios bârbaros. The story is 
richly illustrative of the importance and effectiveness of 
personal diplomacy in dealing with Indian populations, for 
the Spanish successes were due not to great military force 
but to the creative diplomacy of a few outstanding officials, 
such as Thomas Vêlez Cachupîn, Athanas© de Mézières, Juan 
Bautista de Anza, and Bernardo de Galvez.
Underlying this history of manipulation of Indian 
populations to establish control of a strategic frontier are 
the ethical assumptions upon which Spanish Indian policy was 
based. The Crown required that all of its Indian popula­
tions should be regarded as potential converts and vassals.
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and honestly tried to protect the native peoples from the 
Spanish settlers and soldiers. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, wars of conquest against the Indians were barred, 
and only defensive actions were permitted. It was required 
that gentle means be preferred to force in dealing with the 
Indians whenever possible. Violence against women, chil­
dren, and infirm members of the indios bârbaros was prohi­
bited, with severe penalties assessed against colonials who 
were guilty of such excesses. All possible material assis­
tance was given to encourage groups of the indios bârbaros 
who were willing to try settled agricultural life. In com­
merce, steps were taken to protect the indios bârbaros from 
the extortionate practices of the settlers and Pueblos.
The study embodies as well the effect upon the 
Spanish frontier and its Indian population of the expanding 
French, English, and American frontiers. International 
rivalries, sometimes for local wealth and sometimes for con­
siderations of world empire, operated at all times to shape 
the relations of Spain and the indios bârbaros,
The ethno-historical importance of this segment of 
northern borderlands history is far-reaching. Here are 
shown the impacts of European livestock and technology on 
the indios bârbaros, and the ferment of Indian population 
movements which were set in motion by the diffusion of those 
elements and by the encroachments of European immigrants.
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The significance to the history of the United States 
frontier of the eighteenth-century relations of Spain with 
the indios barharos can hardly be exaggerated. As the 
United States acquired the territories ranged by the Coman­
ches, Apaches, and other bârbaros. they acquired Indian 
tribes which had been dealing for more than a century with 
the European powers represented on this continent. These 
Indians had in a very brief span of time revolutionized 
their cultures under the European impact, and they had in 
some cases assumed definite responsibilities as parties to 
treaties and as allies. That these factors were not well 
comprehended by the United States government was the root 
of tragedy in the latter nineteenth century. An understand­
ing of that historical background is today vital to sound 
perspective in the writing of the history and ethno-history 
of the Indians of the United States.
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